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Corporate and Product Identity in the
Postnational Economy: Rethinking
U.S. Trade Laws
Lan Cao

In the global economy, a General Motors automobile may involve
South Korean assembly; Japanese engines; German design and style engineering; Taiwanese, Singaporean, and Japanese small components; British
advertising and marketing; and Irish and Barbadian data processing.
What is the country of origin of this product? How should U.S. trade laws
evaluate a product's origin, if it is a global composite with research,
assembly, processing, and manufacturing performed in different countries?
Similarly, corporations have become increasingly global in orientation and
operations. Even "national" corporations have lost their territorial ties to
the state of their nationality. Through a phenomenon termed "global
outsourcing" and foreign direct investment, and as a result of the transformation of the economy from an industrial to a postindustrial one, corporations are engaging in global webs of cross ownership and strategic
alliances outside their home territories.
The trade laws of the U.S. are replete with references to "domestic
industry, " "domestic" corporations, and "domestic" products. U.S. trade
laws, like those of other countries in the world trading system, remain
rooted in antiquated understandings of "nationality" and "national
origin. " Without a thorough reassessment of these two concepts, the U.S.
responds to the challenges posed by globalization in a piecemeal manner,
its trade laws vacillating between the pull of nationalism and internationalism. The Article proposes an alternative that balances the current global
reality with the nationalist call for a return to the local. To the extent that a
"national" market can still be accurately identified, its identification does
not come from the traditional conceptions of a national corporation or a
national product, but from the one factor in the production process that is
still territorial rather than globally oriented: the national workforce. Any
company that meets what is termed a substantial socioeconomic participation test should be granted the benefits of nationality available under U.S.
trade laws.
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A product's "national origin" should also be reassessed. Despite
calls from nationalists to fortify national boundaries to protect domestic
products and industry, products that are globally sourced are in fact the
products of no one country in particular. Country-of-origin designations
thus merely perpetuate this chimera of nationality in a world of internationality. The Article proposes to revise the interpretation of current rules
to accomplish two objectives: first, to reflect the emergence of the postindustrial economy, and second, to address the nationalist fault lines required to ensure the continued political survival of the current trading
system.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult to determine the
national origin of a product or the nationality of a corporation. Products
appear to be made everywhere and also nowhere in particular, as shown on
the following computer circuit label: "Made in one or more of the
following countries: Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan,
Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines. The exact country of
origin is unknown." 1
Similarly, corporations with a global presence have become increasingly denationalized, that is, unbounded by the territorial borders of their
state of nationality. Even corporations that have been identified with a particular country may no longer be as "nationally" identified. "Americans
may know that Jaguar cars are now American. But do they know that
Burger King or Winchell's Donuts are British?"2 Indeed, global corporations now wish to present themselves not as nationals of a state but rather,
as cosmopolitans of the world. A former executive of IBM was quoted as
saying, "[f]or business purposes the boundaries that separate one nation
from another are no more real than the equator. They are merely
convenient demarcations of ethnic, linguistic and cultural entities .... Once
management accepts this world economy, its view of the marketplace-and
its planning-necessarily expand ...." 3 Cross-border alliances and production have blurred the national identity of enterprises and products.
Without a thorough understanding of these developments, many countries, the United States included, still maintain trade policies that are often
disjointed and contradictory. For example, in 1991, the U.S. Customs
Services refused to designate as ''North American" Hondas built in Ohio
I. BENJAllnN R. BARBER, JIHAD vs. McWoRLD 14 (1995).
2. Michael Mann, Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: DiversifYing, Developing,
Not Dying, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at 115, 132. Winchell's Donut House is currently owned by
Shato Holdings, a British Columbia company.
3. Quoted in Tom Nairn, Internationalism and the Second Coming, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993,
at 155, 157.
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and Ontario, charging that the Hondas at issue had less than 50% local
content (a requirement of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement) and
hence would not qualify for duty-free treatment when shipped from
Honda's plant in Canada to the United States. The fact that Honda's operations in the United States at the time included a $2.2 billion central Ohio
complex that supported a payroll of $7.3 million for 10,000 workers4 was
not significant to the Customs determination. 5
While U.S. Customs was charging that Honda Civics built in
Marysville, Ohio, were not sufficiently North American, the United States
was trying to convince the Europeans that Honda Accords also made in
Marysville, Ohio, and shipped to the European market were all-American.
The Bush Administration argued that the U.S.-assembled Hondas could not
be included in the European Community and French quotas on Japanese
imports because "the nameplate doesn't matter. This is an American car."6
The United States, like other countries, is ill-equipped to address a
fundamental issue that underlies trade laws today-how to think about
nationality in a postnational and increasingly internationally integrated
world. 7 Despite the globalization of economics, the assumption underlying
the trade laws of most countries is that the competitiveness of their national
economy is essentially tied to the competitiveness of their "national" companies8 as a matter of course. Yet, as a General Motors executive remarked,
"[w]hat's nationality got to do with it anyway?" 9 Globalization has transformed the very meaning of "nationality" and called into question the

4. Paul Magnusson eta!., Honda: Is It an American Car?, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1991, at 105.
5. As a result, Honda was faced with $20 million in back tariffs. And Canada, wishing to protect
the Canadian jobs provided by Honda's Alliston, Ontario plant, had prominent Canadians lined up to
defend Honda as North American and denounce U.S. action as "economic arson," Frederic P. Cantin &
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rules of Origin, The Canada-U.S. FTA, and the Honda Case, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 375, 383 n.37 (1993) (statement of Paul Martin, a Liberal Member of Parliament and the son of the
Minister for External Affairs in the government of Prime Minister Pearson), and "terrorism,"
Magnusson, supra note 4, at 105 (statement of the former president of the Canadian Automotive Parts
Manufacturers' Association), and U.S. officials as ''real thugs." /d. (statement of the former president of
the Canadian Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association).
6. Magnusson, supra note 4, at 106 (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills).
7. See, e.g., Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 230, 231-32 (1992)
(describing "a central notion of GATT: that all merchandise has a single nationality").
8. See, e.g., Laura D'Andrea Tyson, They Are Not Us: Why American Ownership Still Matters,
AM. I'ROSPEcr, Winter 1991, at 37 ("The tradition of identifying nations and corporations extends far
back into the past when corporations served the monarchs who gave them special charters."); Robert B.
Reich, Who Is Us?, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53.
9. Jenny King, Auto Industry Reaches the Point of Domestic BMWs and Toyotas and Imported
Chryslers, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1999, at 4. Consumer preferences, langnages, geography, temperature,
and safety standards might be influenced by nationality and thus might be relevant in a company's
business or marketing decision making. But the nationality of a corporation no longer has much to do
with where its products will be made.
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relationship between the state and the market, as states appear to relinquish
their power to a market that increasingly transcends national boundaries. 10
Indeed, the two gravitational centers of power in the international
order today, the state and the market, have spawned a complex configuration of ancillary and dualistic rivalries: nationalism versus internationalism, political versus economic, sovereignty and self-sufficiency versus
integration and interdependence. 11 For some, the state is thought to be the
sole or primary institutional entity that is capable of defending the political
ideals of nationalism and sovereignty against economic globalization,
where corporate production is easily globalized and manufacturing facilities are closed in one national jurisdiction and opened in the next. For others, the state's continued insistence on archaic categories, such as
nationalism and territorial frontiers, merely stands in the way of open borders, of greater trade liberalization and greater harmonization of national
laws deemed necessary for the removal of trade barriers. These recurrent
disciplinary rivalries between the state and the market-the politics of
identity versus the economics of profit12-are all the more pronounced now
because of the increasing globalization of production and the increasing
mobility of goods, services, and capital across, and without regard for,
national borders.
There are different responses to the apparent conflict between market
and state. Generally speaking, nationalists defend the state as the site for
politics, governance, and national cultures, and argue for a national trade
policy that defends the national market, national corporations, and national
products from the international by fortifying national borders. 13 This has
generally meant favoring protectionism against "foreign" companies and
"foreign" goods in favor of "domestic" ones. Nationalists advocate
national, at times even localized, particularistic identities, as championed
by the state 14 against cosmopolitan rootlessness, market expansions, and

10. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman observed that globalization has eroded ''the
traditional boundaries between politics, culture, technology, finance, national security and ecology."
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 15 (1999). Given the imperatives of the
global economy and ''the difficulty of government regulation of international economic
behavior .•. there is today hardly any subject that can be said to be effectively controlled by a single
national sovereign." John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J.lNT'L
EcoN. L. 17,24-25 (1996).
I I. See generally Nairn, supra note 3, at 159 ("Since the fall of Napoleon's empire, these two
world views have existed in a permanent, uneasy tension with one another, the Siamese twin brothers
of a single world-historical process.").
12. See BARBER, supra note 1, at 7.
13. For a discussion of the nationalist response, see infra Part 1.
14. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the state has been the site of personal identity. Yet, in recent
years, for many people, identity and loyalty are clustered around other nonstate forms, such as
ethnicity, religion, or tribe. Take, for example, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, Quebec, and
Indonesia, to name a few. See generally BARBER, supra note 1; see also infra note 30.
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global economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization
("WTO").
Internationalists, on the other hand, do not condemn globalization on a
wholesale scale, but rather defend internationalization and the international
order in various ways and at various levels. 15 The internationalist relationship with nationalism has ranged from suspicion and mistrust of nationalist
passion to attempts at managing and channeling nationalism in ways that
are acceptable to the internationalist sensibility. On the whole, aside from
the occasional call for a tighter regulatory framework, internationalists,
especially in the economic field, are more or less comfortable with an international economic system that transcends the national or the cultural in
order to insulate economic rationality against the interference of the state.
There are still other antiglobalization responses, both from the left and
the right, that are neither strictly nationalist nor internationalist but a populist mix of the two. 16 Witness the rise of grassroots movements that demand
a return to more meaningful forms of democratic participation and local
control-"the democratic taste for the neighborhood," 17 so to speak; or the
proliferation of religious, environmental, organized labor, student, and
other ad hoc groups, all opposed to economic globalization and the antinational, antisovereign, and antidemocratic tendencies perceived in international institutions such as the WTO. 18
Yet, current responses, whether nationalist, internationalist or a mix
thereof, have been inadequate for two separate but interrelated reasons.
First, they do not pay sufficient attention to the impact globalization has
had on the way corporations conduct themselves-that is, globally and not
just nationally, resulting in an increasing disassociation between the corporation's activities and its state of nationality. Similarly, products are no
longer produced in one or even two countries but are often composites of
parts, each designed, assembled, processed, or manufactured in different
national jurisdictions. These developments have eroded, as a practical
15. For a discussion of the internationalist response, see infra Part I.
16. A much more blunt characterization of the antiglobalists was offered in Jim Chen,
Globalization and its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157 (2000).
17. Benjamin R. Barber, Constitutional Faith, in FOR LovE OF COUNTRY 34-35 (Joshua Cohen
ed., 1996). Communitarians, for example, bemoan the emptiness ofliberal cosmopolitanism and urge a
return to a society marked less by "'the politics of difference,"' Richard Rorty, The Unpatriotic
Academy, BALTIMORE SuN, Feb. 17, 1994, at 19A, and more by "the emotion of national pride," id.,
and "the idea of a national identity," id., joined by "habits of the heart." AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT
OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, REsPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 24 (1993).
18. Globalization vs. Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999, at Al5 (advertisement number two in a
series on economic globalization for The Turning Point Project, http://www.turnpoint.org) ("With the
emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO), democracy has moved to the back burner. It no
longer matters what democratic societies want; what matters is what global corporations want, as
expressed and enforced by global trade bureaucracies in Geneva.") The Turning Point project is a broad
coalition of environmental, labor, religious, and other disparate groups opposed to globalization. The
ads are posted on the group's web site.
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matter, the structures needed to maintain distinctions between the
"national" and the "foreign." This fact should have profound implications
for trade laws and policies, which are still anachronistically premised on a
clear distinction between what constitutes "national" corporations and
"national" products versus "foreign" corporations and "foreign" products.
Yet, the nationalist response to these developments is merely to reinforce the boundaries of the national at the expense of the international; that
is, to make corporations be more national in orientation even while the
market is global; or to promote national products even though the national
identity of a product is less than clear. Conversely, the internationalist response is merely to proceed along the current globalized order, even expand the boundaries of the international and insist on more liberalization,
without regard to the rifts among groups within and among nations nor the
antitrade, anti-international backlash 19 that has deepened as a result of
globalization.2°
Second, current responses to globalization also fail to effectively address the distributional fault lines sparked by global transformations. As I
argue below, the nationalist tendency to erect barriers to international economic movements is counterproductive because it is wealth decreasing for

19. See generally Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 217 (1998) (discussing how and
why productive arrangements might generate political backlash and complicate economic analysis); G.
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade
Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 907 (1995) ("Any governance structure for global trade that focuses
too narrowly on maximizing wealth without taking into account distributional consequences is likely to
encounter strong, perhaps even violent, resistance from the lowers in the distributional tug-of-war.'').
Antitrade protests in recent years include the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in November 1999, see The
Battle in Seattle, THE EcoNor.nST, Nov. 27, 1999, at 21, the anti-Summit of the Americas protests in
Quebec in April200I, see Alfredo S. Lanier, Unfair? Free Market Is Still the Best Option, CHI. TRIB.,
May 27, 2001, at IC, and the labor-led antiglobalization protests in Washington D.C. in April 2000
against the China trade bill and other international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, see
Joseph Kahn, Unions Prepare to Hit the Street in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,2000, atA16.
20. A new globalized world where companies could easily move production facilities to lowerwage countries has meant a "shifting of opportunities for wealth and incomes from the older, richer
societies to the poorer ones," WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NoT: THE MANIC LoGIC OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 42 (1997), hence a concomitant sense of anxieties among the working and middle
classes in the advanced, economically developed world.
Antitrade critics like Greider, however, tend to ignore the benefits to "older, richer" societies that
free trade still brings. Free international trade generally benefits people of all countries, whether rich or
poor; it benefits consumers, productive workers, workers in competitive sectors, and productive and
efficient firms. Trade also pushes a country, rich or poor, either to improve any domestic sector that is
economically inefficient and lagging, or in the alternative, to transfer resources to those sectors in
which it has a comparative advantage. In the process, there are those who are displaced if they are in an
industry that lacks a comparative advantage. The solution is not to succumb to protectionism. Workers
displaced could instead simply be given direct transfer payments or cash compensation. See John 0.
McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REv. 511, 520-25
(2000). For a summary of the positive effects of increased international trade, see JuNICHI GoTO,
LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON JAPANESE-AMERICAN ISSUES 82
(1990). See also infra note 84.
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rich as well as poor countries. 21 On the other hand, the internationalist tendency to disregard the significance of nation and national constituents with
territorially based attachments is also counterproductive because it fails to
address effectively the fact that in this epoch of globalization, labor is for
the most part territorially bound, hence most concretely associated with the
nation, while capital is increasingly global, hence less so. The internationalist thus must come up with a response that defends unequivocally the free
trade norms of international economic law but at the same time revises,
where feasible, international trade rules to allow considerations of legitimate nationally based interests in ways that do not promote economic nationalism or protectionism.
This Article provjdes a proposal that would resolve these difficulties.
The Article sets forth an alternative to the conventional national and international responses to the postnational economic system. Part I discusses
the nationalist and internationalist positions. It highlights the intellectual
traditions, characteristic sensibilities, and biases in these two intellectual
disciplines and explores the dichotomous responses to globalization each
has promoted. Part II frames the nationalist and internationalist debate
within the context of globalization in trade, production, and investment. It
explores how the global logic of commerce and capital has changed the
meaning of "nationality" and the relationship between market and state
actors in both economically developed and underdeveloped regions. 22 In
this way, Part II demonstrates that international economic law generally,
and U.S. trade law particularly, should be re-evaluated in light of these
transformations. Part III proposes a new framework to address and manage
the conceptual difficulties involved in defining the "national" in a postnational economic system. This proposal is designed to achieve two objectives: first, to reassess the concept of "nationality" and "national origin" in
trade law and second, through this revised understanding of"nationality,"23

21. Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States with
Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 539, 550 (1993)
("[P]rotectionism raises prices, entrenches inefficiency and destroys more jobs than it saves.").
22. I will use the terms "economically developed," the "North," the "First World," the
"industrialized countries," or ''rich" countries interchangeably in this Article. "Economically
undeveloped," "developing countries," the "Third World," the "South," or "poor" countries will be
used interchangeably.
23. As opposed to through the adoption of redistributive tax laws, or through the incorporation of
the social compact under United Nations ("U.N.") auspices and stressing a code of conduct for
multinational corporations in their labor practices. For a discussion of progressive taxation as a means
of addressing the needs of lower-skilled workers in the United States faced with competition from the
global economy, see Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation,
"Globalization," and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 731 (2000). While progressive taxation
may be appealing if the focus is on the rich and poor in one country, for example the United States, the
issue becomes more complicated when international questions are considered to include not just the
rich and poor in the United States, but the poor in the developing world. For a discussion of labor and
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to strike the necessary balance between the national and the international,
the state and the market.
Part Ill addresses the need to reassess corporate nationality. Given the
ease with which products and technology, capital and corporations cross
national boundaries, national labels as traditionally understood can no
longer be accurately worn. To the extent that a "national" market can still
be accurately identified at all, its identification does not come from the traditional conceptions of a national corporation, but from the one factor in
the production process that is still territorial rather than globally oriented: the national workforce and its ties to the national and local community where it is located. Consequently, companies that meet what I term a
"domestic participation" test, that is, substantial participation in the national and local community in which they conduct their businesses,24
should be granted the benefits of nationality (including a newly proposed
"participation offset" right),25 regardless of whether they are in fact incorporated in that state, whether the seat of management decision making is in
that state, or whether the majority of their shareholders or directors are nationals of that state. 26 This revision is designed to bring into the global terrain of international economics the territorially based considerations, such
as those represented by the interests of community and labor.
Part Ill also suggests ways to re-examine product nationality through
a reassessment of national origin rules. I propose general guidelines for
trade, see Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes, Labor Standards and Global Governance: Examining
the Dimensions ofinstitutional Engagement, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 259, 262 (2000).
At the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, even the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan issued a rejection of linking trade and labor standards within the WTO, offering the following
compact to business instead: the U.N. would '"make the case for and maintain an environment which
favors trade and open markets.'" Id. at 266 (quoting UN press release SG/SM/6881/Rev.l, Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General of the U.N., address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 1 February
1999).
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.A.2. The participation offset right, in brief, would entitle companies deemed
domestic under the domestic participation test to be exempt from the payment of rules of origin tariffs
as well as those additionally imposed pursuant to the various import relieflaws and the so-called unfair
trade laws-to the extent that the calculated value of the company's domestic participation exceeds the
amount of duties owed. From a practical standpoint, a participation certificate denominated with a
certain face value could be issued to the company (the value of the certificate would vary depending on
the degree of participation of that company). The certificate would be the equivalent of a "free pass,"
allowing the company to have the freedom to import whichever products it chooses, up to the amount
of the certificate, without having to pay tariffs and charges that would otherwise have been owed
pursuant to various trade laws. For a discussion of whether this proposal is consistent with General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") obligations, see infra note 255.
26. This proposal accords with recent theories on nationality and citizenship, favoring an
interpretation of nationality not formalistically but effectively, "having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties." Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (second phase), 1955 I.C.J.
4, at 23 (Apr. 6). Corporations that demonstrate a level of participation or embeddedness in the national
economy of a state will be granted the benefits of nationality under that state's trade laws.
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rethinking the rules of origin in a way that will foreground distribution concerns more effectively. As Part III makes clear, rules of origin have
become so politicized, unwieldy, and convoluted that the profound impact
they have on poor countries and high-volume workers in rich countries is
hidden by a facade of technical and seemingly innocuous details. In my
sketch of an alternative set of origin rules, I emphasize the ways in which
the rules could be revised (1) to reflect more accurately the postmanufacturing economy and (2) to spread the benefits of international trade more
evenly. The critique and proposal for reform are meant to be applicable to
the international trading system as a whole, although I intend to focus on
the United States merely for purposes of illustration.
Reassessing the concept of nationality along the lines I propose is
necessary to address, on a practical level, the fact that nationality has been
muddled by globalization. At the same time, by conferring the grant of
domestic nationality on any global corporation that demonstrates a level of
participation in the national economy, the proposal achieves the additional
objective ofbringing into focus a balance between the global and the local,
the international and the national, the market and the state, capital and labor-without favoring either unchecked globalization on the one hand, or
economic nationalism and protectionism on the other hand. Using a revised
understanding of "nationality," I argue for a return to the national and the
relevance of place in a way that is not antimarket and anti-international.
I
NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

A thorough study of nationalism and internationalism, and of each
discipline's history and development, is beyond the scope of the Article.
Instead, my aim in this Part is merely to highlight the competing sets of
ideas that give each discipline its respective zeitgeist or characteristics. Nationalism and internationalism have long vied for intellectual dominance. 27
Nationalism is itself a contested term subject to multiple meanings and interpretations,28 and no unitary definition or description is possible. For
27. E.g.,WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297
(1964) (identifYing in this landmark book two categorical imperatives termed modern state-nationalism
Between
"Alliance"
and
and
modern
internationalism);
Nathaniel
Berman,
"Localization": Nationalism and the New Oscillationism, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 449, 449
(1994) (describing the "international legal preoccupation with nationalism"); Thomas M. Franck, Clan
and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 359
(1996) ("In historical terms, both nationalism and transnational regimes have long bid (sometimes
competitively) for the adherence of persons."); S.R. Insanally, Nationalism: No Longer a Domestic
Dispute, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 439, 440 (1994) ("There is nothing new about the
tension ... between internationalism, which the United Nations above all personifies, and
nationalism.").
28. See generally Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 7, 7 (1995) ("[Nationalism] means such different things to different people. There are many areas
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some, nationalism lies in the realm of inventions: '"nationalism is not the
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they
do not exist. "'29 Nations themselves are not natural entities endowed with a
predestined physical existence.30 Although there has been much
intellectual debate over the origins of nationalism and the many historical
meanings the term has been associated with,31 nationalism now refers to
that which is associated with claims surrounding the international system
of nation-states or the rights of cultural, historical, or ethnic "nations"
aspiring for statehood.32 The nation as an entity is constructed around some
of disagreement."); John A. Hall, Nationalisms: Classified and Explained, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993,
at I ("[N]o single, universal theory of nationalism is possible."); Symposium, Reconstrncting Nations
and States, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993. For historical accounts of nationalism, see BENEDICT
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COM!IIUNmES: REFLECf!ONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM
(rev. ed. 1991) and ERIC HOBSBAW!II, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRA!II!IIE, MYTH,
REALITY (1990).
29. Hall, supra note 28, at4 (quoting ERNEST GELLER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 169 (1964)).
30. ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 49 (1983). For Gellner, it is inevitably
difficult to define a "nation," because the sociological attributes that make up the essence of "nation,"
common language, religion, etlmicity, are theiUSelves unfixed. ld. at 49 (''Nations are not inscribed into
the nature of things, they do not constitute a political version of the doctrine of natural kinds. Nor were
national states the manifest ultimate destiny of ethnic or cultural groups."). Gellner was highly critical
of Hegel's assertion that it is the destiny of nations to evolve into states. CARLTON J. H. HAYES, THE
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MODERN NATIONALISM 159 (1931) (describing the demands in Europe
"that each nationality should be a political unit under an independent constitutional govermnent which
would put an end to despotism, aristocracy, and ecclesiastical influence"); GEORG W. F. HEGEL,
LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WoRLD HISTORY 134 (H. B. Nisbet trans., 1975) (''Nations may
have had a long history before they finally reach their destination-i.e. that of forming theiUSelves into
states .•..").
Between nation versus state, "the term nation or tribe suggests an affinity group that has placed
certain values high on its agenda: shared genealogical origins, language and historic myths, as well as
cultural and, perhaps, religious compatibility." Franck, supra uote 27, at 362. States refer to a more
politically based form of association than one based on commonalities from past history. In this sense,
many states are not nation-states in the sense that they are multinational, for example, India, Canada,
Nigeria, and Switzerland. When the "nations" within the state wish to free theiUSelves from the state,
for example, "nation" is not interchangeable with "state" but rather, conflicts with "state." Before the
World War I peace and minorities treaties, see infra notes 42-47, international law, with its statist
foundation, was reluctant to recognize "nations." See, e.g., Nationality in International Law, 28
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS Soc'y 151, 151-52 (1943).
The word ''Nationality" does not mean what it says, nor does it say what it means.
Etymologically it would mean the condition of belonging to a nation, of being a national. In
International Law ''nations" are an unknown quantity•... The word "national," if used in
International Law, has a technical meaning ... [and] means a member or a subject of such a
State.
/d.
31. HoBSBAW!II, supra note 28, at 16-24 (noting the term "nation" has been used in reference to
nonstate identifications, such as guilds, corporations, feudal estates).
32. FRIEDMANN, supra note 27, at 21 ("More and more, from the sixteenth to the early twentieth
century, the national state, in many cases coalescing from the older and smaller entities of dukedoiUS,
principalities, and city republics, became the sole source of legal power and the exclusive focus of
political allegiance."). Nationalism in its current modem incarnation can be traced to the Wilsonian
post-World War I world composed of "people" who have a right to self-determination and by
implication their own nation-state. See WOODROW WILSON, The Fourteen Points Address (1918),
reprinted in 1 WAR AND PEACE 155 (1970); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Nationalism and
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common mooring, whether of language, ethnicity, religion, culture, or
some other essential characteristic33 upon which the state's "homogenizing
project''34 can be established. Nationalism in its simplest and most general
meaning may mean "simply that one identifies with the claims of one's
nations and one's co-nationals, and takes them as one's own."35
By contrast, internationalism is generally built around a different set
of preoccupations. In the United States especially, internationalism has
been linked to a liberal framework of cosmopolitanism. 36 Unlike the
nationalist whose identification is with the nation, the cosmopolitan's

Internationalism: The Wilsonian Legacy, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 493, 493 (1994). John
Maynard Keynes was particularly distressed at the balance struck in the Treaty of Versailles between
nationalism and internationalism. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A Revision ofthe Treaty, reprinted in 3
THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES I, 8 (Royal Econ. Soc'y Ed., 1971). Keynes
commented:
The Wilsonian dogma, which exalts and dignifies the divisions of race and nationality above
the bonds of trade and culture, and guarantees frontiers but not happiness, is deeply
embedded in the conception of the League ofNations as at present constituted. It yields us the
paradox that the first experiment in international government should exert its influence in the
direction of intensifYing nationalism.
/d.

33. Brilrnayer, supra note 28, at I 0 ("There is also controversy about what exactly the defining
characteristic of a nation is. A nation is an entity that is fairly homogeneous with respect to some
particular variable-it is a community that shares some attribute-but it is difficult to say precisely
which attribute that should be. The usual candidates are language, religion, ethnicity, culture, and race;
but for every potential defining characteristic, counterexamples can be found.").
34. Katherine Verdery, Whither "Nation" and "Nationalism", in DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at
37,43.
35. Brilmayer, supra note 28, at 8.
36. David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. lNT'L L. 9,
22-25 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Nationalism Versus Internationalism: Another Look, 26
N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L & PoL. 585, 585 (1994). As Professor Kennedy notes:
one generally does not find in the United States ... international lawyers who are also
nationalists. International law in the United States after I 945 provided a congenial intellectual
home for a large number of immigrants, among them European and Jewish refugees, whose
American patriotism was cosmopolitan rather than jingoistic and who have been among the
field's strongest intellectual leaders.
Kennedy, supra, at 23; see also id. at I I ("Legal internationalists in the United States for most of the
last 50 years have linked their status to the reputational ups and downs of a broadly liberal
cosmopolitanism ....").
Between the two, internationalism, rather than nationalism, is generally more friendly to the spirit
of cosmopolitanism. Writing about a universal international order composed of a cosmopolitan and
republican federation of liberal states governed by law, Immanuel Kant, for example, rejoiced in the
coming of a Weltbiirger (citizen of the world) and denounced "the demand of fools in Germany for
national pride." HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM: A STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS AND
BACKGROUND 401 (1944) (citing Kant's HANDSCHRIFrLICHER NACHLASS, No. 1099, at 489); Linda
Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 447, 494-95 (2000). Bosniak
argued:
The ethical cosmopolitan view, in its classical form, rejects particularist loyalties ... ; it is a
perspective committed to the well-being of humanity at large, rather than any particular
community of persons.... In such a view, therefore, grounding one's solidarity in the
nation-state is unacceptably narrow and parochial.
/d.
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"allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings.'m To the internationalist, nationalism is the "alien," the "other" whose unruly nature
and primitive urges are to be tamed and contained by, or managed within, a
modem and rational international order.38 Internationalism associates nationalism with "particularism and parochialism," and proclaims itself to be
allied with ''universalism and cosmopolitan sophistication.''39 The political
cosmopolitanism that underlies the international project has meant an overall preference for international or multilateral over bilateral or unilateral
approaches to problem solving.40 At the same time, even while fearing the
explosive forces of nationalism, internationalism also recognizes the need
to include and simultaneously tame, to appease and simultaneously shape
nationalist aspirations and demands by subjecting them to international law
and international legal authority.41 Indeed, for almost two hundred years,
international law has struggled to develop an effective framework of internationalist responses to nationalist conflicts through a variety of legal techniques to harness nationalism and contain sovereignty, such as
37. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FoR LoVE OF COUNTRY, supra
note 17, at 4. Cosmopolitanism has roots in the ancient Greek Stoics who favored a community that '"is
truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this comer nor to that, but measures the
boundaries of our nation by the sun."' Id. at 7 (citation omitted). Cosmopolitanism is also defined as
"[t]he belief in, and pursuit of, a style of life which ... [reveals] acquaintance with, and an ability to
incorporate, the manners, habits, languages, and social customs of cities throughout the world." RoGER
SCRUTON, A DICTIONARY OF PoLITICAL THOUGHT 100 (1982). Jeremy Waldron characterized a
cosmopolitan as someone who does not secure his or her sense of identity by deeply entrenched
moorings to any particular or bounded subset of place, culture, or tradition. Jeremy Waldron, Minority
Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992). For a classic
denunciation of the notion of world citizenship, see HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 89 (1968)
("A world citizen, living under the tyranny of a world empire, and speaking and thinking in a kind of
glorified Esperanto, would be no less a monster than a hermaphrodite.").
38. In a celebrated work, Professor Haus Kohn described nationalism thus:
Its roots seemed to reach into the dark soil of primitive times and to have grown through
thousands of hidden channels of unconscious development, not in the bright light of rational
political ends, but in the mysterious womb of the people, deemed to be so much nearer to the
forces of nature.
KoHN, supra note 36, at 331; see also Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair": European
Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1792, 1798, 1803
(1993) (describing the post-World War I conceptual framework as one designed to strike "a
paradoxical 'alliance' between turbulent nationalist passion and a newly autonomous international law"
because "'[p]eoples and nationalities' were viewed as seething cauldrons of unpredictable forces and
passions, rather than as sources of simple and rational first principles"). For the internationalist, the
national is primal and the international rational; "if faced with a choice between reason and belief, law
and politics, the secular and the sacred, to choose the first term is to build the international, to choose
the second is to reinforce the national." Kennedy, supra note 36, at 93.
39. Slaughter Burley, supra note 36, at 585.
40. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 23; Slaughter Burley, supra note 36, at 586.
41. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 38, at 1803 (discussing how the interwar lawyers "attempted to
rejuvenate law by opening it up to the vital energy of nationalism, while reshaping nationalism by
endowing it with legal form"); see a/so HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-47
(1952) (viewing internationalist as defending "internationalism and pacifism" over "natioualism and
imperialism").
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self-determination,42 international minority protections,43 internationalization through international administration, 44 supranational legal integration,45 mandates, 46 and universal human rights. 47
42. WILSON, supra note 32, reprinted in 1 WAR AND PEACE 159 (1970). One solution to address
the collapse of the European empires was to create "national" states. The creation of a Polish state from
areas with Polish populations was addressed in Wilson's Thirteenth Point. See also Damrosch, supra
note 32, at 493 ("Wilson gave expression to the nationalist aspirations of peoples around the world,
through his endorsement of the principle of self-determination. He also initiated the first institution that
had as its objective the organization of the international community to apply concerted power in
support of universal values.").
43. The redrawing of the European political map after World War I inevitably created minority
groups within the territorial borders of the new states. These new states were compelled to sign
minority protection treaties or to make declarations guaranteeing rights for their minority groups,
including civil rights for all and specific cultural, educational, and lingnistic autonomy rights for
minority group members. See generally INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES I6 (1955). There
were other attempts to administer minority identity within states. For example, in territories transferred
from German to Polish sovereignty, German nationals were to acquire Polish citizenship. However, the
plebiscite principle allowed German nationals over eighteen years of age to opt for German nationality
after two years. In deference to Poland's sovereign powers as a state, Poland was allowed to refuse
citizenship to certain residents of the new Polish territories. And Polish citizenship could be granted to
certain Poles outside the territory of Poland. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 91, 225 Consol.
T.S. 188,240-41.
44. When Britain relinquished its mandate over Palestine in 1947, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted Resolution 181, which provided for the partition of the territory and the internationalization of
Jerusalem. Jerusalem was to be placed under the administration of the U.N. Trusteeship Council, with
the following plans for the implementation of an international solution: the creation of two states, one
Arab, one Jewish, with self-determination rights; guarantees of minority protection for Jewish and Arab
minorities in the new states; supranational integration through the "Economic Union of Palestine,"
overseen by Arab, Jewish, and U.N. representatives; and internationalization subject to plebiscite
review by the residents after ten years. See Berman, supra note 38, at 1795-96.
45. Between 1919 and 1921, the area known as Upper Silesia, the territory divided between
Poland and Germany, was placed under international tutelage providing for temporary unity of the
region under a fifteen-year complex legal regime, which included the following arrangements: the
imposition of a plebiscite, with an International Commission conducting the vote and a Committee of
Experts and the Conference of Allied Ambassadors interpreting the results; the establishment of a
supranational regime that reflected parts of the two sovereigns' legal systems; extensive provisions for
minority rights; the creation of a quasi-internationallegal personality to residents of Upper Silesia; and
the establishment of mixed local and international tribunals. See generally Berman, supra note 38, at
1893-98.
The formation of the European Economic Community and the European Union might constitute
another example. See Mann, supra note 2, at 120-28.
46. International law responded to the collapse of European empires by formal recognition of
national states and minority rights protections. See supra notes 43 & 45. The non-European possessions
of the collapsed empires, deemed not yet ready for statehood, were subjected to the mandate system.
Treaty of Versailles, supra note 43, at 203. The mandate system was divided into Class A, B, and C
mandates. Class A mandates were composed of the former territories of the Ottoman Empires. These
former territories were deemed to "have reached a stage of development where their existence as
independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice
and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." !d. at 203. Accordingly,
the administering authorities had only nominal supervisory power over Class A mandates. Class B
mandates were made up of the former German colonies in Central Africa, and the administering
authorities had greater supervisory power over them. Other former German territories in Africa and the
Pacific were deemed Class C mandates and part of the territory of the mandatory, "subject to the
mandatory municipal law." Ramon E. Reyes Jr., Nauru v. Australia: The International Fiduciary Duty
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The contrasts between nationalism and internationalism have become
even more stark as a result of globalization. As Part ll will show, one might
characterize globalization as a hyper state of intemationalization.48 Thus it
is not surprising that nationalism and globalization might be viewed as
each other's antithesis. 49 For nationalists, globalization is associated with
an inevitable "move from public to private. The state will be weaker and
commerce will be strengthened"50 in ways that will result in the increasing
homogenization of social and economic relations51 and accordingly, the
dilution of national distinctiveness and control. The nationalist agenda thus
includes a vigorous defense of "a basic reality-that a major value of human life is a rootedness in place."52
and the Settlement of Nauro's Claims for Rehabilitation of its Phosphate Lands, 16 N.Y.L. ScH. J.
lNT'L & COMP. L. 1, 16 (1996).
47. The Versailles system had aimed towards the preservation of sovereignty, national identities,
and individual and minority rights. The system eventually collapsed and the international minority
protection system was replaced with the notion of universal individual human rights. Josef L. Kunz,
The Present Status of the International Law for the Protection of Minorities, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 282,
284 (1954).
48. Or, as antiglobalization critics may characterize it, "globalization is merely capitalism writ
large." Globalisation and Its Critics, THE EcoNor.nST, Sept. 29,2001, at 5.
49. Franck, supra note 27, at 362 (discussing the "thesis of nationalism and antithesis of
globalization"). Some have noted the dangers should nationalism feel itself diminished by the
dominance of globalization. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Soeiology of
Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 88-89 (1996) ("Modem nationalism and ethnocentrism
may be particularly virulent and dangerous, precisely because group identity is constantly threatened by
the forces released by modernity. These powerful forces of globalization include mass communications,
mobility, and tourism, and the rapid spread of fashions and tastes."); Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or
the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 345, 348 (2000) (''As integration and
globalization increase, there is simultaneously a growing fragmentation within States and strong
pressures for decentralization of decision-making. Ethnicity, nationalism, and the need for personal
affiliations and satisfaction push toward fragmentation and decentralization.'').
50. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 40; see also Zillah Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of
Us: Retrieving Publicness from the Privatization of the Globe, 41ND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 59, 63
(I 996). Eisenstein commented:
Because privacy always exists in relation to publicness, and because they shift and conflict
with each other simultaneously, the privatization of the public realm has created a crisis for
both realms .... If a notion of public is gone, how does one live outside the self?
Transnational capital needs privatization of multiple publics. So neocons revise democracy
for global marketing.
!d.; Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Democracy Should Not Have Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 589, 592
(2000) (describing proglobalization internationalism as being devoid of "any conception of a world
beyond the market-the political or civic or cultural world in which ideas, beliefs, traditions, even
innovations have meaning beyond their salability'').
51. Suzanne Berger, Introduction to NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1 (Suzanne
Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996) (criticizing the "convergence across nations in the structures of
production and in the relations among economy, society, and state"); Robert Wolf, The Regionalist
Answer, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 610, 621 (2000) (describing "globalization of world trade and
culture [as] a process of homogenization which an increasing number of people perceive as soulless and
dehumanizing" and decrying "world-wide monoculture now being created by the corporations"). !d.
52. John Miller, Globalization and its Metaphors, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL 'TRADE 594, 598 (2000);
see also HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON Goon 233-35 (1989) (arguing that
global trade erodes local communities and promotes an imagined and nonexistent "world community'').
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Fear of globalization as a commodity-centered modeP 3 of social and
economic arrangement is exacerbated by the apparent cozy relationship
that seems to have been struck between globalization and international
economies. "Many see a lag between the bold new world of international
commerce, communications, regulation, and policy which has adapted to
life in a global village and the international political institutions which
have not."54 In this way, globalization is equated with erosion of sovereignty and governmental control. 55 Sovereignty at the nation-state level is
thus all the more necessary to defend against the global economic system
and "the Golden Straitjacket"56 states must increasingly accept as a precondition to attracting capital. For many countries, wearing the Golden
Straitjacket has meant, as nationalists bemoan, "your economy grows and
your politics shrinks,"57 a narrowing of politics and further erosion of

53. Paul B. Thompson, Globalization, Losers and Property Rights, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
602, 606 (2000).
54. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 39; Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modem State? The
Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 483, 511 (1998)
("[G]lobalization of the economy has meant that there is no escaping the market. Interstate corporations
and the consolidation of the domestic economy threatened to outstrip the capacity of the states or the
market to control them ....").
55. Whittington, supra note 54, at 512 ("[G]Iobalization has weakened governmental
sovereignty, the perceived governmental ability to make and enforce autonomous decisions.").
Additional charges against globalization include assertions that it erodes democratic values. Wolf,
supra note 51, at 614 (condenming the "megalithic" corporations); Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, supra note
50, at 593.
56. FRIEDMAN, supra note !0, at 86. "The Cold War had the Mao suit, the Nehru jacket, the
Russian fur. Globalization has only the Golden Straitjacket." This means that for countries to generate
the growth necessary to embark on a program of economic development, they have to link with and
engage the global market and its rules:
[M)aking the private sector the primary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low
rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as
close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, eliminating and lowering tariffs on
imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas and
domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries ....
!d. at 86-87.
57. Id. at 87. Once plugged into and linked with the global market, in other words, states are
expected to manage their economies according to the rules of the international market-to wear the
global straitjacket. Those who do not have to deal with the consequences of capital flight. In India, even
the coalition led by the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which campaigned on a Hindu-first platform,
conceded that "[t)he priority is to build a national consensus on the acceptance of global capital, market
norms and whatever goes with it. ... You have to go out and compete for investments." Jonathan Karp,
India's BJP Is Shifting Priority to the Economy, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 7, 1999, at A21. Similarly, even leftof-center parties in Europe have had to accept the straitjacket of globalization, prompting critics to
ask: After all, "what is the point of 'Europe', if Europe is turning out to be just another United States?"
What Is Europe?, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 12,2000, at 15. Korea's Prime Minister in the mid-1990s, Lee
Hong Koo, said, "The big decisions today are whether you have a democracy or not and whether you
have an open economy or not. Those are the big choices. But once you've made those big choices,
politics becomes just political engineering to implement decisions in the narrow space allowed you
within this system." FRIEDMAN, supra note I 0, at 89; Cf Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 48, at
18-19.
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national sovereignty.58 Increasingly, nationalists defend the national project
as a populist movement that speaks not an abstract, universal language but
rather, the people's language-"the emotionalism, the vulgar populism, the
highly-coloured romanticism of most nationalist ideology (all the things
intellectuals have always held their noses at)."59
To further complicate matters, for nationalists, the "marketization of
international law" 60 has created an international domain that is not only
global and antinational, but also culturally American and therefore, by that
very fact, additionally problematic. 61 As globalization spreads, the nationalist opposition to globalization on economic grounds has taken on an additional cultural element: "We have our own culture, our own values, and
we will do it our own way at our own pace." 62 Nationalism thus proclaims
itself to be "against civilization being disseminated out and downwards
from the appropriate centers."63 Nationalism is a movement not just to liberate people whom imperial powers had forced to live together in empires
but also to oppose the self-serving ideology of ''big battalion" states that

58. The global market in general and the WTO in particular are viewed as stealthy,
antidemocratic, sovereignty-eroding bodies. Globalization vs. Nature, supra note 18; see also Patti
Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL lNT'L
LJ. 631, 634-43 (1994); Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 734-37 (1994). For a thoughtful examination of the WTO and its impact on
sovereignty and democracy, see Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 401,
410-19 (2000).
59. TOM NAIRN, THE BREAK-UP OF BRITAIN 354 (2nd exp. ed. 1977).
60. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 34.
61. The Marxist cultural critic Fredric Jameson has called the merger of economic globalization
and culture a "postmodern hyperspace" that expands without regard to territorial boundaries. Fredric
Jameson, Postmodemism, or the Cultural Logic ofLate Capitalism, NEw LEFT REv., July-Aug. 1984,
at 53; see also Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Postmodemism, NEw LEFT REv., July-Aug. 1989, at 31.
Prominent Neo-Marxists like Tom Nairn now associate cosmopolitanism and internationalism with the
self-serving elitist ideology of "big battalion" states that hide their particularistic agenda of infinite
capital accumulation behind a facade of universalistic norms, and more specifically, behind the agenda
of the American empire. Nairn, supra note 3, at 157, 161. According to Nairn, the recent unrestrained
movements of production and capital transnationally have resulted, for poor countries, in "[p]rogress in
the abstract [and] domination in the concrete," and domination as "Anglicization or
Frenchification .... [or] more globally: 'Westernization' or 'Americanization."' NAIRN, supra note
59, at338.
62. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 90; see also Frank E. Manning, Reversible
Resistance: Canadian Popular Culture and the American Other, in THE BEAVER BITES BAcK?
AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE IN CANADA 4, 4 (David H. Flaherty & Frank E. Manning eds., 1993).
Manning quotes Margaret Atwood in the following:
Canada as a separate but dominated country has done about as well under the U.S. as women,
worldwide, have done under men; about the only position they've ever adopted towards us,
country to country, has been the missionary position, and we were not on top. 1 guess that's
why the national wisdom vis-a-vis Them has so often taken the form of lying still, keeping
your mouth shut, and pretending you like it
I d.
63. Nairn, supra note 3, at 160.
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employ universalistic norms against local cultures. 64 Fearing that globalization is now the vehicle for cultural imperialism, the nationalist struggle
adds local culture to the long list of ideals to be defended. 65
Internationalists, on the other hand, do not condemn globalization,
transnationalization, or postnationalization66 on a wholesale scale, but
64. Nationalists are "protagonists of medieval particularism" against the abstractions of
universality, "favoring [n]ot the implacably prescribed common sense of internationalism, but the
nonlogical, untidy, refractory, disintegrative, particularistic truth of nation-states," Nairn, supra note 3,
at 157, 158, precisely because of the "thinness of cosmopolitanism and the crucial humanizing role
played by identity politics in a deracinated world of contracts, markets, and legal personhood." Barber,
supra note 17, at 30. In repudiating the notion of a cosmopolitan ethics, Hannah Arendt proclaimed that
a citizen "is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries. His rights and duties
must be defined and limited, not only by those of his fellow citizens, but also by the boundaries of a
territory." ARENDT, supra note 37, at 81.
65. See Richard A. Falk, Culture, Modernism, Postmodernism: A Challenge to International
Relations, in CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 268 (Jongsuk Chay ed., 1990) (commenting
that the rhetoric of globalization tends to "disguise patterns of interstate hegemony, especially as
between Europe and the rest of the world"); L. Amede Obiora, Feminism, Globalization, and
Culture: After Beijing, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 355,380-81 (1997). Obiora stated:
Marginalized by exposure to an onslaught of conditions of modernity, the market economy,
and imperialistic transnational entctprises, distinct cultural groups tend to view themselves as
being under pressure to demonstrate their ritual purity and allegiance to traditional high
culture. In certain quarters, changes emanating from globalization are suspiciously perceived
as Trojan horses in service of cultural imperialism. As such, they are countered with fervent
expressions of nationalism ....
Id; Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, supra note 50, at 593, 590 (decrying support by "global marketers," for
"globalization, 'the American steamroller,' which decimates languages, traditions, and the environment
at whim").
66. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. Terms such as globalization,
internationalization, transnationalization, postnationalization, and even denationalization have been
used to describe the process by which activities which were once taking place within national borders
are now taking place beyond national borders. See generally R.J. BARRY JONES, GLOBALISATION AND
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 3 (1995). Goods, financial
instruments, capital, services, technology, and even culture itself, are being exchanged across national
borders. Each of the terms above describes something about that process, although each term may
connote something specific about the character of and consequences to this phenomenon.
The term "globalization" is generally associated with various forms of linkages among businesses
and markets across and without regard to national borders and usually connotes some erosion of the
national, provoking questions about the meaning of democracy, participation, and sovereignty.
"Internationalization" or "transnationalization" may simply mean "cooperative activities of
national actors," bilaterally or multilaterally; see Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization: An
Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 375 (1996), so that the national is not necessarily
diminished. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183,
184 (1997) ("The state is not disappearing, it is desegregating into its separate, functionally distinct
parts. These parts--courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures-are networking with
their countetparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental
order.").
"Postnationalization" implies a shift, conceptually and paradigrnatically, from the national to
something beyond the national, although the term does not necessarily implicate a shift in the
relationship between the state and the market, as in "globalization," but rather a shift in the relationship
between the state and other nonmarkct, non-state entities, such as nongovernmental organizations in the
fields of human rights and the environment. See, e.g., RiCHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAUGH,
GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 429-30 (1994); Richard
Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS: BEYOND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 39,
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rather defend internationalization and the international order in various
ways and at various levels. In the economic field, internationalists, as compared to nationalists, are also more or less comfortable with an international system that extends beyond the national and nationalism, governs
"from a space beyond culture,"67 and protects the market and its cosmopolitan ordet8 against the political interference of the state.69
47-48 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993); Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental
Activism and World Civic Politics, 47 WORLD POL. 311,312-13 (1995).
"Denationalization" is used less, but refers to the primarily economic phenomenon, in which the
national is diminished. See SASKIA SASSEN, LosiNG CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 33 (1996) ("[E]conomic globalization has contributed to a denationalizing of national
territory ... .'').
"Transnationalization," "postnationalization," and "denationalization" have also been used to
describe wholly noneconomic developments, to capture the emergence of crossnational or subnational
identities to give rise to a new meaning of citizenship that is multiple and transterritorial. See, e.g.,
Yasemin Nohuglu Soysal, Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organized Islam
in European Public Spheres, 26 THEORY AND Soc'y 509, 513 (1997) (postnational citizenship); Peter J.
Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REv. 597 (1999) (book review).
67. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 82; see also Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global
Governance, 22 MicH. J.lNr'L L. 1 (2000). Paul commented:
The whole legal structure of the free trade norm rests on a rational economic
model. ... Cultural claims threaten that rationality argument. Cultural claims derive from
sentiment, nostalgia, insecurity; they are rooted in non-rationality. To protect the rationality
of the market from the non-rationality of nationalism and culture, the international
community rejects cultural exceptions.
!d. at 80. For a critique of the internationalist assumption that the international is acultural, see David
Kennedy, Background Noise? The Underlying Politics of Global Governance, HARv. lNT'L REv.,
Summer 1999, at 52 [hereinafter Background Noise?] ("Common but mistaken ideas-like the idea that
international governance is separate from both the global market and from local culture, or is more a
matter of public than of private law-sharply narrow the sense among foreign-policy professionals of
what is possible and appropriate for foreign policy.'').
68. Karl Marx was one of the earlier critics of the international market's claim to
cosmopolitanism:
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan
character to production and consumption in every country.... [I]t has drawn from under the
feet of industry the national ground on whieh it stood. All old-established national industries
have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries,
whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, ... industries
whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe.... In
place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in
every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations.
Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 476-77
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
Similarly, today's critics argne that the supposed cosmopolitanism of market-driven globalization
entails "a pen.l'ective of the whole [world] that is totally oblivious to the ethical imperatives of human
solidarity," Richard Falk, Revisioning Cosmopolitanism, in FoR LovE OF COUNTRY supra note 17 at
53, and is in no way related to the cosmopolitanism espoused by those like Martha Nussbaum, supra
note 37; see also Falk, The Making ofGlobal Citizenship, supra note 66, at 44.
69. For example, the European common market has been depoliticized:
In a technocratic private market, the locus for political choice is less opened up than it is
rendered invisible. Take the European Union, whose political decision-making always seems
to take place "elsewhere" .... The idea of a "govemmenf' promoting a "program" has been
replaced by the enlightened management of prosperity.... EU policy managers[, for
example,] treat the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe less as a set of
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Globalization of trade and investment, the free movement of goods
and services, and, increasingly, of capital, across national borders, are generally compatible for private internationalism. 70 Even though some internationalists would like to see a superinternational regulatory structure-a
globalized New Deal, so to speak-instituted to manage these changes,
they are not opposed per se to the rise of transnational economic activities. 71 Indeed, international economic law has over the years aimed to build
an international liberal regime of WTO rules to overcome a protectionist
national regime of local rules 72 more susceptible to capture by parochial
political interests. 73 Recently, in an effort to create a dispute settlement system that is based less on diplomacy or power and more on rules and law,
the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO was empowered to issue decisions that are binding unless the Dispute Settlement Body, including
the winning party, votes unanimously to overturn it. 74 To private
political exclusions and choices than as the technical management of different natural stages
of development.
Background Noise?, supra note 67, at 53.
70. There is a set of characteristics that define private internationalism:
International economic law ... is defined not by the subjects it governs, but by its regulatory
terrain-the law, of whatever origin, which governs international economic transactions. It
mixes national and international law, and is rooted in private law-both national regimes of
contract or property and international regimes of private law unification and conflict of laws.
We might have called aspects of this field "private international law" some years ago, but the
newer phrase "international economic law" embraces the public law institutional machinery
of trade law and policy-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), North American
Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the European Union, Mercado Comunitario Suramericano
(MERCOSUR), and the rest.
Kennedy, supra note 36, at 38-39.
71. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burly, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and
the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND
PRAXIS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FORM 125 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993); Shell, supra note 19, at 907
(arguing for a "trade stakeholders" model which would allow individual and nongovernmental
organization participation in the WTO).
72. International trade legalism allows governments to resist domestic resistance to free trade.
For the argument that free trade internationalism is more democratic than domestic protectionism, see
generally Robert E. Hudec, "Circumventing" Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade
Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 311 (1993); McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 20
(discussing how internationalism of the type manifested in the WTO provides the antidote to naked
interest-group politics and domestic rent-seeking at the national level); Jan Tumlir, Need for an Open
Multilateral Trading System, 6 THE WORLD EcoN. 393, 406 (1983) (arguing the trade system and its
"international rules represent a truer expression of the national interest of all the countries concerned
than the mass of national [economic] legislation'').
73. For a discussion of how interest groups, particularly industries with significant political
strength, press for protectionist measures that further their own rather than the national interest, see
ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23-24
(1986); see also Edward John Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffi and the
Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 285, 290-91 (1987) (discussing how special
interest groups worked to block the opening of U.S. markets for exports from poor countries).
74. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, art.
16(4), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1235 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding on Rules]. The losing party is to comply
with the decision. Understanding on Rules art. 21(3). If the losing party does not, the parties are to
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internationalists especially, the idea that conflicts can be "privatized" or
"economized"-that is, cabined in a private, economic sphere-and disagreements among states resolved through a rational regime of
"technocratic cosmopolitan governance" consisting of "technocratic
means, sound management and trade deals"75 is appealing. Thus, the international is appropriately cosmopolitan and universal, the correct antidote to
parochial politics, national controls, political interventions, and other forms
of capitulation to organized interest groups. 76
As one example of the nationalist versus internationalist response to
economic globalization, take the case of a Japanese automaker that ships its
design components for assembly in its plant in Mexico, and then distributes
the finished product to buyers in the United States and in other parts of the
world. The company, motivated in part by its ability to engage in "wage
arbitrage"77 in Mexico, has chosen to move production from a high-wage to
come up with a "mutually acceptable compensation." Understanding on Rules art. 22(2). And failing
that, the winning party may seek authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body to withdraw
concessions "equivalent to the level of the nullification and impairment" suffered. Understanding on
Rules art. 22(4). The losing party thus could comply with the WTO ruling, by changing the law or
practice that had given rise to the complaint, or it could pay damages for noncompliance. Contrast this
with the old GATT system, where the losing party could veto dispute resolution panel decisions to keep
them from becoming binding. JoHN H. JACKSON, REsTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 61-65 (1990).
75. Background Noise?, supra note 67, at 54 ("Specialists tend to overestimate the technocratic
or apolitical nature of economic concerns, including the independence of economic development from
background cultural, political, and institutional contexts.'').
76. See Michael D. Pendleton, A New Human Right-The Right to Globalization, 22 FORDHAM
lNT'L LJ. 2052, 2052-53 (1999) ("Globalization offers a realistic vehicle for escaping from failed
nationalism to an expanded concept of global rights and duties .... [Its] economic potential is what
gives globalization power even against antagonistic national governments.''); see also Wesley A. Caun,
Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the
Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and
Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413, 414 (2001). Cann quoted Renato Ruggiero, Director-General
of the \VTO, as follows:
[T]he need is not to discuss whether globalization is a good thing, but to ask •.. "what would
be the alternative?" It would be a world divided by economic and political nationalism-a
world in which we would go down the road towards power-based relations, increased tension
and violence, as history has taught us.
/d. at 414-15 n.4; Renato Ruggiero, Reflections After Seattle, 24 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 9, 14 (2000)
("Without the WTO, we will go back to a world of national barriers, protectionism, economic
nationalism, and conflict. History has repeatedly showed where this road can lead.''). The state is all too
susceptible to the push and pull of "local politics (of protectionism, exchange controls, redistribution,
corruption, etc.)..•." Kennedy, supra note 36, at 86. International economic rules such as those of the
\VTO are thus necessary for "bringing law in general to bear on politics in particular, order to bear on
anarchy, reason on chaos, the international on the national.'' /d.
77. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 58; see also Michael Kelly, Globalization: No Pain, No Gain,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 2001, at A31 ("[T]he purpose of globalism is to allow capital to freely chase
profits around the world: to allow corporations to make more money by manufacturing their goods in
dirt-wage, low-regulation undeveloped countries instead of in high-wage, high-regulation developed
countries...• [Thus] [m]anufacturing jobs must migrate from developed countries to undeveloped
countries ... .''). However, although the desire to engage in ''wage arbitrage" is a contributing factor to
a company's global expansion, it is not the only one. The economist Lester Thurow noted that the
inability to develop skills for a technology-oriented information economy is as significant a threat to
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a low-wage labor market in order to reduce the cost of production and increase its profit margin, and to position its products for preferential treatment by NAFTA.
The ease with which multinational companies move globally sets up
the following: a tug of war between workers from the mature industrial
economies who are threatened with losing their fifteen-dollar-per-hour jobs
and workers from the agrarian, newly industrializing ones who may in fact
gain two-or three-dollar-per-hour jobs. 78 Globalization has shifted certain
types of economic activities from one region of the globe to the other. For
lower skilled workers in industrial sectors in rich countries, the concern is
simply stated: "to what extent has, or will, the pay of low-skilled
Americans or French or Germans be set in Beijing, Delhi and Djakkarta
rather than in New York, Paris, or Frankfurt?"79 But globalization has also
rewarded, whether in rich or poor countries, those workers in the "highvalue"80 information-oriented sectors who are the economic beneficiaries
of the global age. The national and international trade regime has crafted
radically different responses to these shifts. 81
In response to the rifts that have arisen between countries (rich and
poor) and groups within countries ("high-value" and "high-volume" workers), nationalists and other antiglobalization groups, particularly from rich
countries, have generally favored more protectionism against "foreign"
companies and "foreign" goods in favor of "domestic" ones (invoking the
high-volume, manufacturing-based workers as is the large pool of low-wage workers in the poorer
countries. LESTER C. THUROW, THE fUTURE OF CAPITALISM 166-84 (1996); see also infra note 155.
For a discussion of how, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, "free international trade benefits
the abundant factor and harms the scarce factor," and the impact this has on U.S.-China trade (or trade
between any capital-abundant country and labor-abundant country), see STEVEN HusTED & MiCHAEL
MELVIN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 105, 106-09, 116-17 (5th ed. 2001).
78. Put another way, as then-U.S Trade Representative Micky Kantor reportedly asked his fellow
cabinet members in a 1993 meeting: "Who are my clients-American companies or American
workers?" Daniel F. Burton, Jr. et a!., Multinationals: The 'Who Is Us' Debate, CHALLENGE, Sept.Oct. 1994, at 33.
79. MARINA WES, GLOBALISATION: WINNERS AND LoSERS (Commission on Public Policy and
British Business: Issue Paper No.3 (1996)).
80. ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 82-84 (1992); see also Joseph Kahn, Unions
Prepare to Hit the Street in Washington, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at A16 (discussing the rift between
high-tech workers and other union-based workers and the tension between presenting an internationalist
image versus a protectionist one for the U.S. Democratic Party). For a discussion of the importance of
the new information technology, see also S. REP. No. 104-359 (1996) (recommending the enactment of
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996).
81. See generally SYLVIA 0STRY, THE POST-COLD WAR TRADING SYSTEM (1997). Using an
"exit" and "voice" paradigm suggested by Alfred 0. Hirschman in EXIT, VOICE, AND LoYALTY (1970),
Professor Ostry noted that the United States pursues a strategy of "exit" for displaced U.S. workers,
whereby the workers themselves, not the government, are expected to make the necessary adjustments
to their own losses sustained as a result of international trade. Workers who may be forced to exit thus
oppose trade liberalization. Europe pursues a strategy of"voice," where the government plays an active
role in minimizing the costs of adjustment in order to maintain social cohesion, even at the expense of
economic efficiency. OSTRY, supra, at 235. Here, workers may oppose trade liberalization if they
believe it will accelerate a loss of voice.
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name of nationalism and sovereignty). As applied to the example above,
this could mean keeping out, through quotas or high tariffs, foreign auto
components of Mexico-in order to save the jobs of U.S. workers who
would otherwise lose their jobs to workers in Mexico. Yet, by overlooking
the costs of propping up sunset industries in which rich countries no longer
have a comparative advantage,82 First World economic nationalists insist
on the politics of the local at the expense of aggregate wealth generally and
Third World economic development particularly.83
Besides the fact that "nationality" has become increasingly blurred,
this nationalistic solution is also flawed because it will have the effect of
producing allocative inefficiency and decreasing efficiency gains for the
richer countries, as well as increasing barriers to trade and developmental
possibilities for the poorer countries. The solution to the distributional
problem within the rich countries, I argue, should not be one that compounds the distributional problem between poor and rich countries. That
engagement in the global economy produces greater total wealth is the basic premise of the international economic system and of this Article. 84
On the other hand, as I have mentioned, internationalists have emphasized the economic and efficiency benefits of international trade and investment without paying sufficient attention to the pull of the national and
the local. The internationalist response to the above example: push for
more liberalization, perhaps expand NAFTA to include a Free Trade Area
for the whole of Latin America, and allow the rules of trade and the law of
comparative advantage to sort out winners and losers. In certain areas already, the boundaries of the international economic regime have been
82. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 52, at 597 (voicing concern for industries such as "steel,
petroleum, and agricultural production"). For a discussion of the costs of protectionism, see supra note
21.
83. The World Bank defines extreme poverty according to a set of"reference lines" of$! and $2
per day in 1993 terms. THE WORLD BANK, MEASURING POVERTY, at http://www.worldbank.org/
poverty/rnission/up2.htm (last modified Oct. 16, 2000). Openness to trade, not protectionism or
isolationism, increases wealth and reduces poverty. See infra note 84.
84. This Article relies on works by liberal trade scholars and accepts that free trade creates wealth
for and among nations. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988). The U.N. concluded in a
recent report that "[t]here is now widespread acceptance that, in the long run, the expansion of
international trade and integration into the world economy are necessary instruments for promoting
economic growth and reducing and eradicating poverty ...." U.N.G.A., REPORT OF THE SECRETARYGENERAL TO THE PREPARATORY CO~!M. FOR THE HIGH-LEVEL INTERNATIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL
EVENT ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT 26 (Dec. 18, 2000) (NAC.257/12).
A number of studies have also shown that growth benefits not just the rich but also the poor. See,
e.g., Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality, 10 WoRLD BANK
EcoN. REv. 565 (1996); William Easterly, Life During Growth, 4 J. EcoN. GROWTH 239 (1999); see
also David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth Is Good for the Poor 2 (Development Research Group, the
World Bank, March 2001 draft), available at http://www.worldbank.org/researchlgrowthlpdfiles/
GlGFTP3.pdf (concluding, based on an empirical study involving a sample of ninety-two conntries
where the median number of growth episodes is three per country, that "on average, within countries,
incomes of the poor rise equi-proportionately with average incomes''); Globalisation and Its Critics,
supra note 48, at 10-11.
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expanded to give the international the mechanisms it needs to frustrate national protectionist ambitions. Indeed, free trade norms developed by private international arbiters have increasingly acquired the force of law,
granted direct legal effect in domestic courts through the adoption of a
number of legal devices. 85 Economic internationalism, then, is precisely the
shield needed to counter the temptation of economic nationalism. For internationalists, "national interest'' is but a code word for parochialism and
economic protectionism. 86
There are still other responses that are neither strictly nationalist nor
internationalist but a populist mix of the two. Composed of a broad coalition of religious, environmental, organized labor, student, and other ad hoc
groups, 87 this movement has emerged in recent years to oppose economic
globalization and the perceived antinational excesses of the WTO. 88 At the
85. Note that a decision issued by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, though binding as WTO
law, does not have to be implemented domestically. See supra note 74. By contrast, there are now
parallel economic regimes that go much further, at least as far as enforcement is concerned, and allow
awards by international tribunals to be recognized and enforced by domestic courts with minimal
domestic scrutiny. NAFTA's dispute resolution provision, Article 19, for example, "creates a binding,
supranational arbitration scheme accessible directly by private business parties through which
businesses may overturn final anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions of domestic trade
regulators." Shell, supra note 19, at 887. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, creates
a system where domestic courts of signatory countries are bound, subject to minimal "public policy''
exceptions, to enforce arbitration agreements rendered by private international commercial arbitrators.
Similarly, under the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"),
contracting states may be sued by private parties and must "recognize an award rendered pursuant to
this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State." Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between State and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1965,
art. 54(1), 17 U.S.T. 1270, at 1291,575 U.N.T.S. 159, at I94.
The rise of international economic arbitration has been explained as the attempt by international
business to develop "in appropriate cases, ajus gentium or a lex mercatoria of a new type, free of the
contingencies and prejudices which dominate the scene in the various States." RENE DAVID,
ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1985). "[W]hen parties request that arbitrators adjudicate
their dispute in accordance with international law or with the general principles of law, their intention is
to escape from the national systems of law." !d. at 350-51.
86. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE I, 4 (2001) (counseling "vigilance against protectionist wolves cloaked in wooly talk about
'national interests,' 'public order,' and 'precautionary prudence"').
87. See Globalization vs. Nature, supra note 18. The Turning Point Project's website and the
series of ads in the New York Times may be viewed at http://www.turnpoint.org. For a disparaging view
of the antiglobalization protestors, see Robert L. Bartley, Clinton Gives a Pass to Globaphobia, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 31,2000, at A44. In the words of then-Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo:
A peculiar alliance has recently come into life. Forces from the extreme left, extreme right,
environmentalist groups, trade unions of developed countries and some self-appointed
representatives of civil society are gathering around a common endeavor: to save the people
of developing countries from development. ... [They express] a very revealing common
denominator: the word protection.

!d.
88. Invisible Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, I999, at Al5 (advertisement number three in a
series for The Turning Point Project, http://www.turnpoint.org). The advertisement included:
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now-infamous Battle in Seattle,89 followed in succession by protests elsewhere,90 the antiglobalization protestors managed to derail the opening of
the WTO's rounds of trade talks and oppose its plans towards increased
liberalization.91 In language that is resoundingly nationalist, yet at the same
time internationalist in tone, protestors, joined by a common concern for
"global justice,"92 complain about the loss of national sovereignty, the
WTO and its "unprecedented powers ... to rule on whether laws of
nations-concerning public health, food safety, small business, labor
standards, culture, human rights, or anything-are 'barriers to trade' by
WTO standards."93
The WTO is already among the most powerful, secretive, and undemocratic bodies on Earth.
Its authority extends deeply into the internal political processes of sovereign countries,
forcing them to alter laws and priorities. It is fast becoming a bonafide global government for
the new millennium.... The central idea of the WTO is that free trade-actually the values
and interests of global corporations-should supersede all other values.

Id.
89. For a critique of the antiglobalization critics, see Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 48,
at 3-30. For a critique of the antiglobalist position that globalization hurts poor workers in poor
countries, see id. at 10-13 & 28-30. For a defense of the Seattle protests and mass resistance generally,
see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Ta!..ing Seattle Resistance Seriously, THE HINDU, Dec. 11, 1999, at 10,
and Saadia Toor, Child Labor in Pakistan: Coming ofAge in the New World Order, 575 ANNALS 194
(2001).
90. David Montgomery, For Many Protesters, Bush Isn't Main Issue, WASH. PoST, Jan. 20,
2001, at Al4 (describing protests against the IMF and World Bank in Washington D.C. and Pragne,
and against further trade liberalization for the Americas in Quebec City); America Prepares Law and
Politics, BoSToN GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2001, at Al (conunenting on protests in Seattle in 1999, Pragne in
2000, Quebec City in the spring of2001, and Genoa in the sununer of2001); see also supra note 18.
91. Invisible Government, supra note 88. The advertisement included:
[T]he Godzilla of\VTO plans is to revive some of the old, discredited Multilateral Agreement
on Investment. Those rules would impose restrictions on every level of government; down to
states, countries and cities. Foreign companies would have to be given "national treatment,"
i.e., treated exactly as if they were local companies.

Id.
92. America Prepares Law and Politics, supra note 90 (describing how Mobilization for Global
Justice led antiwar protests and denounced economic injustice as the "root causes" of terrorism); R.C.
Longworth, Rebels with Many Causes, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 5, 2001, at Cl (describing the antiglobalization
movement as a "call for global justice" uniting religious activists, students, environmentalists, labor, all
opposed to "Washington Consensus" of free trade, privatization and free markets); Montgomery, supra
note 90 (describing the "global justice" crowd of "save the rain forests" and antisweatshop activists,
feminists, and human rights workers); Tom Morganthau, Getting Ready for "Seattle II," NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 24, 2000, at 40 (describing the "Mobilization for Global Justice" as opposed to Third World debt,
child labor, and environmental degradation).
93. Globalization vs. Nature, supra note 18. The antiglobal movement is not confined to the
United States. Jose Bove, a Frenchman arrested on charges of vandalizing a McDonald's in August
1999, has been lauded in French newspapers for standing up to globalization, particularly American-led
globalization, with his slogan '"McDo Dehors, Gardons le Roquefort!' (McDonald's Get Out, Let's
Keep the Roquefort!)" Even President Jacques Chirac was prompted to declare "that he, too, detests
McDonald's food." Suzanne Daley, French See a Hero in War on "McDomination," N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1999, at Al. Bove's opposition to U.S. imposition of high tariffs on Roquefort cheese and pate de
foie gras in retaliation for the EU's decision to ban U.S. hormone-treated beef struck a nerve with the
French, who view the issue in wider terms-the tyranny of the market versus "nostalgia for a way of
life," local culture, and local tastes. Id. As Bove himself put it: '"There have been three totalitarian
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While protestors rallied in the streets of Seattle and condemned multinational corporations for their exploitation of Third World workers,
President Clinton delivered his indictment of child labor and his call to
provide Third World children with a way "out of the soccer ball industry in
Pakistan, out of the shoe industry in Brazil, the fireworks industry in
Guatemala."94 The movement that Seattle epitomizes, in other words, combines the typically nationalist denunciations of globalization95 with concomitant expressions of concerns for international matters beyond the
national boundary. 96
In these ways and through these dichotomies and polarities, nationalism and internationalism, and their particular subvariants, "as ideologies, as
sets of mental attitudes;m have staked out their respective boundaries on
market and state. The tensions and conflicts between the two have only
increased in recent years as globalization-"probably the most contentious
philosophical issue underlying the law of trade and development" 98
today-is added to the mix of politics and sovereignty on the one hand, and
markets and interdependence on the other.

forces in our life time .... The totalitarianism of fascism, of communism and now of capitalism. How
can people try and tell us that we must import hormone-enhanced beef? What is that?" Id
94. Roger Cohen, Clinton Remark on Child Labor Irks Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at Al4.
In response to President Clinton's remarks, Brazil noted, for example, that the shoe industry has made
huge progress towards eliminating child labor, as U.N. studies have corroborated, and that the use of
child labor is commonplace only in the coal business. '"But it so happens that Brazil does not export
coal to the United States, or street children."' Id (quoting Klaus Kleber of Gazeta Mercantil, Brazil's
leading business newspaper). According to Brazil, behind the apparent lofty concern of countries like
the United States for workers' and children's rights in developing countries lies "down-to-earth
political and economic considerations." /d.
95. "Under globalized free trade, countries as diverse as Sweden and India, Canada and Thailand,
Bolivia and Russia are meant to merge their economies, and homogenize their values toward maximum
commodity accumulation. This puts the whole planet in a single giant economic (and political)
structure, with global corporations in charge," so that "[o]lder values like preserving nature, or
protecting workers, or public health, or communities, or democracy are viewed as impediments to
global corporate growth." Globalization vs. Nature, supra note 18.
96. For a description of the protestors' position, see Mark Weisbrot, Last Stop for Corporate
Globalization: Seattle '99, available at http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvts/Globalisrnlwtoweis.htm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2002) (on file with author) {describing protestors' concern for "European
consumers," "workers," and "the poor," in rich and poor countries, because free trade with Mexico has
left workers in Mexico and the United States with lower real wages than those they had in the 1970s);
see also America Prepares Law and Politics, supra note 90 (favoring the '"globalization of social
justice, of human rights, of environmental protection"'); Montgomery, supra note 90 {denouncing
globalization as "a war against the poor in the Third World, conducted by the corporate power structure
in the U.S.," according to a codirector of the International Action Center).
97. Slaughter Burley, supra note 36, at 585.
98. Chen, supra note 86, at 7.
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II
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE MARKET

A.

Globalization ofProduction

At the heart of the globalization debate lies the market, or at least the
ideology of the free market-the "global business civilization,"99 in other
words, and its relationship to the nation-state. Globalization marks the
beginning of a new era in the relationship between modernity and the
nation-state on the one hand and postmodernity and the global age on the
other. "Fundamentally the Global Age involves the supplanting of
modernity with globality ...." 10° Consequently, the nature of competition
between and among states has changed from one of competing for territories to one of competing for markets, making trade and finance policies
more significant than defense and foreign policies. 101 For scholars writing
about this globalist framework, markets and other nonstate entities are
deemed to be the principal actors in the political and economic orders. 102
For others who study globalization from an international framework,
the emphasis is on the political variant of economic globalization.
Although "[t]he nation-state has 'lost' sovereignty to regional and global
institutions and to markets[, it] has also acquired new areas of control in
order to promote 'national competitiveness. "'103 From this perspective, the
99. Susan Strange, The Name of the Game, in SEA-CHANGES: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A
WORLD TRANSFORMED 238, 260 (Nicholas X. RizopouJos ed., 1990) [hereinafter SEA-CHANGES). This
"global business civilization" consists of a "complex network or web of transnational, bilateral
bargains-bargains between corporations and other corporations, between corporations and
governments, and between governments." Susan Strange, Protectionism and World Politics, 39 lNT'L
0RG. 233,234 (1985); Cf BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 261 (1995) (describing the Jinks among
economics, culture, and politics); H. W. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the
Restructuring of Legal Fields, 12 CAN. J. L. & Soc'Y 219 (1997) (describing "globalization of the
mind" as equally as important as globalization of business).
100. MARTIN ALBROW, THE GLOBAL AGE 4 (1997); see also ROLAND ROBERTSON,
GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 113 (1992); MALCOLM WATERS,
GLOBALIZATION 1 (1995) ("[G]lobalization may be the concept of the 1990s, a key idea by which we
understand the transition ofhuman society into the third millennium.").
101. Susan Strange, The Defective State, DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 55-74; see SEA-CHANGES,
supra note 99, at 243 ("When states ..• try to use their power to influence where and how international
production takes place, they find they cannot direct, as with trade. They can only bargain.").
102. See generally LoWELL BRYAN & DIANA FARRELL, MARKET UNBOUND: UNLEASHING
GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1996); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE (1996); HENRY WENDT,
GLOBAL EMBRACE: CORPORATE CHALLENGES IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD (1993).
103. Vincent Cable, The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power,
DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 23-24; see also Meinhard Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in International
Economic Organizations: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Strengthening the GAIT Dispute
Settlement Procedures, in THE NEW GATI RoUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL
AND EcONOMIC PROBLEMS 285, 321 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard HiJf eds., 2d updated ed.
1991) (commenting that "[i]ntemational economie integration, influenced by a multitude of
uncontrollable actors, entails a Joss of sovereignty").
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nation-state itself has not been diminished but has simply allowed itself to
be internationalized, acting as mediator and negotiator with the global
political economy and ensuring that the domestic economy can be effectively adjusted to the mandates of the world economy. 104
From either globalist or internationalist orientation, commerce has
transcended territorial definition and is now extraterritorial and global in
orientation. 105 Because "almost every factor of production-money,
technology, factories, and equipment-moves effortlessly across
borders....",1°6 in time "[t]here will be no national products or
technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There will no
longer be national economies, at least as we have come to understand that
concept." 107 No longer are "national corporations," that is, corporations
incorporated in or identified and associated with a certain nation-state, limited, either in their production or operation, to the territory of their own or
any particular nation-state. 108
104. See generally ROBERT W. Cox & TIMOTHY J. SiNCLAIR, APPROACHES TO WORLD ORDER
(1996). For a different version of this argument, see Anne Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and
International Relations Theory: A New Generation ofInterdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. lNT'L L.
367, 378 (1998) (arguing that the state is no longer a unitary actor but a disaggregated entity, where
distinct government institutions such as legislatures, executives, courts, and administrative agencies, act
quasi-autonomously with their counterparts internationally).
105. This transformation from national to global parallels the earlier transformation in the
American economy from regional to national. As technological developments affect transportation and
communication and as global markets are further integrated, the need for an amended legal regime
becomes more pressing. The American economy went through similar changes during the period from
1815 to 1860, the period of major innovations in rail, canal transportation, and communication. See,
e.g., GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, I 8 I 5- I 860 (1989); Richard B. Du
Boff, Business Demand and the Development of the Telegraph in the United States, /844-1860, 54
Bus. HisT. REv. 459 (1980). Such changes facilitated the formation of an integrated national economy,
as foreign, out-of-state corporations-no longer disadvantaged by physical distance-began expanding
their businesses into states other than their home states, resulting in the erosion of local monopolies.
SIDNEY RATNER ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN EcONOMY: GROWTH, WELFARE, AND
DECISION MAKING 123 (1979).
106. REICH, supra note 80, at 8.
I 07. /d. at 3; see also GREIDER, supra note 20, at 44 ("What is a nation, after all, if commerce has
destroyed the meaning of national boundaries? For that matter, what is a citizen?"). For opposing views
that argue that corporate nationality still matters, see, for example, Paul Magnusson, Why Corporate
Nationality Matters, Bus. WK. July 12, 1993, at 142, and D'Andrea Tyson, supra note 8, at37.
108. American companies, for example, employ, at least according to a 1994 report, 5.4 million
people abroad, with 80% in manufacturing. The issue is the loss of jobs and the question thus is "Why
can't the goods and services that these foreign workers produce be supplied from the United States?
Why must companies migrate abroad, shedding some of their national identity and loyalty?" Louis
Uchitelle, U.S. Corporations Expanding Abroad at a Quicker Pace, N.Y. TiMEs, July 25, 1994, at AI.
It should be noted that historically, there have been business enterprises with some degree of
foreign presence since the Middle Ages. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND THE LAW 19-20 (1995); Yitzhak Hadari, The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71
MICH. L. REv. 729, 735 (1973). For example, trading firms in Italy had operations and branches in
other European countries as early as the thirteenth century. Id at 735. Similarly, one could also
consider some of the European colonial trading companies of the sixteenth and seventeenth century,
such as the British East India Company, a multinational corporation. Nonetheless, most business
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This shift has meant more than simply the internationalization of economic activities. 109 It has, rather, also resulted in a fundamental
transformation in the relationship between market power and state authority, in which the state is increasingly unable or unwilling to regulate the
activities of its internationally mobile corporate actors. 110 This transformation provoked, in turn, a shift from public to private modes of regulation
and a shift from territorially based to nonterritorially based centers of
authorityY 1 It was remarked, even as early as 1969, that
[t]he international corporation has no country to which it feels
more loyalty than any other, nor any country where it feels
completely at home .... The nation-state is just about through as
an economic unit .... The world is too small. It is too easy to get
about.II2

In more recent years, the global economy has made it all the more easy for
multinational companies 113 to engage in transnational economic activities
such as "world-wide sourcing" 114 and foreigu direct investment, 115 thus
historians mark the mid-nineteenth century as the point at which the multinational corporation as we
currently know it first emerged. See MuCHLINSKI, supra, at 19-20.
109. Some of the transformations associated with globalization were identified as early as 1944 by
Karl Polanyi. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). However, while the rise of
the market and the retreat of the state might have occurred previously, they did not occur with such
speed or breadth. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman observed:
[T]oday's era of globalization is not only different in degree; in some very important ways it
is also different in kind.... Today's era of globalization is, built around falling
telecommunications costs-thanks to microchips, satellites, fiber optics and the Internet.
These new technologies are able to weave the world together even tighter.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at XV.
110. See generally U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., PROGRAMME ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPS., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1993: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTEGRATED
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION, at 161, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/156, U.N. Sales No. E.93.II.A.l4 (1993)
[hereinafter WIR 1993] (describing inability of states to regulate corporate multinational activities
whether for tax and other revenue-raising purposes or to restrain unfair business practices).
Ill. In this way, free market globalization, like its antithesis from a prior era (communist
internationalism), is obtuse to the pull of the particular and instead exhibits behavior that generally
scorns the relevance of place. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL QUESTION, SELECTED WRITINGS BY ROSA
LuxamURG 135, 159, 161 (Horace B. Davis ed., 1976) (favoring internationalism over nationalism,
which Luxemburg considered to be a mask for class division); see also JOHN GRAY, FALSE
DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 3 (1998) (equating the flaws of global capitalism
with those of global communism).
112. C.P. KlNDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 207 (1969).
113. The term "multinational corporation" was coined in 1960 by David E. Lilienthal, who was
then the Director of the Atomic Energy Commission. See PAUL A. BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY,
MoNOPOLY CAPITAL 192 (1966); see also D. K. Fieldhouse, The Multinational: A Critique of a
Concept, in MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (Alice Teichova ed., 1986).
114. SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS 82 (2d ed. 1994); see also Norman Jonas, The
Hollow Corporation, Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 1986, at 57, 58. Jonas wrote:
Outsourcing breaks down manufacturers' traditional vertical structure, in which they make
virtually all critical parts, and replaces it with networks of small suppliers .... In the short
run, the new system may be amazingly flexible and efficient. In the long run, however, some
experts fear that such fragmented manufacturing operations will merely hasten the hollowing
[out of U.S. industry].
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freeing companies from the restraints and "factor endowment of a single
nation" 116 and allowing them access to resources and markets across
national boundaries. 117
Firms have pursued internationalization in two ways, by engaging in
"glocalization" or "globalization." Firms may "glocalize," diversifying
internationally as a business strategy, primarily to avoid "being treated as
an 'outsider,' or being hit by trade or investment barriers and thus losing
market share ... .''118 "Glocalizing" firms are deemed multinationals, that
is, more international than global. While they do decentralize production
and sales by extending their operations internationally, their decisionmaking apparatus remains home-centered, with the more high-value-added
/d. Various industries are resorting increasingly to outsourcing. See, e.g., J. Linn Allen, Chicago Mecca
for Real Estate Gurus, CHI. 'TRIB., Sept. 3, 1996, at 1 (describing how a major telecommunications
company outsources management of its real estate assets to another company}; Leslie Helm, The
Fading Metropolis, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at Dl (describing how a major accounting firm institutes
"hoteling'' for its auditors; auditors are to make reservations to use a limited number of office spaces
when not conducting audits); see also infra note 140.
115. In the United States, foreign direct investment is defined as "the ownership or control,
directly or indirectly, by one foreign person of 10 per centum or more of the voting securities of an
incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business
enterprise, including a branch." 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a) (2001). '"A key element of the structural
transformation into the global company town was the role played by the multinational corporation and
foreign direct investment. ... Technological advances have played a part in triggering the global
revolution, but the multinational corporation has evolved to become an important vehicle for allocating
resources.'" Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization: An Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 375, 387 (1996) (quoting Bijit Bora, The Implications of Globalisation for
Australian Foreign Investment Policy, in EcONOMIC PLANNING ADVISORY COMMISSION,
GLOBALIZATION: ISSUES FOR AUSTRALIA 92 (1995).
The flow of foreign direct investment into and out of a country is routinely used as a reliable
indicator or gauge of corporate international expansion. See U.N. Center on Transnational
Corporations, The Process of Transnationalization in the 1980s, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS: A DECISION APPROACH 23, 26, 33 (Robert Z. Aliber & Reid W. Click eds., 1993). The
growth of foreign direct investment in 1995 exceeded that of export of goods by 18% and world output
by 2.4%. U.N. CoNFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT I996: INVESTMENT,
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.96.li.A.l4 (1996)
[hereinafter WIR 1996]. At one point, almost half of the total world stock of foreign direct investment
could be traced to one single country, the United States. MucHLINSKI, supra note 108, at 26-27. But as
European and Japanese corporations began to expand internationally, by 1985, the United States
accounted for only 25% of the world's total foreign direct investment share, with Western Europe as a
region accounting for almost 50% and Japan for 11%. /d. at 28.
116. MICHAEL E. PoRTER, THE CoMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 14 (2d ed 1998).
117. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc., a Swiss-Swedish electrical engineering company, considers itself
"a company without any regard to national boundaries," for example. Charlene Marmer Solomon,
Transplanting Corporate Cultures Globally, PERSONNEL J., Oct. 1993, at 78, 80 (statement by Richard
P. Randazzo, ABB's vice-president of Human Resources). ABB also planned to lay off a thousand
Swiss workers and invest $1 billion in Asia. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 62.
118. WINFRIED RUIGROK & ROB VAN TULDER, THE LoGIC OF INTERNATIONAL RESTRUCTURING
179 (1995). For example, the growth of regional trading blocs, such as the European free trade region,
was one of the key factors that caused U.S. and Japanese firms to establish subsidiaries in European
member countries for fear of being excluded from "Fortress Europe." U.S. INT'L TRADE CoMMISSION,
THE EFFECTS OF GREATER EcONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE
UNITED STATES (USlTC Pub. No. 2204 (July 1989)).
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component of production, such as research and development, to be retained
at home. 119
By contrast, globalizing firms, transnationals in the true sense of the
word, are "[t]ransnational in operation, ownership, and often in origins." 120
Transnationals "exceed national boundaries, transcend definitions of
national identity, and regard the entire globe as a single theater of
operations." 121 Transnationals are more likely to adopt a functional and
decentralization approach to decision making so that if research and development is allocated to a particular unit of the fum, then that unit bears
responsibility within the company for all research and development. 122
The debate as to whether or not corporations are multinational or
transnational, glocalizing or globalizing, regional or global in orientation,
does not significantly change my central point: 123 corporations are adopting
production and investment strategies that result in linkages across national

119. RUIGROK & VAN TuLDER, supra note 118, at 9-10; Louis W. Pauly & Simon Reich, National
Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalization,
51 INT'L 0RG. I, 1-30 (1997). Others defme multinational corporations more generally, as affiliated
corporations incorporated in different jurisdictions but under common control conducting a common
enterprise. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993); WIR 1993, supra note 110, at 18391.
120. WENDT, supra note 102, at 3. Others disagree about the extent to which a firm is truly global.
See, e.g., William R. Miller, The Role of Global Corporations, in GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND
NATION-STATES: Do COMPANIES OR COUNTRIES COMPETE? 21 (Richard S. Belous & Kelly L.
McClenahan eds., 1991); Ethan B. Kapstein, We Are US, NAT'L INT., Winter 1991-92, at 55-62; Robert
Kuttner, One Big, Happy Global Economy? Not Yet, Friend, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1990.
121. WENDT, supra note 102, at 5. For example, Asea Brown Boveri, a Swedish company formed
through a merger between Asea, a Swedish engineering company, and Brown Boveri, a Swiss
company, has 85% of its sales and 50% of its shares held outside of Sweden. William J. Holstein, The
Stateless Corporation, Bus. WK., May 14, 1990, at 98, 103. The company's official language is
English, although it is the mother tongue of only one third of its approximately 18,000 employees
located in forty different countries; members of the company's coordinating executive committee come
from eight countries; and its approximately 500 global managers routinely alternate among various
foreigu assignments. The ABB ofManagement, THE EcoNor.nST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 56.
122. Holstein, supra note 121, at 98. Such a fully globalizing strategy might be contingent on the
fact that markets are truly global and consumer tastes truly standardized so that there is little need for
customization. RUIGROK & VAN TuLDER, supra note 118, at 180-82. Coca Cola, McDonald's, and Levi
Jeans are examples of firms whose products reflect universal tastes. Other transnationals, especially
those from smaller markets, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, have adopted global
strategies as well. Those often cited include Shell, Unilever, Volvo-Renault, Asea Brown Boveri, Arjo
Wiggins Appleton, Sony, ffiM, and Nestle. WENDT, supra note 102, at 12; see also The Discreet
Charm of the Multicultural Multinational, THE EcoNor.nST, July 30, 1994, at 58 [hereinafter Discreet
Charm] (discussing how McDonald's issues its employees worldwide operation manuals and how
Unilever brings managers from around the world to its training headquarters in the United Kingdom);
The World Turned Upside Down, THE EcoNor.nST, June 24, 1995, at S5.
123. To the extent that glocalizing firms may exhibit less economic commitment to the particular
national community in which they operate, that may be a siguificant factor in the state's determination
of corporate nationality and consequently, the state's relationship with the firms at issue. See infra Part
Ill.
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borders. The internationalization of economic activities have produced at
least three identifiable and significant changes in the economic landscape.
First, it is likely that a product produced by a multinational corporation can no longer be unambiguously identified as the product of a particular state; equally likely, its components parts have been internationally
sourced and produced. "During earlier years when the norm was to produce
goods in one country and export from there, the use of origin rules to
define a product's place of manufacture was simple. Over the past decade
the issue has become more complicated."124 A Pontiac Le Mans, ostensibly
a General Motors product of American nationality, is in fact a globally
composite product involving South Korean assembly; Japanese engines,
transaxles and electronics; German design and style engineering;
Taiwanese, Singaporean, and Japanese small components; British advertising and marketing; and Irish and Barbadian data processing. 125 To underline the multinational composition of its product, Toray, Japan's largest
synthetic-fiber manufacturer, has adopted the label "Made in Toray." 126
This internationalization of a product's "origin" has profound implications
for an international and national trade regime still very much based on the

124. E. Ivan Kingston, The Economics ofRules ofOrigin, in RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL
'TRADE 9 (Edwin Vermulst et al. eds., 1994). Consider the following examples. An official of the
Caterpillar Tractor Corporation noted that
while we export from the U.S., our views as to transportation, markets, and product are
worldwide. For example, there is no U.S.-made Caterpillar tractor. A Caterpillar productwherever it is built-is just that-a Caterpillar product-graphic evidence that people of
different national origins and political interest can achieve common objectives.
DAVID H. BLAKE & ROBERTS. WALTERS, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 112-13
(4th ed. 1992). Similarly, precision ice hockey equipment may be "designed in Sweden, financed in
Canada, and assembled in Cleveland and Denmark for distribution in North America and Europe,
respectively, out of alloys whose molecular structure was researched and patented in Delaware and
fabricated in Japan." REICH, supra note 80, at 112. Products can no longer be presumed to be made in
one or even two countries-hence the following label affixed on a computer part: "This part was made
in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, China, Mexico, Germany, the U.S., Thailand, Canada and
Japan. It was made in so many different places that we cannot specifY a country of origin." FRIEDMAN,
supra note 10, at 33.
125. REICH, supra note 80, at 113. The confusion associated with product nationality is by now
routine, especially in automobile manufacturing. The Chevy may be built in Mexico from imported
parts and then reimported into the United States; a Ford built in German plants by Turkish workers and
sold in Hong Kong and Nigeria; a Toyota designed by an American designer at Toyota's Newport
Beach, California, Calty Design Research Center, assembled at the Georgetown, Kentucky plant from
American-made parts (except that the engine and drive trains are still Japanese) and then test driven at
Toyota's Arizona proving ground. BARBER, supra note I, at 24, 315 n.7. The 1977 first-generation
Honda Accord made in Marysville, Ohio, originally had no American parts. The 1982 model contained
50% American parts and the new fifth-generation Accord 80%. See Doren P. Levin, Honda's Star Gets
Another Sequel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at Dl.
Other industries have gone through similar experiences. McDonnell Douglas, for example,
engaged its global partners in the construction of its MD-95 planes, with Halla Engineering of South
Korea building the wings, BMW/Rolls-Royce developing the engines, and Alenia of Italy building the
fuselage. Stanley Holmes, When Jobs Go South, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at AI.
126. Andrew Pollack, Breaking out ofJapan's Orbit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at Dl.
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presumption that products, like corporations, have distinct and identifiable
countries of origin. 127
Second, this confounding combination of product cross-nationalities
is matched by a similarly confounding parallel cross-ownership among the
corporations. The national corporations that were once clearly identified
with their countries of origin are now international, or global, in orientation
and ownership. 128 Equally significant, corporate players are more likely to
engage in "genuinely strategic alliances" 129 of "low or non-equity ventures
that mix and match corporate strengths in research, development,
manufacturing, marketing, service, and other business functions" 130 than in
"establishing dominance in all of [a] business system's critical areas," 131
allowing them to spread the costs and risks of product development and

127. For a discussion of the policies underlying rules of origin, see RULES OF ORIGIN IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 124.
128. Daimler-Benz AG, a German industrial champion, and Chrysler Corp., the American maker
of Jeeps, merged in a culture "where shared values of open markets, hard money and standardized
technology increasingly take precedence over old-fashioned nationalism." Joseph B. White, Global
Mall, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1998, at AI ("More and more, national boundaries, cultural variations and
accidents of geography such as the Atlantic Ocean aren't stopping business leaders who see a chance to
expand their reach as trade barriers fall, communication becomes cheap and cousunter tastes for
everything from cola to cellular phones converge."). Anheuser-Busch owns a stake in Japan's biggest
brewery, Kirin, as well as a 5% share of China's Tsingtao and a 10% share of Antarctica, Brazil's
leading beer company (as of 1997). GREIDER, supra note 20, at 20. In the past ten years, the growth of
worldwide cross-border mergers and acquisitions has approxitnated the growth of foreign direct
investment flows. \VIR I996, supra note 115, at 7. In 1995, the total value of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions was S229 billion, twice the value of the 19881evel. Id. at 10.
129. Kenichi Ohmae, The Global Logic ofStrategic Alliances, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1989,
at 143 (discussing alliances forged among corporations for distribution purposes and for research and
development in industries ranging from automobile to pharmaceutical). This phenomenon is also
referred to as international strategic alliances, see U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations, supra
note 115, at 27, where separate entities engage in various collaborative agreements for marketing, joint
ventures, subcontracting, cross-licensing, research and development, technology exchanges, and so
forth. See BERNARD MICHAEL GILROY, NETIVORKING IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 34 (1993); see
also What Is a U.S. Company?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Research & Tech. and the
Subcomm. on Int'/ Scientific Cooperation of the Comm. on Science, Space, and Tech., lOlst Cong. 30
(1989) (describing "cross-border alliances between companies from different countries that blur the
national identity of products, processes and individual enterprises''), 34 !describing how "[d]etennining
the nationality of corporate ownership requires sorting through this interwoven network of transnational
alliances"), 66 (explaining that because of costs, technology, and marketing reasons, companies have
had to enter into alliances, as "no single company can afford the cost of staying on the leading edge")
(statements of Dr. John Kline, Deputy Director, Langegger Program, Georgetown University)
[hereinafter What Is a U.S. Company Hearings].
In the 1980s, U.S. firms entered into an estimated 2,000 strategic alliances with European firms.
GILROY, supra, at 26 (1993). Germany's Siemeus has forged a partnership with Skoda Plzen to produce
steam turbines in the Czech Republic; Japan's NEC collaborated with Korea's Samsung to make
DRAM memory chips; AT&T formed various alliances with the telephone companies of Sweden,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands, and MCI with British Telecommunications. GREIDER, supra note 20,
at 20-21.
130. What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 129, at 33 (statement of Dr. John Kline).
131. Ohmae,supranote 129,at 143.
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providing each firm with access to new technology that is not yet available
within the firm. 132
Third, and perhaps most significant, the internationalization of economic activities has coincided with the transition from high-volume production such as manufacturing to high-value production such as
information technology, 133 resulting in an even more accelerated transformation of the multinational corporation-from one territorially bound to
one more decentralized and hence less connected to its country of nationality.134 Consequently, high-volume production of standardized commodities
requiring heavy investment in immobile assets has been supplanted by
high-value production of nonroutine, specially tailored products and services requiring neither fixed machinery nor factory. 135 For example, in

132. John M. Kline, The Inverse Relationship Between Nation-States and Global Corporations, in
GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATION-STATES: Do COMPANIES OR COUNTRIES COMPETE?, supra note
120, at 2.
133. See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, ELECTRONIC
ENTERPRISES: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 13-15 (1994); Peter F. Drucker, Management and the World's
Work, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 65 (relating the decline of manufacturing and the rise of
information industry in the United States); Siew Meng Leong & Chin Tiong Tan, Managing Across
Borders, 24 J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES 449,449 (describing shift in "volume to value production'').
The essential difference of the new information technology-its capacity to amplify human
intellect rather than muscle-is integral to the social and economic consequences that are
unfolding.... [D]ecision-making can be decentralized in reformed workplaces and
production jobs can be scattered across many distance places, even at a computer terminal in
one's home.
GREIDER, supra note 20, at 28; see also BARBER, supra note 1, at 59-87. Indeed, the information
technology industry is widely acknowledged to be the new coin of the realm in international trade. See,
e.g., LAURA D'ANDREA TYsoN, WHO's BASHING WHOM?: TRADE CONFLICTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIES 11-13 (1993).
134. Corporations are eager to present an "anational,'' or cosmopolitan, face. Reebok's advertising
campaign promoted the company under the banner "On Planet Reebok." BARBER, supra note 1, at 24.
Ralph Lauren's perfume for men, Safari, promoted the concept of"Living Without Boundaries" in its
1992 launch campaign. /d. Toshiba proclaimed in its 1992 annual report that "'as good corporate
citizens' they 'do our part to ensure that progress continues within the world community.'" /d. In 1997,
British Airways removed the Union Jack emblem from the tails of its planes and replaced the British
flag with various ethnic designs because "the airline was no longer a British company with global
operations, but a global company that happened to be headquartered in Britain." Undoing Britain?, THE
EcONOMIST, Nov. 6-12, 1999, at 3. According to its chief executive, Bob Ayling, "'We are proud to
have been born and raised in Britain ... [b]ut we want to show Britain as modem, not imperial."' Id
135. During the Industrial Revolution, wealth was created through the mobilization of technology
combined with the accumulation of capital and the abundance of unskilled labor, see 9 THE NEw
CAMBRIDGE MoDERN HisTORY 31-47 (C.W. Crowley ed., 1965), for the mass production of industrial
and consumer goods. 6 CAMBRIDGE EcONOMIST HISTORY OF EUROPE 451-54 (M. M. Postan & H.J.
Habakkuk eds., 1966). To maximize profits, management focused on decreasing costs and producing
ever larger quantities of products, by adopting various corporate growth strategies, such as forming
trusts in the industrial and commercial sectors, JEREMY ATACK & PETER PASSELL, A NEW EcONOMIC
VIEW OF AMERICAN HiSTORY 474-81, 481-88 (2d ed. 1994), leading to "the dramatic wave of
consolidations that took place around the tum of the century ... ."/d. at 488. After World War II, many
of the largest manufacturing firms, particularly the American ones, were transformed from national to
multinational enterprises through the development of subsidiaries and affiliates outside the home
country, contributing thus to the increasing integration of one national economy with another. See
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terms of structure, the early multinational corporations in the manufacturing sectors operated on a clear division between the function of the company's headquarters versus its overseas operation. The company's
headquarters in its home territory performed research and development,
designing, and major production operations; the company's overseas activities were generally confined to assembly, distribution, sales, and marketing. 136 Starting in the 1970s, foreign affiliates and subsidiaries of
multinationals assumed greater responsibility in a wide array of functions,
such as research and development, product innovation, design, as well as
production. 137 Firms with worldwide, global strategies are now likely to
favor greater integration of the parent and its subsidiaries and the adoption
of global product standards, production processes, and orgauizational structures.r3s
With intellectual property as the new currency, the corporation is increasingly composed of decentralized corporate webs consisting of globally dispersed, mobile independent or semi-independent entities, each
engaged in various forms of partnerships, joint ventures, subcontracting,
cross-licensing, and brokering relationships with each other. 139 In the
Raymond Vernon, Multinationals Are Mushrooming, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND
INTERNATIONAL EcONO~nc POLICY: A READER 220, 220-21 (Philip King ed., 3d ed. 2000).
The earlier multinational corporations, however, were more likely to be involved in the extraction
and production of natural resources or in the manufacturing of agricultural commodities. See
MucHLINSKI, supra note 108, at 22. After World War II, corporate investments internationally shifted
toward technologically advanced manufacturing and services in other economically developed
countries. /d. at 28. Strategic resource was capital in the industrial age. In the current postindustrial age,
strategic resource is lmowledge. See generally Thomas A. Stewart, Brainpower, FoRTUNE, June 3,
1991, at 44; JOHN NAISBITT, MEGATRENDS 17 (1982) ("Knowledge has already become the primary
industry, the industry that supplies the economy the essential and central resources of production.").
136. Typically a company's first venture abroad begins with the exporting of products to foreign
markets, followed by the establishment of distribution and assembly operations. At the next stage of
involvement, the foreign operation engages in manufacture, sale, distribution, and servicing of products
sold in the foreign country, and may eventually assume responsibility for research and development
See Hadari, supra note 108, at 746 & n.91; Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, The Internationalization ofFirms, 5
J. WORLD TRADE L. 72, 81 (1971).
137. See Louis Uchitelle, U.S. Businesses Loosen Link to Mother Country, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
1989, at AI; see also Raymond Vernon, Transnational Corporations: Where Are They Coming From,
Where Are They Headed?, in I TRANSNAT'L CoRPS. 7, at 10, 12 (1992); Hadari, supra note 108, at 746;
Hawrylyshyn, supra note 136, at 81; Holstein, supra note 121, at 98.
138. See Discreet Charm, supra note 122, at 57-58; Holstein, supra note 121, at 104. For example,
in 1995, the Ford Motor Company, a U.S.-origin company, began implementation of a new
reorganization and consolidation policy aimed at integrating its regional operations into a single global
enterprise. See The World That Changed the Machine, THE EcoNo~nST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 63. Xerox,
Caterpillar, IBM, Unilever, Siemens, and Hoechst, like Ford, also began to integrate their operations
into global units. Discreet Charm, supra note 122, at 58.
139. John W. Kensinger & John D. Martin, Financing Network Organizations, in THE NEW
CORPORATE FINANCE 561 (Donald H. Chew, Jr. ed., 1993); REICH, supra note 80, at 92-93 (describing
the proliferation of decentralized corporate webs: spin-off partnerships (independent businesses
partially owned by headquarters after the spin-offs); spin-in partnerships (independent businesses
spinning into partnerships with headquarters); licensing; and brokering); Russell Johnston & Paul
Lawrence, Beyond Vertical Integration-The Rise of the Value-Adding Partnership, HARV. Bus. REv.,
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knowledge-based economy, emphasis is on alacrity and flexibility. Companies in the highly competitive high-technology sectors must launch new
products in multiple world markets-hence the rush to internationalize
corporate operations. I40
These shifts in corporate outsourcing, international alliances and ownership, and structural organization have prompted many commentators to
note the emergence of the truly global corporation.I 4 I The effects of this
phenomenon on First World and Third World economic relations and on
the international trade system are the focus of Part ll.B and Part li.C below.
July-Aug. 1988, at 94 (describing smaller value-added partnerships); Spinning It Out at Thermo
Electron, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 1997, at 57 (describing spin-outs or spin-offs spun from larger
companies such as Thermo Electron, which retains a majority stake in each spin-out but allows its spinouts more freedom than what conventional subsidiaries would normally be given); Jerry Useem, The
Start-Up Factory, INC., Feb. 1997, at 40, 42,46 (describing technology marketing partnerships such as
Idealab, which is in the bnsiness of creating bnsinesses by nurturing start-up companies through a
network of "interdependent yet nominally independent companies, all built around a core base of
knowledge."); John W. Wilson & Judith H. Dobrzynski, And Now, the Post-Industrial Corporation,
Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 1986, at 64; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at xv-xvi (describing how new
technologies "allow companies to locate different parts of their production, research and marketing in
different countries, but still tie them together through computers and teleconferencing as though they
were in one place''); Gary Gereffi, Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in Asia, 12 J.
ASIAN Bus. 75, 81-82 (1996) (describing the proliferation of the producer-driven and buyer-driven
global commodity chain, with its many-tiered production networks).
140. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MULTINATIONALS AND THE
NATIONAL INTEREST: PLAYING BY DIFFERENT RULES 38 (1993) [hereinafter MULTINATIONALS AND
THE NATIONAL INTEREST]. For a discussion of a product's "life cycle" and its relationship to foreign
direct investment, see generally DAVID K. EITEMAN ET AL., MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS FINANCE 47072 (6th ed. 1992).
Additionally, the accelerating life cycle, from conception to obsolescence, of new electronics
products has made it too costly for even large companies such as IBM or Philips Electronics to invest
globally in the production of new products. Jonathan Friedland & Gary McWilliams, How a Need for
Speed Turned Guadalajara into a High-Tech Hub, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2000, at AI. As a result,
contract manufacturing is expected to grow 20% annually over the next few years, from $60 billion in
1998 to $149.2 billion in 2003. !d. With speed (and not just cheap labor) becoming a crucial factor in
the production process, places like Guadalajara, Mexico, have developed into high-tech hubs and
principal manufacturing centers for electronics products sold in the United States. Companies like
Cisco Systems switched to contract manufacturers to build their networking gear and other products. !d.
The technology revolution has thns reinforced the trend towards worldwide outsourcing, see supra
notes 133-40 and accompanying text, as companies increasingly shed their previous organizational
model of vertical integration to pursue a strategy of "buying parts or whole products from other
producers, both at home and abroad." Jonas, supra note 114, at 58. Relying on their webs of alliances,
toy companies such as Lewis Galoob Toys, with a mere 115 employees, were able to ensure that new
products are on the shelves in U.S. stores quickly and efficiently. Lewis Galoob Toys relies on
independent inventors for new designs and on independent partner contractors in Hong Kong who
subcontract the labor-intensive manufacturing to factories in China. See Wilson & Dobrzynski, supra
note 139, at 64.
141. See KENICHI 0HMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD 114-36 (1990); Holstein, supra note 121, at
97; Reich, supra note 8, at 53; Cf D'Andrea Tyson, supra note 8, at 37; Kapstein, supra note 120, at
55-62 (arguing that global corporations have not yet shed their national identities); Robert Kuttner, One
Big, Happy Global Economy? Not Yet, Friend, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1990; see generally John H.
Dunning, The Global Economy, Domestic Governance, Strategies and Transnational
Corporations: Interactions and Policy Implications, TRANSNAT'L CoRPs., Dec. 1992, at 11.
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The Distributional Impact: Rich and Poor, High-Volume, High-Value

International capital is footloose and, under the right economic conditions, may be enticed into or away from any country. While place-based
communities that attract capital may have problems coping with the infusion of capital in the local economy/42 place-based communities abandoned by capital are faced with a far more serious problem. 143 In the early
1990s, while capital flowed into the emerging markets of historically
lesser-developed nations and "while the advanced economies remained
stagnant or mired in recession, a league of poorer economies was enjoying
a spectacular investment boom." 144 There is no doubt that the vast majority
of countries in the world are still mired in "abject and dehumanizing
poverty." 145 But for a number of developing countries that have successfully engaged the global economy, "[t]he new fulcrum is the shifting of
opportunities for wealth and incomes from the older, richer societies to the
poorer ones." 146
This new opening has created real opportunities for poorer countries
to benefit from global economic activities, not through a U.N.-declared
redistribution that calls for a new international economic order 147 or a
"right to development," 148 but through a "market-based" framework pursuant to economic integration, interdependence, and convergence. 149 As one

142. See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and
Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftennath of the Mexican Financial
Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539 (1996).
143. See, e.g., Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. LJ. 1757, 1759 (1993).
144. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 22.
145. Report of the Secretary-General to the Prep. Comm. for the High-Level International
Intergovernmental Event on Financing for Development 2, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.257/l2 (2000). The World Bank estimated that the percentage of the world's population still
living in extreme and absolute poverty, defined as living on less than $1 a day, fell from 28.3 to 24.0%
between 1987 and 1998. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONO~nc PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 29 (2000); THE WORLD BANK GROUP, 2001 POVERTY UPDATE, at
http://www.worldbank.org/htrnYextdr/pb/pbpoverty.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
146. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 42. These govermnents vie to have corporations contribute to the
manufacturing and capital base, as well as the research and technology capabilities of their local firms
and local economies. MULTINATIONALS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 140, at 2-3. "[11he
fact that people in rich countries now fret about developing countries' success, not their poverty, is
itself a remarkable tribute to those countries' economic reforms." War of the Worlds, THE EcoNo~nsT,
Oct. l, 1994, at 5.
147. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201,
U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. l, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
148. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 4l/l28, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp.
No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/4l/53 (1986).
149. See L. Alan Winters, Trade and Poverty: Is T/zere a Connection?, in \VTO SoCIAL STUDIES
No. 5: TRADE, INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY 43, 43 (World Trade Org. ed., 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english!news_e/pres00_e/prl8l_e.htm (June 13, 2000); see also Harold J. Berman,
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writer has aptly noted:
[f]or the first time in human history, ... a fateful connection is
emerging between the first [the rich countries at the top of the
ladder] and the last. One end of the ladder (or seesaw) cannot
defend its own general prosperity without attending to human
conditions at the other end. For masses of people in the global
marketplace, economic self-interest is converging with altruism. 150
In other words, by taking advantage of this new opening provided by the
internationalization of trade and investment, poor countries could leverage
themselves out of poverty. Even Japanese corporations, traditionally more
territorially tied to Japan than other corporations are tied to their home territories, have moved their operations, and consequently jobs, abroad. 151
Approximately 50% of Sony's employees come from outside of Japan. 152
By the early 1990s, Toyota's international production, that is, production
outside Japan, was up to 20% of its total production. 153 Mabuchi Motors,
which has half of the world market for minuscule motors used to power
toothbrushes, zoom lenses, and car windows, employs thirty-three thousand workers-one thousand in Japan, but most in cheaper labor markets
elsewhere. 154
According to a controversial study, conventional economic analysis
had underestimated the job losses suffered by advanced economies and
gained by developing countries-shifts attributable to international trade in
particular. 155 Comparative advantage for a growing number of developing
The Role ofInternational Law in the Twenty-First Century, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617, 1621 (1995).
Berman commented:
That humankind, in the aftermath of two world wars, has reached a turning point in its
history, that the world has entered a new era of global interdependence, that all inhabitants of
Planet Earth share a common destiny, is a historical fact, a political fact, an economic fact, a
sociological fact, that has finally penetrated the consciousness of most of the earth's
inhabitants.
/d.
150. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 43.
151. See Brenton R. Schlender, Japan Hits the Wall, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 1993, at 128. Beginning in
the 1990s, with the appreciation of the yen, Japanese companies had to offset the proportionate rise in
the price of Japanese goods in the export markets by shifting production to other nations in Asia.
Sony's Walkman, for example, is now made entirely in Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. GREIDER,
supra note 20, at 69.
152. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 15.
153. Andrew Pollack, Honda Setto Increase U.S. Output, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at Dl.
154. Andrew Pollack, Today's Corporate Game Plans Know No Boundaries: Mabuchi Motors;
an Un-Japanese Mode/for Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1994, at Cl.
155. See generally ADRIAN
WOOD, NORTH-SOUTH
TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND
INEQUALITY: CHANGING FORTUNES IN A SKILL-DRIVEN WORLD (1994). This study has generated
discussion because of the author's conclusion that international trade has increased trade between
developed and developing countries, which has created adverse consequences, in terms of wage and job
security, for lesser-skilled workers in rich countries. Economists who question the study believe,
instead, that competition from low-wage producers in poor countries cannot be the primary cause of job
losses of industrial workers in rich countries. For these economists critical of Wood's study, the
technology revolution, not trade with poor countries, is the more important cause of job losses in rich
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countries no longer means just exporting raw materials or "low-tech,
labour-intensive goods while industrial countries keep the high-tech
goods." 156 In fifteen years, Thailand moved from being a rice producer to
the world's second-largest producer of pickup trucks and fourth-largest
manufacturer of motorcycles. 157 For workers in the rich nations, then, jobs
are moving overseas, but not just jobs in the traditional manufacturing or
high-volume sectors. 158 As markets become more international and open to
increased trade and foreign direct investment, demand for information
technology also increased, causing more companies to locate an even wider
range of value-added activities overseas, such as research and development, procurement, accounting, and data entry and processing. 159 Even
countries. See, e.g., Carol Stump, Comment, Free Trade Area of the Americas, 4 J. lNr'L L. & PRAc.
153, 168 (1995). Wood's study, published in 1994, stood in contrast with the conventional
understanding of"[m]ost economists [who] have emphasized the role of technology, arguing that skillbiased technological improvements have reduced the relative wages of unskilled workers in the United
States... ."See John T. Addison et al., Technology, Trade Sensitivity, and Labor Displacement, 66 S.
EcoN. J. 682, 682 (2000); Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 48, at 9 (discussing a study by
William Cline that shows that ''technological change was perhaps five times more powerful in
widening inequality in America between 1973 and 1993 than trade (including trade due to FDI [foreign
direct investment])"); Workers of the World, Compete, THE EcoNOMIST, Apr. 2, 1994, at 70 ("Many
economists prefer to blame the dwindling demand for unskilled workers on the technological revolution
of the past decade.").
See also MULTINATIONALS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 140, at 10 (describing Joss
of jobs, export earnings, and tax revenues faced by governments when corporations move from one
jurisdiction to another); THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL EcONOMY (Jerry Mander & Edward
Goldsmith eds., 1996). The apparent economic success of poorer countries, as seen in the rise in their
exports, is considered "the single most important reason for the increase in European unemployment
rates." See generally WES, supra note 79, at 2 (citing COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
GROWTH, COMPETmVENESS, EMPLOYMENT: THE CHALLENGES AND WAYS FORWARD INTO THE 21ST
CENTURY-WHITE PAPER, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg
(1993)).
156. War of the Worlds, supra note 146, at 24. Technological changes "mean that developing
countries don't just have to trade their raw materials to the West and get finished products in return;
they mean that developing countries can become big-time producers as well." FRIEDMAN, supra note
10, at XV, 45; see also WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: WORKERS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 51
(1995).
157. FRIEDMAN,supra note 10, at46.
158. Traditional ship-building countries such as Finland are seeing their shipbuilding industries
relocate to countries such as Brazil, China, Taiwan, and the countries of Eastern Europe. GREIDER,
supra note 20, at 62. Caterpillar also shifted production to overseas plants in Brazil, Europe, and Japan.
Id at63.
159. See generally \VIR 1993, supra note 110. China, India, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
established computer programming and equipment-design centers; created service industries, such as
banking, accounting, and insurance; and globalized the preparation and handling of tax returns,
insurance claims, and the processing of airline tickets. See GREIDER, supra note 20, at 66; Keith
Bradsher, SJ..illed Workers Watch Their Jobs Migrate Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at AI.
Outside of Bombay is a new, high-tech town known as SCEEPZ-the Santa Cruz Electronic Export
Processing Zone-where transnational companies like Swissair and AT&T hire Hindi-, Tamil-, and
Mahratti-speaking computer programmers to write software. BAREER, supra note 1, at 18; see also
Sanjoy Hazarika, An Indian City of the Future with the Lure of the Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at
D6. Call centers are thriving in India, as companies like GE and British Airways have established
phone banks employing Indian workers with fictional American lives to handle customer inquiries from
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without significant governmental resources to foster technology development, a number of small countries, most spectacularly, the Philippines,
have nonetheless managed to become a center of information activities. 160
In many instances the global dispersion of production and investment
has resulted in a divergence between the national and the corporate interests. While it had once been understood that the interests of the national
corporations or the national champions were more or less aligned with the
national interests, so that, for example, "what is good for General Motors is
good for America," this alignment of interests can no longer be easily presumed.161 The corporation is no longer territorially confmed to its home
the United States. Mark Landler, Hi, I'm in Bangalore (but I Can't Say So), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,2001,
at AI (describing how customer service employees hired to field calls have set up fake telephone
identities to convince Americans dialing toll-free numbers that the customer service employees work
nearby; some watch American sitcoms such as Ally McBeal to learn the right phrases).
Where physical contact with customers is not essential, there is increasing scope for
outsourcing to countries with cheap, but relatively well-educated workforces. People can be
employed anywhere to carry out labour-intensive computer programming and data
processing, keeping in touch with head office by computer network and satellite. Routine
accountancy work, for example, could be subcontracted to developing countries.
War of the Worlds, supra note 146, at 24; Chen May-Yee, Let's Make a Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25,
2000, at Rl 0. Costa Rica, for example, successfully assembled an incentive package that included an
eight-year income tax exemption, with a subsequent four-year period of 50% reduction in the country's
30% income tax rate, duty free import of raw materials, and free movement of capital-in order to land
a $300 million semiconductor test and assembly plant established by Intel outside the Costa Rican city
of San Jose. May-Yee, supra.
160. "Even poorer places, and those without strong links to established innovation centers, can
piggyback on the wide distribution of skills, knowledge, communications systems and capital around
the world." G. Pascal Zachary & Robert Frank, High-Tech Hopes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at R4.
In the Philippines, "poor, largely rural students from remote villages [using] the most basic tools to ride
the digital wave" have formed programming pools and attracted companies like Motorola and
Anderson Consulting. /d. Web developers in Asia and Europe now send their design work to the
Philippines, and engineering companies, like Bechtel Corporation, send blueprints to the Philippines at
night and have them turned around and computer ready by the next morning. Id. America Online is
building a world-wide service center at the former U.S. Clark Air Force Base where Filipino engineers
and software experts work the e-mail system answering questions from AOL users in the United States.
I d.

Other smaller countries that have managed to develop high-powered niches for certain
technologies include: Israel for "instant messaging" technology, used in electronic mail; optoelectronics technology for China; and user interfaces technology for Mexico. Id. In an effort to become
attractive technology sites, Costa Rica has eliminated import taxes on computer-related equipment,
adopted an aggressive policy upgrading information technology facilities in schools, and strengthened
its intellectual property laws. South Korea has an official policy of promoting e-business, with tight
security standards for telecommunications centers. Hungary has invested heavily in information
technology education, and all its secondary schools are connected through network computers.
Estonia's Parliament approved a proposal to guarantee internet access as a matter of constitutional right
for all its citizens, with the government setting "e-readiness" as its national priority. Ghana has become
the first West African nation to attain connectivity in 1994. Id.
161. See generally REICH, supra note 80, at 43-68; GREIDER, supra note 20, at 76. John Ruggie
has termed this a breakdown of the "embedded liberal compromise" between capital and labor in the
rich industrialized countries, which has also resulted in the state's adoption of a market-oriented
approach to economic management to replace the Keynesian, state-oriented welfare approach that had
characterized much of the post-World War II era. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes,
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economy in the rich countries and could be lured to any country that offers
the right combination of factors for increased profitability. 162 These events
have produced two significant changes. First, they have allowed poorer
countries to exploit the increasing dispersal of capital to their advantage,
reducing to some degree the raw power of the historically dominant nations
to impose colonialist or neocolonialist terms of trade on the poorer countries.163 Second, however, it has also caused increased inequalities among
certain groups within the advanced industrial societies, as companies shift
their high-volume and even some high-value work from the richer to the
poorer countries. 164
This Article proposes that these substantive issues with distributive
impact, both nationally and internationally, be addressed in a way that
takes into account both the fact of globalization and the social and political
context within which globalization itself must be engaged. For the free
trade system to survive, it must have not just economic success but also
political appeal. But before one can institute an effective economic regime
that strikes a balance between the free trade orientation of the global economic system on the one hand and the protective concerns of national governments for their national economies on the other, one must first
accurately understand what is meant by "national" and "international" as
those terms have been employed and understood.

C.

Confusion: Dilemmas Underlying Current Trade Law and Policy

lt is time to reassess the extent to which the national corporation is
still an appropriate conduit for national trade and investment policies. To
use the United States as an example, because the benefits of U.S. trade
Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post War Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG.
379, 379-415 (1982).
162. A brief examination of tbe history of American corporate law shows tbat individual states in
tbe United States have also engaged in a competitive race to attract corporations by adopting liberal
corporate enactment statutes. For example, New Jersey had long been aware oftbe revenue-generating
aspects of corporate chartering; tbus tbe New Jersey general incorporation act was tbe broadest and tbe
most enabling, providing for a simple incorporating procedure and lenient residency requirements. See
generally Gordon Tullock, Entry Barriers in Politics, 55 AM. EcoN. REv. 458 (1965); ROBERT HEssEN,
IN DEFENSE OF THE CoRPORATION 68-71 (1979). The New Jersey General Incorporation Act marked a
complete shift from tbe states' initial hostility towards foreign corporations to one tbat welcomed
corporate business activities within tbeir territories. GEORGE HEBERTON EVANS, BUSINESS
INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, t8oo-1943, at 11 (1948); Vicki Been, Exit as a Constraint on
Land Use Exactions: Rethinl..-ing the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473,
534 (1991). Delaware too has followed tbe New Jersey model and "bettered" it, allowing Delaware to
assume leadership in providing and keeping a body of liberal corporate laws. See Andrew G. T. Moore,
Preface toR. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND BusiNESS ORGANIZATIONS H-11 (3d ed. 1998); BernardS. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990).
163. See supra notes 146-50.
164. See supra notes 151-60; David R. Howell, The Skills Myth, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1994, at
81.
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laws and policies are only available to American companies, what
constitutes "American" has significant implications. 165 But how or when a
company or product qualifies as domestic is currently determined in
piecemeal fashion by a system without clear rules or objectives.
Take as an example U.S. antidumping laws, one of the types of laws
that regulate the importation of foreign products into the U.S. market.
Dumping occurs when imports are sold in the United States at less than
"fair value," that is, less than the price for home market or third market
sales, and as a result, cause or threaten to cause material injury to a U.S.
industry. 166 Since the statute itself requires that the petition be made "on
behalf of an industry," the antidumping laws are geared to the protection of
a domestic industry from unfair practices. 167 But the regulatory framework
governing U.S. antidumping laws is one rooted in a time when U.S. industry meant U.S. companies, as traditionally understood. 168 With the growing
internationalization of production by corporate entities, the question of
which party has standing to invoke the antidumping laws or which product
is a U.S. versus a foreign product has become increasingly complicated.
For example, in a proceeding initiated by Motorola, whereby Motorola
claimed injury by less-than-fair-value imports of pagers from Japan, the
definition of "domestic industry" became an issue when NEC, one of the
Japanese importers, argued that Motorola should not be considered a domestic producer because Motorola itself imported pagers manufactured in
its facilities in Malaysia. 169 Which entity can be deemed part of the
domestic industry is no longer simple when a domestic company (the
165. Examples of such trade laws include those designed to protect U.S. industry from unfair trade
or import surges, those designed to open up foreign markets for U.S. companies, or those that condition
certain government policy initiatives on the recipients being U.S. nationals or part of domestic industry.
See Hilary K. Josephs, The Multinational Corporation, Integrated International Production, and the
United States Antidumping Laws, 5 TUL. J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 51, 59 (1997) ("Because special benefits
accrue to the 'American' corporation and not to foreign corporations (including the ability to invoke the
protection of U.S. laws), the tests for identifYing corporate nationality are crucial. United States
corporation law has not kept pace with changes in the economic reality.").
166. See Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 731-39 (1950), amended by !9 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673(h) (1994),
and Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 211-234, 108 Stat. 4842-4901 (1995).
167. Article 5.1 of the GATT Antidumping Code states the following: "An investigation to
determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall normally be initiated upon a
written request by or on behalf of the domestic industry affected." Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI ofthe General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 5.1, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 18
I.L.M. 621 (1979).
168. Josephs, supra note 165, at 54-55.
169. See Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan, USITC Pub. 1410,
lnv. No. 731-TA-102 (Aug. 1983). NEC and Matsushita Communication Industrial Company argued
that even if Motorola could be considered a domestic producer, any injury complained of by Motorola
was only to products that were themselves imported. Matsushita also argued that injury to the domestic
industry should be assessed only with respect to domestically produced pagers. The ITC held for
Motorola, based on the overall nature of Motorola's activities in the United States, and concluded that
Motorola's production of pagers, including those pagers partially assembled in Malaysia, are to be
considered part ofthe domestic industry injured by less-than-fair-value sales of imports.
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producer) performs operations offshore and when a foreign company (the
importer) performs some operations in the United States.
As complex as it is now to determine the nationality of a corporation,
it is equally difficult and complex to determine the national origin of a
product. In an investigation of an antidumping action involving forklifts,
for example, the Commerce Department confessed that "strictly speaking,
there was no such thing as a U.S. forklift, or a foreign forklift for that
matter.'mo Nonetheless, the agency determined that a forklift would be
considered a U.S. forklift if its frame is manufactured in the United States,
even if the remainder of its parts is made abroad. 171 The rules that determine a product's national origin have become so convoluted that it is hard
to tell whether they are designed to be part of a free trading system or to
present barriers to trade. 172
170. REICH, supra note 80, at 115.
171. Id.
172. Appearing before the Canadian Parliament to explain the various NAFTA provisions, then
Canadian Trade Minister, Michael Wilson, said the following about rules of origin: "Rules of origin
are very, very complex. You don't want to know about them. They are terrible things to deal with."
John P. Simpson, North American Free Trade Agreement-Rules of Origin, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 33, 33
(1994). For example, in determining which products qualify as North American and are thus eligible
for preferential tariff treatment by the member states, trade authorities must apply NAFTA rules of
origin. Goods wholly originating in the NAFTA trade area qualify for tariff preferences. But goods that
contain nonregional materials are still considered North American if those materials have been
substantially transformed so as to undergo a change in tariff classification. North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 40l(b), H.R. Doc. 103-159, 32 I.L.M. 289, 349 [hereinafter NAFTA].
According to international standards, nationality of a product is determined by the nationality of the last
country in which it underwent a "substantial transformation." Certain products, however, may also be
subject to different and more specific rules of origin. For example, autos and light trucks must meet a
specified 62.5% North American content. For computers, if the circuit board is made in North America
and transformed in the region, the computer may be freely traded. RALPH H. FoLSOM ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 412-13 (2d ed. 2001). Under special NAFTA rules,
television sets, for example, count as "North American" and are exempt from various taxes only if they
are not only assembled in North Ameriea but also contain North American made picture tubes
consisting of the screen and the electron gun. Keith Bradsher, In Twist, Protectionism Is Used to Sell
Trade Pact, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 7, 1993, at 26; see NAFTA, supra, annex 401, item 8528.10bb, 32
I.L.M. at 438; Mariana C. Silveira, Rules of Origin in International Trade Treaties: Towards the
FTAA, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 411, 442 (1997). For example, a color television receiver with a
screen size of more than fourteen inches is a NAFTA national only if the color picture tube originates
in North America. NAFTA, supra, annex 401, item 8528.10bb, 32 I.L.M. at 438. A color television
receiver with a screen size of less than fourteen inches must have all of the printed circuit boards and
the tuner originate within the region. NAFTA, supra, annex 401, item 8528.10aa, 32 I.L.M. at 437.
Assume that a television set is made in Mexico from component parts made in Mexico, Korea, and
elsewhere. While the television set may not receive NAFTA preferential tariff treatment unless the
color picture tube itself is manufactured within North America, the television may nonetheless be
classified as a product of Mexico for marking or other purposes, such as the application of a countryspecific quota or an antidumping duty. For a discussion of rules of origin, see infra text accompanying
notes 242-248. See also David A. Gantz, Implementing the NAFTA Rules of Origin: Are the Parties
Helping or Hurting Free Trade? 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 367, 372 (1995).
Yet, this special rule for televisions does not necessarily assure that the product will be more
"North American" and less "foreign." "[S]ince Japanese companies own large shares of both of the
'American' glass companies that manufacture tubes, 'American' domestic television sets will still be
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Without a thorough understanding of how globalization has produced
a post-national economic system, international trade laws continue to rely
on muddled notions of "nationality" to determine which company or which
product is domestic or foreign. As a result, decisions are made on a scattered basis, guided by obsolete rules and short-term national interests. In
some cases, countries found that traditional concepts of nationality were
inadequate and needed to' be revised, at least for the immediate cases at
hand. For example, when France tried to limit Japanese automobile imports
to 3% of the French market, Margaret Thatcher opposed the French move,
as the Nissan Bluebirds were not only assembled in Britain but also composed of parts 80% ofwhich came from Europe. 173 Similarly, when Taiwan
included Toyotas assembled in the United States in its ban on Japanese
auto imports, the Bush administration was compelled to come to Toyota's
defense and pressured Taiwan to back down. 174
But at other times, traditional and anachronistic notions prevail and
prevent countries from re-evaluating old premises. In 1986 when the
Reagan administration negotiated a formal semiconductor agreement with
Japan to provide a guaranteed market share to the U.S. semiconductor
industry, and even as the U.S. government made the defense of its
American semiconductor industry a centerpiece in its dispute with Japan,
the U.S. semiconductor industry was already moving production abroad;
from I982 to 1991, American jobs in this industry had suffered a 37%
decrease, from 290,000 to 184,000. 175 Motorola's workforce was increasing
globally but its U.S. share was declining to 56%. 176 In 1989, the Bush
Administration used the threat of Section 301 177 to force Japan to open its
substantially Japanese, even if they qualify as American under NAFTA rules." BARBER, supra note 1,
at 25; see also Bradsher, supra at 26. Asahi Glass of Japan owns 49% of the Corning subsidiary that
makes glass for television screens, and Nippon Electric Glass of Japan owns a subsidiary of Owenslllinois, the other major U.S. producer of television screen glass.
173. REicH, supra note 80, at 118.
174. ld.
175. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 91. The same anachronistic notions of "American" corporate
nationality prevail in the nontrade area as well and inform U.S. funding to Sematech, a consortium of
American semiconductor companies such as IBM, Texas Instruments, Motorola, AT&T, and others.
Despite the initiative's overtly nationalist objectives, at least from the perspective of the U.S.
government, the participating companies were clearly global in orientation: Texas Instruments began
building a $250 million semiconductor fabrication plant in Taiwan. It already had a plant in Kywhyu,
Japan, and had also formed an alliance with Hitachi to design and make a new generation of superchips,
as did Motorola in its alliance with Toshiba. AT&T, too, paired up with Japan's NEC and Mitsubishi
Electric; Intel with Japan's NMB Semiconductor Company and Matsushita Group, and IBM with
Germany's Siemens. In other words, "the consortium was in fact little more than a partnership among
several emerging global webs whose future would be only tangentially related to the future skills of
Americans." REICH, supra note 80, at 161. Ironically, a Japanese company, NEC, which was
constructing a $400 million advanced-chip fabrication facility in Rosevale, California, was not
permitted to join the Sematech consortium. See also What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note
129, at 36, 37-39 (statement of Dr. John Kline).
176. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 91; see also Uchitelle, supra note 137.
177. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 2011, 2041 (1976).
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market to Motorola. 178 At that point, despite its formal "American" corporate nationality, Motorola's production facilities were primarily in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. 179 In 1995, Motorola announced that it was locating its
new $750 million wafer fabrication plant not in the United States but in
China.tso

Although globalization of the firm and its products has resulted in a
convoluted concept of "national" identity and thus created awkward contradictions in the way trade law is conducted, there is as yet no comprehensive re-evaluation of corporate "nationality"181 in the international trading
system. What is a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation if its operations can be found in multiple national territories outside its home
state? 182 Corporate nationality has been determined by using a number of
178. REtcH, supra note 80, at 164.
179. Uchitelle,supranote 137.
180. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 91, 214 (describing the movement of operations to Asia by U.S.
auto parts producers); see also Helene Cooper, What Is the Luxury-car Fight About? A Primer, WALL
ST. J., May 18, 1995, at A2. Similarly, when the Clinton Administration was approached by both
Northern Telecom, a Canadian finn, and AT&T, an American company, for the Administration's
support of their respective bids to win the phone franchise in China, the U.S. government backed
AT&T, presumably because it is an American company. Northern Telecom, however, promised to
manufacture the hardware in its U.S. factories, and AT&T made no such promise. AT&T was
ultimately awarded the franchise after it agreed to build two new factories for advanced switching
equipment, both in China. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 213. Companies that have moved their
manufacturing operations abroad counter the suggestion that they are shedding their ties to the United
States. When Robert Reich suggested to the Federal Communications Commission that it choose a
high-defmition-television standard based in part on which system would. create '"the greatest
contribution to domestic high-wage employment,"' the chairman of Zenith, which assembles many of
its television sets in Mexico, argued that the issue should not be where the high-tech television sets are
assembled but where the semiconductor circuitry originates. Magnusson, supra note 107, at 142. Thus
while European companies might have moved some of their assembly operations to the United States,
the high-value-added jobs have remained in Europe. Id. Accordingly, Zenith, by offering to buy
components from AT&T's Florida and Peunsylvania chip factories, should rank above the European
companies in terms ofU.S. trade priorities.
181. The concept of"nationality'' was initially thought to be inapplicable to a corporation, because
"national" counoted a sense of personal allegiance towards the sovereign which only a natural person
could have. See Herman Walker, Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties,
59 AM. J. lNT'L L. 373, 377-78 (I956); E. Hilton Young, The Nationality of a Juristic Person, 22
HARv. L. REv. I, 2 (1908) (objecting to the application of the word "nationality," which carries certain
implications of political duties and allegiance, to a corporation). In modem U.S. law, the notion of
corporate nationality is fully accepted. See generally Yitzhak Hadari, The Choice of National Law
Applicable to the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality ofSuch Enterprises, I974 DuKE L.J. I,
3 [hereinafter Hadari, Choice of National Law]; Heinrich Kronstein, The Nationality ofInternational
Enterprises, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 983 (1952).
182. Citations infra notes 183-87 to works on corporate nationality are drawn from compilations
in Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: Towards Intermediate
Scrutiny for a Quasi-suspect Classification, 59 Mo. L. REv. 569, 677 un.2, 4, 5 & 6 (I994). See I7
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 8290 (perm. ed., rev. vol. I987) for a widely accepted definition of corporate nationality ("With
respect to a particular state or country, a corporation created by or under the laws of that state or
country is a 'domestic corporation' and any corporation that owes its existence to the laws of another
state, government or country is a 'foreign corporation."').
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tests. 183 First, the traditional incorporation test looks to where a corporation
is incorporated. 184 Under this test, a corporation is a mere artificial person
and therefore "can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created.... It must dwell in the place of its
creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty." 185 Second, the socalled control test determines corporate nationality by looking to the nationality of its stockholders and others, such as officers, directors, and
managers, who exercise control over its affairs. 186 And third, corporate nationality has been assigned by reference to the seat test, which looks to the
state where the center of a company's management is located. 187
183. The tests for corporate nationality are described infra notes 184-87. However, "[i]nternational
law does not provide a single, agreed answer to the problem of corporate nationality .... " Michael P.
Avrarnovich, The Protection ofInternational Investment at the Start of the Twenty-First Century: Will
Anachronistic Notions of Business Render Irrelevant The OECD's Multilateral Agreement on
Investment? 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1201, 1223 (1998); see also John H. Merryman, Nationality of
the Corporate Person, 22 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 181 (1947) ("No one rule for the determination of
nationality has been accepted by the various nations ....").
184. There are two primary and competing theories for determining corporate nationality: test of
incorporation and the place of the corporate "seat." In the U.S and other common law countries,
corporate nationality traditionally has been determined by reference to a corporation's place of
incorporation. See REsTATEMENT (TIDRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 213 (1986) ("For purposes
of international law, a corporation has the nationality of the state under the laws of which the
corporation is organized."}; see also Hadari, Choice of National Law, supra note 181, at 7-11. Where a
corporation was incorporated is easily ascertainable; thus the place of incorporation test also has the
advantage of providing clarity and predictability in choice-of-law matters. See id. at 10. For a
discussion of the seat test, see infra note 187.
185. Banko/Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519,588 (1839).
186. The shareholder nationality or control test gained ascendancy as an alternative approach to
determining corporate nationality in the early-twentieth century due to national security concerns and to
fear of"alien capital," as corporate nationality became crucial in the application of the Trading with the
Enemy Acts. See Hadari, Choice of National Law, supra note 181, at 23-25; Detlev F. Vagts, The
Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 1489, 1527 & n.l81 (1961); R.E.L. Vaughn Williams & Matthew Chrussachi, The Nationality of
Corporations, 49 LAw Q. REv. 334, 337-39 (1933). In a landmark English decision, the British court
looked to the shareholders and directors, rather than the law of incorporation, to determine whether
legal "control" was in the hand of the enemy. See Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., 2
App. Cas. 307, 340-41 (1916); see also Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.
Cas. 756,2 Gall. 105 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156) (holding that because a corporation incorporated
in England was an alien in the United States, it became an alien enemy when England and the United
States declared war on each other). For a discussion of the control test and its use in determining
corporate nationality in various treaties, see Walker, supra note 181, at 381 n.39.
187. Most continental countries adhere to the seat rule, that is, the principal place of business or
central administration of the company, with the place of the corporate headquarters being the dominant
factor in this inquiry. Hadari, Choice of National Law, supra note 181, at 8-9. Some countries look to
the place where the board of directors or the shareholders meet. !d. This has also been referred to as the
"location of control" test, which involves an examination of where management decisions are taken.
See M. Tedeschi, The Determination of Corporate Nationality, 50 THE AUSTRALIAN L.J. 521, 522
(1976). The test of incorporation, along with the seat test, was adopted by the International Court of
Justice in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., 1970 l.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 5} (dismissing a petition by
Belgium, which espoused the claim of Barcelona Traction, because the place of the company's
incorporation was in Canada); see also MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 82 (1993).
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These tests are ill suited for the postnational economy. 188 When corporate production, operation, and organization are no longer localized, as Part
II.A shows, the mere fact that a corporation is organized under the law of
its state of incorporation does not in itself reveal significant or meaningful
connection or identification with that state. 189 Similarly, the nationality of
the corporation's shareholders, or its directors, officers, and managers, as
used in the control test, is equally ineffective. First, given the frequency
and ease with which shares change hands, nationality determinations based
on ownership of equity is potentially inaccurate because share ownership is
unlikely to be frozen or :fixed. 190 Second, focusing on equity ownership and
188. See generally Avramovich, supra note 183, at 1226 ("[T]he traditional tests governing
corporations are becoming increasingly less useful in an economic world where economic decisionmaking is devolving and the corporation merely represents a network of intellectual capital and
relationships."); PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 232-33 (1993) (expressing a general
dissatisfaction with current tests and proposing a test that treats all affiliated corporations of a corporate
group as one "enterprise," noting that ''the concept of the corporation as a separate legal entity, a
concept which originally had satisfactorily defined the economic entity as well as the legal entity, has
failed to correspond to the modern realities of American and world business''); see also Phillip I.
Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 283,
299 (1990).
189. This test is widely used. The Restatement states that for purposes of international law, a
corporation's nationality is that of the state under which the corporation is organized. See
REsTATEMENT, supra note 184. Reporter's Note 5 of the Restatement also noted that the general
assumption under U.S. law is that the place of incorporation determines corporate nationality. That test,
however, has also been criticized. SeeM. Tedeschi, supra note 187, at 521. Tedeschi described the
place of incorporation test as:
the least sophisticated way of determining the nationality of a corporation, in that it takes the
concept of nationality of natural persons and applies it to the corporate sphere by stating that
a corporation, if "born" in a jurisdiction, becomes a subject there. In this era of increased
corporate mobility, the choice of the place of incorporation may be purely a matter of
convenience without any intention on the part of those who manifest the corporate will to
have any other connection with the jurisdiction of incorporation.
Young, supra note 181, at 5. Young notes that the test of incorporation is inadequate because the state:
has done nothing in connection with [the corporations'] institution; it has merely tacitly
assented to their creation, and can in no sense be said to have created them itself, or to have
performed any other act from which it is possible to construe an intention on its part to endow
them with its nationality.
Stanley J. Marcuss & Eric L. Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The
Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439,469 (1981) (discussing how the test,
if used without reference to other considerations such as connections of the corporation in other ways to
the state, is inadequate and simplistic); see generally H.F. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); Kronstein, supra note 181, at 990.
190. "Even when an ownership or control determination is made at a given point in time, this
'snapshot' picture of corporate nationality can soon fade ...." What Is a U.S. Company Hearings,
supra note 129, at 34. "With increased dispersion of share-holdings through global stock exchanges,
tracing ownership and control variables among transnational corporate alliances would be a constant
and challenging definitional task." !d. at 35 (testimony of Dr. John Kline); see also M. Tedeschi, supra
note 187, at 523 (discussing "difficulty ... of tracing ownership and voting rights"); Young, supra note
181, at 3 (critiquing the control test because the "nationality of the majority of [shareholders], or of the
holders of the major part of the common capital, may and often actually does fluctuate rapidly"). An
additional problem with the test is that "control" has been determined primarily by reference to
shareholder control, rather than to control by corporate officers, directors, and managers, who may in
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equity control is likely to present an incomplete and misleading picture,
because of the proliferation of transnational intercorporate alliances that
are highly significant and strategically important, even though they may be
low or nonequity arrangements. 191
The premises underlying the control test are also questionable in the
global economy. While a corporation's profits may be used to pay shareholder dividends, which may in turn be reinvested in the local economy,
there is a great likelihood that, with the increase in cross-border capital investment, shareholders will invest their profits in countries other than their
countries of citizenship. 192 Additionally, shareholder interest (maximizing
share value for its shareholders through globalized production) and the local community interest (preferring local production) or the larger national
interest may not always coincide. 193 The control test ignores this reality by
labeling a corporation more "American" merely because its shareholders
are U.S. nationals.
The control test may be useful to the extent that it looks beyond the
formality or facade of where the corporation is incorporated, or where it
does business, to allow inquiry into where control "truly" lies. lt is not,

fact exercise greater control in a public corporation than the shareholders do. See Sigmund Timberg,
Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 533, 562-63
(1946).
191. For example, a consortia program like Sematech that uses shareholder ownership criterion to
determine a national company would have to impose an additional requirement to "freeze" the equity
holding of the controlling shareholder. Again, even proponents of this criterion recognize the
difficulties of their proposal. See What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 129, at 48 ("[S]ome of
the most innovative companies ... can change ownership into a foreign situation, but that just brings up
the same question again ... and that is, should there be some limitations on key technologies as
respects corporate acquisitions?") (testimony of Larry Hecht, Executive Director of the lacocca
Institute, Lehigh University). However, a requirement that eligible corporate participants must
"maintain their same operational characteristics indefmitely ... would inhibit their ability to embrace
technological change and would isolate them from the marketplace," given their propensity to engage
in cross-border equity and nonequity strategic alliances. Id. at 34 (testimony of Dr. John Kline).
192. From 1980 to 1994, Americans invested a total of $1.5 trillion in foreign securities. See, e.g.,
Russell B. Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United States in I996, in U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, JULY 1997: SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, at 24, 26-27, 30, available at
http:l/www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ai/0797iip/maintext.htrn (last visited Jan. 16, 2002). In 1996, U.S.
investors had $176.4 billion of foreign stocks and $42.7 billion of foreign bonds; conversely, foreign
investors held $1,225.5 billion of U.S. securities. Id.; see also Ted C. Fishman, The Joys of Global
Investment: Shipping Home the Fruits ofMISery, HARPER's MAG., Feb. I, 1997, at 35.
193. See, e.g., Evelyn Iritani, In Global Economy, U.S. Job Gains, Losses Know No Borders, L.A.
TIMES, pr. 6, 2001, at AI. Discussing corporate decisions to shift production, Tom Duesterberg,
president and chief executive of the Manufacturers Alliance, a Washington group of 450 leading U.S.
manufacturers, said, "Most of these decisions are being made more on the basis of the economics of the
situation rather than what would be a more traditional concern of protecting the local community." Id.;
Avramovich, supra note 183, at 1229-31 (critiquing the underlying presumption that shareholders act in
the national interests inherent in the control test); Young, supra note 181, at 2 (criticizing the notion of
allegiance assumed in the term "nationality"). To the extent that the control test relies on shareholder
control, and by implication shareholder allegiance, it would be susceptible to the same critique offered
by Young.
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however, useful if it assumes that shareholders or other control persons
make corporate decisions based on their citizenship obligations 194 (as opposed to economic or corporate interests). Shareholders are principally motivated by the objective of maximizing their investments, and officers and
directors are similarly duty-bound to achieve this objective for their shareholders.195 Under the business corporation laws of many states in the
United States, for example, controlling shareholders as well as directors
and officers owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation, including its
minority shareholders. 196 In a fiercely competitive and global economy, the
controlling shareholders', directors', and officers' decision-making processes are not normally determined by issues of citizenship, but rather, business principles. 197 Moreover, under certain circumstances, companies
owned by foreign nationals, more than "home grown" companies, may be
less likely to pull out of a foreign market in the event of an economic
downturn and more likely to adopt a long-term economic view, precisely
because they have incurred large "sunken" costs to enter the market to

194. See Timberg, supra note 190, at 566-74. The Article questions the assumption that
controlling groups make decisions based on corporate benefit rather than personal advancement and
asserts that the conflict between self-interests and corporate interests, as well as self-interests and
"political allegiance to [the] sovereign state" is quite common. !d. at 572. Modem day critics have
made similar observations. Critics have charged that the elite group of symbolic analysts, those
engaged in "problem-solving, problem-identifying, and strategic-brokering activities," REICH, supra
note 80, at 177, or "high tech nomadic tribe ... [have] more in common with each other than with the
citizens of whatever country they happen to do business in." JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END OF WoRK 176
(1995); see also Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, supra note 66, at 44 (describing the
emergence of a cross-national business and financial elite that has more in common with those within
its membership than it does with other nonelite workers in its own national community); CHRISTOPHER
LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 47 (1995) (''The
denationalization of business enterprise tends to produce a class of cosmopolitans who set themselves
as 'world citizens, but without accepting ... any of the obligations that citizenship in a polity normally
implies."'); REICH, supra note 80, at 208-24 (describing "secession" by the elites who have profited the
most from the global economy into their separate communities).
195. See AM. L. !NST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE § 2.01, at 55
(1994). This does not mean that corporate managers cannot consider other interests besides shareholder
interests. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 717(b) (Consol. 2001) (other stakeholder section) see also Unhappy
Families: Stakeholder Capitalism, THE EcoNOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 23 (discussing how public
companies in Japan and in Continental European countries generally adopt a broader vision of the duty
of their corporate managers, as one that encompasses the interests of other stakeholders, such as
employees, suppliers, and the communities in which they operate).
196. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717(b), supra note 195 (indicating duty of directors
includes the duty to consider the interests of the corporation and its shareholders).
197. See What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 129, at 117. According to Mark Rochkind,
then President of Philips Labs, North American Philips Corporation:
all of the businesses, those that are so-called foreign owned[,] those that are so-called
American owned, are driven by business practice which seeks to make a business success of
their endeavors. The result is that Philips chooses to invest, manufacture, and sell in the
American market. Another result: Certain American-owned corporations, for very good
business reasons, exercise business judgment and not economic nationalism and choose to do
some R&D and product development and manufacture abroad.
!d.
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begin with. 198 Such companies (even if owned or controlled by foreign decision makers) are in that sense even more "loyal" to the country where
significant investments are located than are "home-grown" companies.
From the standpoint of the proposal, which aims to balance the local
with the global, the seat criterion would also not be appropriate because
nationality is conferred on the basis of management's location, that is, the
place that serves as the decision-making center of the corporation. 199 In
fact, the seat test reflects a quintessentially internationalist bias at the expense of that which is usually associated with the national territory; it privileges the position of global elites in conferring nationality. As such, the test
would provide global companies with no incentive to demonstrate a commitment to or establish roots in any one country because no economic
benefit would be derived from such a commitment under the seat test of
corporate nationality. The test also ignores other factors, such as the location oflabor and the company's investment and other assets that anchor the
company in the territory of a particular state.
To accept that corporations have become global in orientation and
operations does not mean, however, that they have transcended the nationstate200 or have no "nationality." lt is evident, for example, that a company
can be formed only pursuant to the law of a particular national jurisdiction
and not pursuant to international law. To that extent, at the very least, its
corporate behavior and strategy are certainly influenced by the legal environment of that country's corporations law. 201 The concept of corporate
nationality itself is not obsolete, but rather, the old tests for determining
corporate nationality are misleading as globalization progresses. Given the
new economic shift, from national to global, a different concept of corporate "nationality" is therefore needed, one that balances the appeal of nationalism with the demands of internationalism.
III
TOWARDS A NEW MEANING OF NATIONALITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

As Part II.C reveals, there is currently no comprehensive assessment
of the meaning of "nationality" and "origin" in an international economy
becoming increasingly postnational. U.S. trade laws, like the trade laws of
198. See DEANNE Juuus, GLOBAL CoMPANIES AND PuBLIC PoLICY 65 (1990).
199. See generally Societe Constr. Ltd. v. Brown, 1897 JoURNAL DU PALAIS 84, 1897 JoURNAL
DE TruBUNAUX DE COMMERCE 552; M. Tedeschi, supra note 187, at 524 (discussing how the "location
of central management and control ... becomes little more than a fiction" if the seat criterion is
determinative for corporate nationality while major corporate assets are elsewhere); Young, supra note
181, at 18-25.
200. For the argument that nationality still matters, see, for example, D'Andrea Tyson, supra note
8, at 37; Magnusson, supra note 107, at 142.
20 I. The corporations law of a country necessarily affects corporate behavior because what is
legal, permissible, or mandated in one country may be illegal and prohibited in another. For example,
codetermination may be required in German corporate law but not in U.S. law.
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many countries, are designed to grant certain beneficial considerations to
and protective measures for domestic companies and their products against
certain acts by foreign companies and foreign products. For example, there
are laws designed to protect domestic industry2°2 and laws that correct
''unfair trade."203 In a globally integrated economic system, however, it is
not always easy to differentiate the "domestic industry" seeking the protection and the "foreign" importer alleged to be injuring domestic industry.
One of the questions raised thus is one of standing: in invoking the protection provided by the relevant laws, is the plaintiff "domestic" and thus eligible for relief? Even in the foreign investment area, where the United
States has been generally less hostile to foreign investment than other
countries, it too has looked upon foreign investment with some degree of
suspicion and anxiety, as evidenced by the concern exhibited in the 1990s
over a supposed "foreign takeover" prompted by the influx of Japanese
capital in manufacturing and high-tech industries.204
Part ill advocates a new way of thinking about nationality that is
compatible with the global framework laid out in the Article. Part liLA
focuses on revising corporate nationality. The proposed corporate nationality test allows any corporation, wherever incorporated or seated and however controlled, to be deemed a national of a state if that corporation meets
a domestic participation test. Global corporations that qualify under the test
are given certain "offset benefits" as incentives to demonstrate national
202. For example, one of the measures used by the United States as a buffer against imports is the
escape clause contained in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, which aiiows a member of a
"domestic industry'' to seek temporary relief from imports upon proof that an increase in imports
substantiaiiy causes or threatens to cause serious injury to domestic industries producing like or directly
competitive articles. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat 2011 (1975), amended by
Trade Agreements of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 106(b)(3), 1106 (d)(l)-(7), 93 Stat 193, 312, and
Trade and Tariff Act of1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 248(a), 249, 98 Stat 2998 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251 (1994)). Section 201 is the domestic statute that implements U.S. obligations under Article XIX
of GATT.
203. Unfair trade laws, such as the antidumping laws, may be invoked when a "domestic industry"
aiieges that imported items are being sold at less than fair value, thereby causing it material injury. 19
U.S.C. § 1673, et seq. (1994).
204. Gregory \V. Noble, Takeover or Makeover? Japanese Investment in America, 34 CAL.
MGMT. REv. 127 (1992). Japanese firms have provided many Silicon Valley startups with capital in
exchange for access to or control of new technologies. Some expressed concern when Japanese real
estate developers bought the Rockefeiler Center, Pebble Beach, Heavenly Vaiiey, and portions of
do\'mtown Los Angeles. When Sony bought Columbia Pictures in 1989, Newsweek ran a cover of the
Statue of Liberty clothed in a kimono.
The exaggerated perception of a foreign "invasion" coupled with the concern that the sale would
give Fujitsu control over chip technologies contributed to the Commerce Department's opposition in
1986 to the proposed sale of Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation to Fujitsu. Id lronicaiiy, despite
proclamations that the "U.S. industry" must be protected, Fairchild was not even an "American" firm at
the time because it was already controiied by the French oil field services firm, Schlumberger.
"Nationality of ownership should have been irrelevant" REICH, supra note 80, at 155. For an analysis
of why traditional understandings of nationality should not determine U.S. policy on which companies
are aiiowed to participate in U.S. technology programs, see id. at 154-68. See also What Is a U.S.
Company Hearings, supra note 129.
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attachment. The proposal champions trade liberalism and favors engaging
with, rather than opposing, the global economy. It does so, however, not by
reference to the conventional internationalist sensibility that typically
reflects a free-floating perspective detached from particular political communities. Rather, the internationalism the test embodies is a rooted
internationalism, where international economic activities flow from, rather
than transcend, national life.
Part III.B focuses on revising rules of origin. To the extent that rules
of origin are part of, and not eliminated from, the trade regime, they should
be reexamined to address the additional complications posed by the globalization of economic activities. Because it will not be politically feasible, in
all likelihood, to have one simple set of rules for all products,2°5 Part III.B
is only intended to offer an alternative framework for determining rnles of
origin. This framework, I argue, should favor a broad interpretation of rules
of origin, primarily in two categories: those in lower-skilled operations
and those in the postindustrial service economy. These revisions will allow
trade rules to better reflect the global transformations identified in the
Article.

205. The working committee established by the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin has been
working since the establishment of the WTO on sector- and product-specific rules of origin. See
Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, art. 2(a)-(c), available at http://www. wto.org/english/docs_ e/legal_e/final_e.htm
[hereinafter WTO Rules of Origin]; see also infra note 285. Similarly, origin rules in NAFTA, for
example, are also different for different products, such as television sets. See supra note 172. The
existenee of separate rules for individual products may reflect the incumbent economic interests of
those domestic interest groups that have organized to ensure that domestic nationality is not easily
conferred. See Silveira, supra note 172, at 420. "Political considerations, sectorial interests and
protectionism" are barriers to achieving simple rules of origin.Jd. at 417, 449; see also Kevin Merida &
Tom Kenworthy, For Some a Bitter NAFTA Taste, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 1993, at A I (noting that to
secure votes for NAFTA, President Clinton had to make deals ensuring special treatment for sugar,
citrus, vegetable, beef, peanuts, and other products).
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Reforming Corporate Nationality: A Proposed Domestic
Participation Tesf 06

The proposed domestic participation test flows from the observations
in Part IT. The key point may be summarized in the following
way: because the global dispersion of economic activities has rendered
problematic traditional economic distinctions founded on an ''us" versus
"them" or a "national" versus "international" market, to the extent that a
"national" market can be accurately identified at all, its identification does
not derive any longer from a "domestic" corporation or a "domestic" product, but a "domestic" work force that for the most part is still territorially
bound. The primary purpose underlying the new proposed test is to ensure
that trade and investment from whichever source can be drawn into the
national territory of a state and in the process generate positive economic
opportunities for its people.207
206. The articulation of this test builds on my prior work on the implications globalization poses
for international economic development, where I argued for a conceptual approach that focuses on
human capital, that is, on the home work force and how it might benefit from value-added activities
drawn from global companies, rather than on protecting "home" corporations, as that concept has been
traditionally understood. See Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic
Development, 32 TEX. INT'L LJ. 209, 259-70 (1997). The domestic participation test proposed in this
section was also inspired by Heinrich Kronstein. Kronstein, supra note 181, at 984. As early as 1952,
Professor Kronstein recognized that there might be a disjuncture between the traditional test of
corporate nationality and the economic reality of corporate economic activities:
Assuming that it is legal theory which should adjust to economic reality and not the reverse, it
follows that any "divergence between corporate theory and the underlying economic facts"
should be resolved in favor of the latter. Such a divergence does exist, and, despite it,
corporate theory has been slow to change. For example, a factory in the United States is an
integral part of the American economy although it may be owned by foreign interests. Yet
recognition of its status as an American business enterprise does ... depend on the fortuitous
fact of whether it is or is not incorporated in an American state. If not, it may be considered to
have no existence distinct from that of the home office abroad even though, as a matter of
reality, it is a distinct enterprise entrenched in the United States economy.
/d.
The proposed domestic participation test might be analogized to similar instances where U.S.
courts have been faced with jurisdictional cases dealing with multistate corporations. See Hadari,
Choice of National Law, supra note 181, at II (commenting that in cases where a manufacturing
company in which "most of the business operations and day-to-day management were carried on in one
state, while the overall management and control of the corporation were exercised from another
state ... the United States courts have tended to find the former to be the corporation's principal place
of business"). A focus on significant business contacts, as evidenced by the courts' inquiry into the
company's principal business operations, is analogous to my proposal to focus on the corporation's
degree of domestic participation in a state. The proposed domestic participation test is also analogous to
the traditional "principal place of business test." The principal place of business test "involves locating
the production or processing of goods or services, the extraction of raw materials, or the investment of
capital." See Tedeschi, supra note I 87, at 522. For a discussion of another version of the principal place
of business test, see What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 129, and Linda A. Mabry,

Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Corporate
Nationality, 87 GEO. LJ. 563 (1999).
207. As the former President of Philips Labs, whose parent company is Dutch-owned,
remarked: "As we examine what it means for a nation to be competitive, we must ask questions not
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The first and foremost area of inquiry is to ask the following question
concerning a corporation's nationality: do the corporate activities within
the state qualify as substantial, socioeconomic participation in the state's
economy? If the answer is yes, then the corporation qualifies as a domestic
firm, entitled to the benefits and protection of the applicable trade laws.
The second part proceed as follows: assuming that a company meets the
domestic participation inquiry and qualifies as a domestic company, it is
entitled to a "participation offset" right. With the offset right, the company
can offset any duties, tariffs, and other protective measures 208 that it may be
subject to under current law, up to the amount calculated to be its "net
total" participation in the domestic economy. This proposed offset would
be available only to companies that qualify as "domestic."
By making the offset right conditional on the company's domestic
nationality, which in tum requires the company to demonstrate
"substantial," "socioeconomic" participation, the test directly addresses the
reality of globalization: corporate capital mobility. A global company is
domestic only if it meets the participation test, which is itself a test
grounded in territorial or national considerations to balance the global with
the local.
1. Step One: Substantial Socioeconomic Participation
a. Substantial
A company's "substantial" participation may be expressed as a
"percentage" test, in which the amount of participation in question is compared to the corporation's overall financial interests and activities. Or it
also may be expressed as a "quantity" test, in which one looks at whether
the amount of participation is sufficiently large to qualify as "substantial."
about its corporations but about its work force. More and more, it becomes clear that a competitive
work force is characterized by skills, training, knowledge, and technological sophistication." What Is a
U.S. Company, supra note 129, at 76 (testimony of Mark Rochkind). Indeed, today's global economy,
ironically, has made the local all the more significant "Prosperity in a nation is a reflection of what
both domestic and foreign firms choose to do in that nation." Michael E. Porter, Attitudes, Values,
Beliefs, and the Microeconomics of Prosperity, in CULTURE MATTERS: How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN
PRoGRESS 16 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000). "Domestic firms that
produced low-quality products using unsophisticated methods hold back national productivity, whereas
foreign firms that bring in new technology and advanced methods will boost productivity and local
wages." I d. Given the rapid movement of capital, technology, and information, and the ease with which
companies (and their competitors) can now source their inputs globally, global outsourcing, while
necessary as a business practice, no longer confers a competitive advantage vis-a-vis other companies.
As a result, "[t]he remaining sources of competitive advantages are increasingly local," id. at 17, such
as the national or local work force, "special supplier or customer relationship, unique insights about
market gleaned from local customers or partners, special access to technology and knowledge from
other local institutions, or production flexibility resulting from the use of a nearby supplier." Jd. at 17.
208. If an escape clause proceeding grants protective relief, such as Section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974, the protective measures may include increased tariffs or tariff rate quotas (tariffs which
increase only after a certain quota for the imported item has been reached). See Trade Act of1974, 19
U.S.C. § 2253(a) (2000).
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Courts have used both approaches in evaluating "substantiality" in other
areas of law,209 and for the most part have held that "each case must be
decided on its own facts" 210 in determining whether or not a company derives "substantial revenue" from goods used or consumed in a state.
Under either test, whether or not the economic presence counts as
"substantial" will depend partially on the history of the corporation, the
nature of the industry, and the level of economic development of the country at issue. The evidence required to demonstrate substantial participation
is evidence concerning tax revenues; production and employment levels;
systematic activities in the domestic economy that significantly utilize
land, labor, and intellectual and financial capital for the creation of value
domestically; domestic linkages with suppliers and subcontractors; reinvestment of earnings in the country in question; and research and development.2u A company wishing to prove the extent of its domestic
209. New York courts have found that a corporation may be subjected to personal jurisdiction in
New York if the company derives "substantial revenue" in the state. See, e.g., Allen v. Canadian
General Electric Co., 410 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aff'd 431 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1980). In
determining "substantial revenue," the court noted that "[o]nly a small portion of [the company's] total
sales of goods and services are made to customers in New York State ..." which was less than I% of
total sales of$879 million in 1976./d. at 708. This meant that revenue in New York was $8.79 million.
The court noted that although the New York statute itself provided no firm guidance on the
interpretation of the term "substantial revenue," "[w]hether a 'quantitative' or 'qualitative' approach is
used, the sum of $8.79 million is too large to be considered insubstantial without further analysis or
proof of the business which would show such fact." Id at 709. Under the quantity test, the actual
amount, though only 1% of the company's total sales, is still prima facie "substantial" to support
jurisdiction. Id; see also Gillmore v. J.S. lnskip, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1967). The court determined that "substantial revenue" should be interpreted to "require comparison of
New York (or interstate or international) gross sales revenue with a defendant's total gross sales
revenue or New York, interstate or international net profits with a defendant's total net profit ...." Id.
(citation omitted). The court also noted, however, that other courts "deal with the question of
substantiality in terms of dollar value of sales or profit in the abstract." Id (citation omitted).
Other courts have relied on similar explications of"substantiality." In Velandra v. Regie Nationale
des Usine Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964), the court found that "substantial economic activities"
in Michigan could be determined by a number of factors, "including the number and value of sales
within the state, their ratio to the total market for like or similar products within the state, the quantity
or value of the [company's] production, the percentage of the total output sold within the state ...." Id.
at 296; see also Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d 423, 429 (Alaska 1965) (holding that "substantial
volume" is not the only method used to measure a company's business presence in a state partly
because "when compared with the total market demands of a fledgling economy for specialized
industrial products, it is quite likely that [the company] would be found to have been supplying a
substantial portion of the total needs of the market ....").
Although these cases arise out of a different context, they show that courts have adopted a flexible
approach to determine whether a company's presence is "substantial" and ways in which this might be
measured. I would advocate an approach that is similarly flexible on this point, as determined by the
state at issue.
210. Allen, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
211. The evidence would be presented to the relevant administrative agencies that make traderelated determinations. In the United States, they would be the International Trade Commission and the
International Trade Administration, which is an agency in the Department of Conunerce. The
individual countries will decide which factors are deemed more determinative or more important than
others.

456

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:401

participation would produce evidence of its activities in the national economy, from production and assembly to servicing and promotion, or
research, development, and design. As I explain in my discussion of part
two of the test below, for the purpose of the proposal, the issue is a comparative one, the degree of a company's participation as measured against
the duties and charges it owes.
A corporation with a substantial degree of participation in the U.S.
economy, for example, is one that has a substantial proportion of its principal assets or operational facilities in the geographic territory of the United
States. The assumption here is that the physical location of a corporation's
assets as well as linkages forged with other local businesses may provide
some measure of the extent to which benefits granted by the state to that
corporation may produce direct or secondary benefits for the state itself.
Therefore, to the extent that it is an accurate reflection or indicator of a
corporation's substantial participation in a national economy, the location
of a corporation's assets is an important consideration in the determination
of corporate national identity.
U.S. subsidiaries and affiliates212 of international companies are significant participants in the U.S. economy, measured by standard factors
such as employment in the United States,213 reinvestment of eamings,214
sales in the United States,215 investment in infrastructure such as plants and
equipment,216 research and development, 217 and exports. 218 In 1997, the
assets of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies reached $3 trillion.
212. U.S. affiliates are firms located in the United States, with investment of 10% or more by a
single or juridical person who is a national of another country. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMIII.,
EXAMINATION OF U.S. INBOUND AND OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT, Pub. No. 3383, 4-J (2001)
(hereinafter INBOUND AND OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT!.
213. Unless otherwise specified, figures discussed in this paragraph are from the Organization for
International Investment, Employment at U.S. Subsidiaries: The National Picture, available at
http://www.ofii.org/facts_figures/national_picture.cfrn (last visited Jan. 31, 2002) (on file with author).
These U.S. affiliates created 20,000 new jobs in 1997, with expansions of existing U.S. subsidiary
operations adding another 149,600. On average, expansions of existing U.S. subsidiary operations have
added I 05,000 new jobs per year over the past five years. Among the NAFTA countries alone, foreignowned U.S. affiliates of NAFTA partners employed 628,300 U.S. workers in 1997, a figure that
represents 12.2% of all U.S. workers employed by U.S. affiliates of foreign firms. INBOUND AND
OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 212, at 4-8 & 4-9.
214. In terms of reinvestment of earnings in the United States, U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
companies have reinvested an average of35% of their earnings in the years 1991 to 1996, and 49% in
1997.
215. Affiliates of parent companies based in seven countries (Japan, the U.K., Germany, Canada,
France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) accounted for 82% of total 1997 sales by U.S. affiliates.
Japan's U.S. affiliates accounted for more than one-fourth of total foreign-owned firms' sales, or
$446.4 billion in 1997. Britain's U.S. affiliates' sales constituted $258.8 billion; Germany's were
$194.5 billion. INBOUND AND OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 212, at 4-13 to 4-16.
216. Figures for 1997 show that they spent $100.8 billion on plants and equipment.
217. Figures for 1997 show expenditures of $19.7 billion devoted to research and development.
These companies employed more than 115,700 scientists, engineers, and technicians in their U.S.
research facilities.
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Take as an example the automobile industry in the United States: If
defined by reference to nationality of ownership or control, the U.S. automobile industry would be comprised of the so-called Big Three-Ford,
General Motors, and Chrysler, although as a result of the latter's merger
with the German-based Daimler-Benz, Chrysler could be excluded.219 But
all relevant data demonstrate that U.S. affiliates of foreign-origin automakers make significant contributions to the U.S. economy, whether in the
areas of employment,220 investment in production facilities, 221 employment
compensation, or purchases of U.S. parts, components, and materials.222
Even excluding Daimler-Chrysler, these U.S. affiliates of foreign-origin
manufacturers participate substantially in the U.S. domestic economy
through design, research and development, marketing, sales, distribution,
and innovation through the introduction of new management techniques
and technologies.223
218. Figures for 1997 show that U.S. affiliates accounted for 20% of all U.S. exports.
219. William J. Holstein, Chrysler's NeJv Identity Crisis, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 26,
1998, at 50. This association had also expelled foreign-owned U.S. manufacturers, such as Honda, in
1992. John Maggs, Ford and GM to Chrysler: Drop Dead, NAT'L J., Oct. 3, 1998, at 2334; David
Mastio, Chrysler Loses Clout with Big 3 Groups, DETROIT NEWS, May 8, 1998, at B3.
220. A 1998 study by the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute found that the
international automobile sector in the United States made significant contributions to the U.S. domestic
economy for 1996, creating 402,700 jobs termed "direct employment" (manufacturing and dealer
activities) combined with spin-off employment of an additional 869,600 jobs for a total of
approximately 1.3 million jobs in the private sector. UNIVERSITY OF MICIDGAN TRANSPORTATION
REsEARCH INSTITUTE ET AL., THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUTO SECTOR TO THE U.S.
EcONOMY, fig.ES.l, at 14 (1998), available at http:l/www.osat.umich.edu/economic.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2002).
221. The U.S. affiliates have invested $12.3 billion in their U.S. production plants since 1982. !d.
at4.
222. The figures for 1996 alone are an estimated $43.2 billion in employee compensation and
purchases, \vith 58% being purchases ofU.S.-produced parts, components, and materials. !d. at 5. This
is in stark contrast to the situation in the 1980s, when sales by the transplants in the United States
consisted almost exclusively of imports. !d. at 3.
223. !d. at 9-12. The continued use of ownership and control as nationality criteria has had
unfortunate consequences in nontrade-related areas as well, for example, U.S.-funded research
initiatives. Despite their participation in the U.S. economy, anachronistic notions of "nationality"
e~:clude foreign-origin U.S. affiliates from the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles
("PNGV''), a collaborative research and development program between the federal government and the
U.S. "domestic" automobile industry, represented by the United States Council for Automotive
Research ("USCAR"), to develop technologically advanced, low-fuel, low-emission cars. Maggs, supra
note 219. See also United States Council for Automotive Research, http://www.uscar.org (last visited
Jan. 31, 2002), self-described as the umbrella organization of Daimler Chrysler, Ford, and General
Motors. Ford and GM have raised questions about Chrysler's nationality upon its merger with Daimler,
suggesting that Chrysler should be expelled from the U.S. auto partnership. Maggs, supra note 219.
Chrysler presents itself as having dual status: "We see ourselves as a transnational company with very,
very strong and deep roots iu the United States and Europe, especially Germany," said Chrysler's chief
lobbyist in the United States. Chrysler has, at least for now, been (correctly) allowed to remain. See
Holstein, supra note 219; United States Council for Automotive Research, http://www.uscar.org. Yet,
foreign-origin automakers, which do participate iu critical ways in the U.S. economy, continue to be
barred. Honda, for example, as the leading U.S. automobile exporter, claims the United States as its
largest market, where it sells more cars than in Japan. What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note
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The central point of my argument is that any company that participates substantially in the economy of any given state should be considered
a domestic company of that state. For countries at a high level of economic
development such as the United States, the participation that may be valued
more may be that which furthers the development of the high-value, intellectual property-oriented economy, that is, research and development
(whereas for poorer countries, participation in the form of light or intermediate manufacturing and assembly may be highly valued). Supporters of
U.S.-owned or -controlled companies incorrectly assume that only
American companies, despite the internationalization of production and
investment, are likely to engage in secondary activities that are beneficial
to the U.S. economy, which is not to say that U.S. companies no longer are
significant participants. 224 Certainly if U.S.-origin companies remain substantial participants in the U.S. economy, then they should remain U.S.
companies and enjoy the attendant benefits of corporate nationality. But
eligibility for and standing under the applicable laws should be defined in a
way that focuses on operational indicators such as actual participation in
the domestic economy. Indeed, this requirement of actual participation is a
key component of the suggested test precisely because it combines the territorial component of the nationalist approach with the trade liberalizing
tendency of the internationalist one.

b. Socioeconomic Participation
Under this part of the proposed domestic participation test, a corporation demonstrates its socioeconomic commitment to the state whose trade
laws it hopes to enjoy through its participation in activities that contribute
meaningfully to the developmental needs of that state. There is often an
overlap between social and economic benefits that go toward meeting a
state's developmental needs. Many countries, for example, have foreign
investment laws that require the relevant authorities to evaluate the benefits

129, at 35. The decision to exclude foreign-origin companies has also been criticized by The National
Academy of Sciences as needlessly excluding the very companies that have done cutting-edge research
on safety and environmental technology. Japanese automakers were the first to use multivalve engines
and fuel injection which reduce emissions and increase mileage and power; Volvo introduced the first
side-impact airbags; the Chevrolet/Geo Metro, made by Suzuki, was the highest-mileage car made and
sold in the United States. Robert Manor, Driving Toward the Supercar, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH,
Sept. 18, 1994, at El; Maggs, supra note 219. In this respect, the European approach is the more
inclusive and better one, as Ford and General Motors, for example, have been allowed to participate in
the Eurocar research alliance. Maggs, supra note 219; Neil MacDonald & Bill Loveless, Execs Discuss
Possible Merger of U.S., Foreign Auto Research, FED. TECH. REP., Apr. 22, 1999, at 3 (discussing
possible collaboration among USCAR and EUCAR and Japan's JCAR projects).
224. Indeed, Department of Commerce 1991 statistics show that U.S.-based operations account for
75% of the $6.9 trillion in total assets held by U.S. companies and that U.S.-owned parent companies
spend $21 on research and development in the United States for every $1000 in sales. Daniel Burton,
Jr. et al., supra note 78, at 33.
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of the proposed investmenf25 by reference either to the country's written
investment laws or a discretionary "operational code."226 The relevant
agency227 considers a whole spectrum of social and economic factors,
including location of the proposed business, its impact on national
culture,228 employment, training, research and development, competition in
the domestic industry, ''new training and job opportunities," effect on the
country's balance of payments, and the nation's ability to participate in the
world market. 229 The preference mix is likely to vary among countries and
is likely to be made by reference to guidelines established by that country,
either applicable across the board, or applicable to particular industries as
determined by the country.230
Different states at different levels of development and with different
national value systems will have different socioeconomic priorities. As is
already the case in practice in the area of investment, it is up to the designated authorities in those states to make the necessary evaluations. There
are no bright-line rules that will dictate the outcome of competing values,
policy considerations, and potential tradeoffs. 231 A nuclear power plant may
be less valuable to one state than an oil-drilling project, and the construction of bridges may be less important than a project designed to transform
salt water into fresh water. Similarly, a foreign joint venture that employs
12,000 people has more value than just the payment of wages if the venture
is in a small country that suffers from high unemployment and surplus rural
labor. Conversely, the project's value in social terms would probably be
225. FoLSOM ET AL., supra note 172, at 776-81. These authorities with investment review power
make determinations on a case-by-case basis. The decisions are made by reference to the written law
and also by reference to unwritten understandings of what type of investment is particularly beneficial
to the economic development of the country. Foreign investment review is not limited to developing
countries. Canada, for example, has had a series of laws to review foreign investment. A Canadian
Foreign Investment Review Agency was created to determine whether investment will benefit Canada
and whether the investment \vill have certain effects on ''productivity, efficiency, innovation,
technological development, competition, culture and rule in world markets." Id. at 780. To encourage
investment, the current Investment Canada Act has raised the threshold, in dollar terms, of acquisitions
that would trigger review. !d. at 780-81.
226. ld. at 785.
227. See supra note 211.
228. Canada, for example, reserves the explicit right to review foreign investment in certain
designated cultural industries. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 172, at 780 n.4.
229. !d. at 780.
230. The evaluation of participation should allow reassessment by the country should a company's
participation significantly change, either annually or biannually. The frequency with which this is
accomplished would depend on how often the individual country already collects relevant data.
231. One might predict that certain developing countries that place a greater value on economic
development than other values would favor the construction of new plants in their territories even if this
may cause environmental problems. China, for example, has forged ahead with the construction of the
Three Gorges Dam despite widespread international concern that the dam would inflict serious damage
to the surronnding region and to the living creatures in the Yangtze River. Andrea Wang, China's
Energy Policy and Competing International Environmental Pressures, 2000 COLO. J.INT'L ENVTL. L.
& PoL'Y 271,277-78 (2000).
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small compared to its economic benefits if it were undertaken in a developed country such as the United States during a period of relatively high
employment.
The socioeconomic component of a company's participation will be
evaluated "subjectively," by reference to the particular national or democratic framework that informs public decision making, but this evaluation
will also be performed in conjunction with more "objective" criteria.232 As
discussed above, the geographic location of a corporation's operational or
principal assets is an important indicator of whether or not a corporation
meets the "substantial" participation test. In making a determination of
corporate nationality, a state may opt to give greater weight to a company's
participation that is likely to be "locked in" a state's territory, investment
with "sunk costs,"233 than participation that is likely to be transient. Such
"locked-in" types of participation include investment in immobile industryspecific assets such as automobile manufacturing and production facilities
that are more difficult or costly for the investor to abandon, relocate, or
convert to other use; investment in firm-specific assets such as the development of brand-name products, which requires long-term investment
before brand-name recognition is achieved; 234 large-scale investment in
industries with low profit margins; investment in operational facilities and
equipment with long life spans rather than those that quickly become obsolete;235 and investment in facilities that require specialized, high-skill workers available in only select markets, as opposed to investment in simple
assembly operations that are easier to duplicate and require widely available low-skill, low-wage workersY 6 In summary, to the extent that
"locked-in" investment is an important consideration in determining
232. Generally speaking, the objective factors to be included in the proposed domestic
participation test are already considered in the United States by the International Trade Commission
("ITC"), and the economic data needed to make a determination of a company's domestic participation
would already be available. See In re Certain Airtight Cast Iron Stoves, U.S.ITC Pub. 1126, Inv. No.
337-TA-69 (Dec. 1980) (finding that U.S. subsidiary of a Norwegian stove manufacturer was an
industry in the United States for purposes of eligibility to press certain trade claims, because the ITC
determined that the company's U.S. activities consisted of testing, repairing the imported stoves,
shipping, servicing, and advertising); In re Certain Miniature, Battery Operated, All Terrain, Wheeled
Vehicles, USITC Pub. No. 1300, Inv. No. 337-TA-122 (Oct. 1982) (establishing that limited qualitycontrol and packaging activities, sales, and promotional activities, such as distribution and advertising,
were not sufficient to make the company a member of the domestic industry entitled to certain domestic
trade protection); Heavyweight Motorcycles and Engines and Power Train Subassemblies Therefore,
USITC Pub. 1342, Inv. No. TA-201-47 (Feb. 1983) (finding that in a Section 20I action U.S.-based
subsidiaries of Japanese motorcycle producers, Honda and Kawasaki, were domestic producers of
heavy weight motorcycles because economic data showed that a substantial portion of the value of their
motorcycles produced in Japan was added in the U.S).
233. RobertS. Pindyck, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment, 29 J. EcoN. LIT. 1110, Jill
(1991).
234. !d.
235. MULTINATIONALS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 140, at 24.
236. Gereffi, supra note 139, at 84.
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corporate nationality for certain trade and investment benefits, it is a factor
that may be evaluated in terms of dollars and factored into the total determination. 237

2. Step Two: The Participation Offset Right
Under step one, the domestic participation test is applied to resolve
the issue of corporate nationality. If a company is not considered domestic
under step one, it is "economically foreign," thus subjecting its imports (if
any) to all trade-protective measures applicable under the current trade
laws. 238 If, however, a company qualifies as domestic under step one, like
all domestic companies under current law, it would have standing to invoke
the benefits afforded by existing trade laws. Additionally, and especially
significant to the balance this proposal aims to strike between nationalist
impulses and internationalist ambitions, the domestic company would be
granted a participation offset right: it would have the right, not available
under any current U.S. trade laws, to offset any tariffs or charges it owes (if
it imports) against the participation it has invested in the domestic economy, if its participation outweighs the amount of tariffs owed.
Under the offset right, the company may have the following types of
duties offset. The domestic government would waive any import duties
such as tariffs that the company would owe under current rules-of-origin
laws239 if it imports certain products into the United States-if the amount
owed is less than the amount it contributes under the first part of the socioeconomic participation test. If the company is also involved in other
importing activities that are subject to additional tariffs or charges pursuant
237. There is growing acceptance of the notion that a corporation's nationality should be made by
reference to the company's participation in the United States, rather than the nationality of its owners or
the place of incorporation, at least in the area of high-technology initiatives. In the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (1994), Congress included statutory guidelines on companies
eligible to participate in cooperative R&D agreements ("CRADAS") established and referred to in the
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, IS U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (1994). As amended,
the relevant CRADA provisions provide that eligible participants are companies "located in the United
States which agree that products ... made under the ... agreement ... will be manufactured
substantially in the United States ...." 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(4)(B) (1994). There is also a provision
requiring that firms "subject to the control of a foreign company" be excluded from CRADA if their
home countries do not offer reciprocal opportunities to U.S. persons. Id. See also William H. Lash, ill,
The Decline of the Nation State in International Trade and Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. lOll,
1020 (1996). For a critique of the control criterion, see supra notes 190-98. For a critique of these
programs, see Mark A. Warner & Alan M. Rugman, Competitiveness: An Emerging Strategy of
Discrimination in U.S. Antitrust and R&D Policy?, 25 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 945 (1994).
238. To use the United States as an example, if the company imports merchandise that is deemed
to have violated the antidumping laws, it would pay a dumping duty, as currently required; or if the
company imports merchandise into the United States at such increased quantities that the imports cause
serious injury to domestic industry producing like products, increased import duties or quotas pursuant
to Section 201 could be imposed to provide relief.
239. See infra notes 242-48 for a discussion of mles used to determine the national origin of a
product. In Part ill.B, I propose a way to rethink rules of origin.

462

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:401

to Section 201,240 or any activities that are deemed in violation of the
antidumping laws or other trade laws, 241 it may offset these additional
amounts, again, to the extent of the value of its domestic participation.
As a general matter, the amount assessed on an imported product,
either as normal import duties or as a result of a Section 201, antidumping,
or other trade proceeding, currently depends partly on its country of origin.
In the United States, imports are subject to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
of the United States/42 which consists of a complex set of tariff rates
depending on the type and value of imported goods and the origin of the
goods. Imports may be subject to either the preferential rules of origin or
general, nonpreferential rules of origin. Preferential rules of origin
240. Where a U.S. company conducts assembly, manufacturing, or partial manufacturing of
certain products outside the United States and then imports those products into the United States,
several issues need to be assessed. For example, will those products that are considered imports for
customs purposes also be considered imports for other purposes, such as under a Section 20 I
investigation? See supra note 202. See generally Certain Cameras, USITC Pub. 2315, Inv. No.
TA-201-62 (Sept. 1990). In the Certain Cameras case, in an action by petitioner Keystone Camera
Company asserting that increased imports of certain cameras was a substantial cause of serious injury
to the domestic industry, the lTC found that imports were not a substantial cause of injury. In the
process, the lTC had to determine whether or not to include within the domestic industry Kodak's
production facilities of (I) 110 camera parts that are exported to Mexico for assembly and (2) its 35
mm camera parts exported to Mexico and Brazil. Kodak opposed Keystone's petition, asserting that
increased imports of certain cameras are not seriously injuring domestic industry and also that all of its
U.S. camera production activity should be included with the domestic industry, even if the camera is
partially manufactured and assembled abroad.
The lTC unanimously concluded that domestic production facilities relating to the 35 mm camera
parts should not be included within the domestic industry manufacturing cameras because the foreign
value added abroad is too significant. However, with respect to Kodak's II 0 camera parts that are
exported to Mexico for assembly, the lTC was divided. Two commissioners found that Kodak engages
in sufficient domestic production activity relating to these II 0 cameras and that the cameras should
thus be viewed as domestic articles. By contrast, two other commissioners classified Kodak's imported
II 0 cameras from Mexico as imports and not as domestic products.
The point is that products manufactured or assembled outside the United States by U.S. firms
might not be considered domestic articles by the lTC, in which case, they would be deemed imports
causing serious injury to the domestic industry and subject to additional Section 20 I adjustment relief
such as increased tariffs beyond the bound tariff concessions. Under the participation offset right, if a
company first qualifies as domestic under the substantial and direct participation test, its imports could
be exempt from such additional tariffs imposed by the lTC.
241. For example, the same issue regarding whether to treat certain products as domestic or
imported, either because they contained significant foreign content or because they were manufactured
or assembled outside the United States, also arises in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. In
Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan, USITC Pub. 1410, Inv. No.
731-TA-102, (Aug. 1983), the lTC determined that the pagers at issue, though assembled abroad and
containing foreign parts, should be considered part of domestic production because there was a
significant percentage of domestic value added and because the domestic activities in the United States
involved a high level of technical expertise and capital investment. As domestic articles and not
imports, these pagers would not be subject to antidumping duties. If, however, a product were deemed
an import and subject to the imposition of antidumping duties, the duties would, under my proposal, be
eligible for the participation offset right if the company at issue were deemed a domestic company
under the proposed domestic participation test.
242. Enacted by Subtitle B of Title I of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. See
infra note 277.
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determine whether imports qualify for duty-free treatment under a reciprocal free trade agreement or other preferential arrangements. 243 General or
nonpreferential rules of origin are used to determine a product's country of
origin for purposes other than the granting of tariff preferences, such as the
application of duty rates to imports, antidumping or countervailing duties,
country-of-origin marking,244 or the implementation of country-specific
quotas and voluntary export restraints. 245
Nonpreferential rules of origin are simple if complete production
takes place in one country.246 But in other cases where materials, manufacturing, or assembly do not originate in one country, U.S. law looks to see
where a "substantial transformation" of the materials into the fmished
product occurs, so that, as a result of a manufacturing process, a new and
different article, having a distinctive name, character, or use, emerges.247
The substantial transformation test is used to confer origin for U.S. tariff
purposes on the country where the substantial transformation takes place if
nonpreferential, rather than preferential, rules of origin are involved.248
If an item is deemed the origin of a WTO-member country, it would
be subject to the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") tariff rate negotiated for
that product. An item made in a non-WTO country would be subject to
non-MFN tariffs, under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1929, which is
prohibitively higher than MFN. If it is deemed the origin of a country with
which the importing country has a preferential agreement, it would be sub243. Examples of preferential schemes include NAFTA, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2706 (1994), the Andean Group preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (1994), and other
nonreciprocal systems that accord preferential access to the U.S. market, such as those afforded to
developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1994).
244. Article IX of GA'IT sets forth rules about country of origin marking requirements. One of the
objectives of marking requirements is to inform the ultimate purchaser of the origin of the article he or
she intends to purchase. See United States v. Ury, I 06 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1939).
245. N. David Palmeter, Rules of Origin or Rules ofRestriction? A Commentary on a New Fonn
ofProtectionism. II FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1987).
246. See 19 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(B) (1994). Products that fall in this category are the easy cases and
include the following: live animals born and raised in a country, fish caught in a country's rivers or
within its exclusive economic zone or caught on the high seas from a country's ships, products made
from such animals and fish, plant and plant products grown in one country, mineral goods extracted
from its territory, and manufactured goods where all the parts are produced in one country. See Gantz,
supra note 172, at 378.
247. 19 C.F.R. § 10.14(b) (2001). For a critique of the "substantial transformation" test as applied,
see infra notes 270-310.
248. Free trade agreements have their own preferential rules of origin. NAFTA, for example, has
its own highly restrictive preferential rules of origin designed "to benefit regional producers of fmished
goods by encouraging manufacturers, particularly in Mexico, to go beyond serving as staging grounds
for final production and assembly and into the manufacture of major parts and components anywhere in
the North American region." Gantz, supra note 246, at 376. NAFTA adopts what is called a tariff shift
rule in cases where all parts are not obtained in the region. When a change in tariff category occurs, the
country where that shift takes place is the country of origin. NAFTA, supra note 172, art. 401, 32
I.L.M. at 397. The NAFTA tariff shift rule is not very different from the substantial transformation
approach because "under the Harmonized Tariff System, a change in tariff classification usually
ret1ects a manufacturing process that causes the shift in tariff category." Gantz, supra note 246, at 381.
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ject to that applicable, better-than-MFN preferential rate. However, as
noted, WTO member countries are allowed to suspend MFN tariff concessions and impose higher tariff rates under specified conditions if, for
instance, increased quantities of imports threaten or cause serious injury to
a domestic industry under Section 20 I or if "unfair" trade acts, such as
dumping, cause material injury to a domestic industry.
Under the proposed participation offset right, whatever duties or
charges a company's imports are subject to249 as described above-whether
under the rules of origin, import relief or unfair trade actions-are still
"owed," except that the cumulative amounts may be offset against the
company's domestic participation (if any), provided that the value of
domestic participation exceeds the amounts owed. Assume that a company
is domestic under the domestic participation test. Assume also that the
corporate participation is calculated to be worth $100.250 The company
could be issued a participation certificate with a face value of $100. The
participation certificate would function essentially as a "free pass,"
allowing this domestic company to be exempt from payment of all tariffs
or duties, up to the value of its participation certificate. 251 Assume further
that the corporation also imports a line of component parts from Germany,
and in accordance with the U.S. rules of origin, the company owes $30 in
MFN-rate tariffs. In a separate antidumping proceeding brought against it,
the company is found to have sold its imports into the United States at less
than fair value by $20. The company would therefore owe a total of $50.
However, because it has been deemed a domestic company under the
domestic participation test, giving it the "participation offset" right, it in
fact will have to pay nothing because its participation valued at $100
exceeds the $50 owed. If, however, the company owed an additional $60
because of a separate Section 201 action which caused its imported goods
to be dutiable at the higher non-MFN rates, it would have to pay $10.
249. An anciJlary issue that needs to be addressed is whether or not there has to be a connection
between the first step (the corporation's domestic participation) and the second step of the test (the
corporation's imports against which it claims a "participation offset" right). In other words, must the
imports at issue be related or connected to the company's current area of business participation? The
answer should be no. Given the complex world of modern businesses, many of which produce or
participate in the production of an ever-expanding line of products, and given the desire of companies
to expand into new areas and new product Jines, plus the necessity of making these decisions with ail
necessary speed, the requirement of a connection would be outdated. Thus, it would be in the state's
interest to allow the company to select the particular imports that the company chooses to weigh against
its own "net total" participation.
250. See supra note 232 (discussing the ITC's reliance on existing economic data to determine
"domestic industry").
251. A paralJel might be made between my proposal to give domestic companies a free pass
exempting them from ali tariff payments up to the value of their participation and the practice adopted
by many countries to exempt certain imports or investments (usualJy technology or high-technology
products or sectors) from import taxes. See Zhaodong Jiang, China's Tax Preferences to Foreign
Investment: Policy, Culture and Modern Concepts, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 549,609 (1998).
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Faced with this scenario, a company may lower its expenditures to
make up for the higher cost. For instance, it could cut its labor force in the
United States, substitute higher paid employees with lower paid ones, or
freeze its planned business expansion. If the cost of doing business is
greater than the benefit received, the company may also opt to relocate.
Alternatively, the company could avoid the added charge altogether. It
could increase its domestic participation (which would further the aim
endorsed in this Article of "localizing'' global companies and promoting
the needs of the local without opposing the global) or give up importing
and use local products as substitutes. In other words, the company would
have the option of deciding whether or not to continue importing, perhaps
because the imported products are indispensable, or substitute local products instead. Equally important, it could also act to lower the tariffs owed
on its imports by taking advantage of the no-duty-GSP 252 preferential program and importing products from a GSP-eligible country which would
enter the United States duty free. The GSP statute "represents the United
States' participation in a multinational effort to encourage industrialization
in lesser developed countries through international trade."253 To the extent
that a company conducts its operations in a beneficiary developing country
in ways that would meet certain minimum content requirements254 to qualify for duty-free treatment, it would lower its own operational costs as well
as further the policy of the United States to foster economic development
in those countries.
The domestic participation test and the "participation offsef' right
strike the right balance between the national and the international because
they encourage companies that may otherwise be even more globally
mobile in orientation to increase their participation in a particular country's
domestic economy. The proposed test, in essence, allows legitimate
national interests to be brought back into the equation without succumbing
to economic nationalism. 255
252. Under international and U.S. trade rules, the generalized system of preferences ("GSP")
allows rich countries to admit products from certain qualified poorer countries at a lower-than-MFN
rate, without requiring reciprocity from the poor countries. MicHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RoBERT
HoWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22 (2d ed. 1999); see also supra note 243.
253. Torrington Co. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1563, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
254. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(2)(A)(ii) provides that duty free treatment is applicable:
If the sum of (1) the cost or value of the materials produced in the beneficiary developing
country ... plus (II) the direct costs of processing operations performed in such beneficiary
developing country ... is not less than 35 percent of the appraised value of such article at the
time it is entered [in the customs territory of the United States].
Jd.; see also Torrington Co., 764 F.2d at 1565.
255. Only companies that qualify as domestic under the domestic participation test may exercise
the participation offset right. This means that qualified domestic companies that import products may
not have to pay duties on their imports. Foreign companies that import the same products would. Some
interesting issues may be raised by this proposal. First, is there a national treatment problem under the
GATT, Article III? General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, T.l.A.S. No.
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1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. This agreement was incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 through the creation of the WTO at the Uruguay Round of Negotiations that ended in 1994.
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143. This is unlikely, because the proposal does not raise any issues of
discrimination against imported goods in favor of like domestic goods. There is nothing in the proposal
that suggests using internal taxes, internal charges, laws, regulations, and requirements in a way that
would favor domestic products over imported products. /d. There is no inter-product competition issue
raised by the proposal in any way. In fact, the proposal would treat imports the same as like domestic
products, as required by the national treatment clause in Article III, and it would treat imports from one
country similarly as like imports from another country, so that any advantage granted by any
contracting party to any product of one country would be granted to the like product of other
contracting parties, as required by the most favored nation clause in GATT Article I. !d., art. I. The
differential treatment is not between imported products versus like domestic products, but domestic
versus foreign companies. This differential should be normatively defensible, however, because the
concept of nationality under the proposed test is inclusive and broad-any company, even those
deemed foreign-origin under current tests, is eligible to be a national of a country if it participates
substantially in that country's economy.
Consider the following example. Canadian Car Company ("CCC") makes wire mesh for air bags in
its facilities in Michigan and Toronto. It imports French Steel Rods into both Canada and the United
States (assume that neither NAFTA nor the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is implicated). CCC
Toronto might or might not be a national of Canada under the proposal; it could be if it meets the
domestic participation test (but not if its connection to Canada is merely that it was incorporated there).
Similarly, CCC Michigan might or might not be a national ofthe United States under the proposal. For
this example, assume that CCC Canada is a national of Canada, and CCC Michigan a national of the
United States. CCC Michigan would be able to offset duties for the French Steel Rods if the amount
owed is less than the value of its participation in the United States. So would CCC Toronto be able to
offset duties for French Steel Rods if the amount owed is less than the value of its participation in
Canada, assuming Canada adopts the domestic participation test and offset right proposed here. The
proposal contemplates adoption of the domestic participation test and offset right not just by one
country, the United States, but multilaterally, as a test for determining corporate nationality that is more
in keeping with the developments posed by globalization.
Second, does the participation offset implicate GATT rules on subsidies? Subsidies are for the frrst
time defined in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, available at
http://www.wto.org/english!docs_ellegal_e/final_e.htrn (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement on Subsidies]. The offset might coneeivably be deemed a subsidy under Article l.l(ii}"govemment revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected." The other definitions in
Article 1.1, for example, financial contribution by government or any public body where the
government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (grants, loans, equity infusion, or loan
guarantees) would not be applicable. But even if the offset is deemed a subsidy, it would not be a
prohibited subsidy under Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies because the offset is not contingent
in law or in fact on export performance or on the use of domestic over imported goods. The offset
might be an actionable subsidy if it is deemed a specific form of government assistance to firms or
industries as defined in Article 2, for example, whether the granting authority "explicitly limits access
to a subsidy to certain enterprises," and if it causes injury to the domestic industry of another country,
nullification or impairment of benefits to another country, or serious prejudice to the interests of
another country. /d. at art 2.1 (a), art. 5.
Because the offset right is available only to domestic enterprises, one could argue that it might be
considered a specific subsidy granted only to certain enterprises. However, as noted above, the very
concept of nationality proposed in this Article is designed to broaden the traditional tests of nationality
to be more inclusive. Thus, although the offset right is available only to domestic enterprises, under the
new test, any company, regardless of its place of incorporation, seat of management, or nationality of
shareholders, may be deemed a domestic enterprise. Given this broad and general reconceptualization
of the "nationality" standard, the offset right should in fact not be regarded as a specific subsidy.
Indeed, this Article suggests that, to the extent that many of the concerns expressed in the GATT were
rooted in an old framework of "nationality," that is, "domestic" versus "foreign," they may no longer
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There are a few other observations to be made. Although the test is
formulated to adapt notions of nationality to a world in which corporations
and products are genuinely international, its analysis does continue to work
from a premise that nationality remains consequential-at least as reflected
in certain trade provisions such as the antidumping law and other laws discussed above. I have argued elsewhere against the antidumping laws as a
vestige of protectionism incorrectly premised on the assumption that protecting domestic firms from acts of foreign firms is a prerequisite to protecting the health of the national economy.256 Certainly, in a world of
perfect free trade, antidumping laws and tariffs derived from rules of origin
in general should be increasingly less significant. And certainly, corporate
nationality and product identity among different countries may at some
point be as relevant as they are among the states within the United States,
that is, not much at all. In fact, one possible outcome of the increased ownership of domestically based facilities by affiliates of foreign companies as
well as the increased reliance of domestic companies on foreign production
and foreign outsourcing may be to discourage domestic companies from
initiating antidumping proceedings against foreign producers with whom
they have a preexisting relationship through equity holding or contractual
dealings. 257
We have already seen some instances of such conduct. For example,
when Ceramic Process Systems Corporation of Massachusetts, a U.S.
company that manufactures ceramic parts for computer and advanced
weapons systems, petitioned the Commerce Department for trade protective measures against Kyocera, a Japanese company that dominates the
industry, it was successfully opposed by established players of U.S. industry, such as the American Semiconductor Industry Association, I.B.M., and
the Aerospace Industries Association, either because they were eager to
avert a trade conflict or because they had their own significant relationship
with the Japanese company. 258 From 1989 to 1991, plans by the Bush
administration to impose tariffs on displays for laptop computers had to be
dropped after encountering opposition from Apple Computer and other
U.S. customers that relied on Japanese parts for their products.259 Similarly,
Toyota Motor Corporation used its 119 American suppliers as leverage to
oppose import quotas or higher tariffs on minivans, urging the U.S. supplibe applicable in the same way, should the "nationality'' framework be expanded in the direction 1 am
proposing.
256. Cao, supra note 206, at 219-22.
257. See, e.g., 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 1582
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) ("Because of the many industries that are characterized by significant
foreign ownership, it is quite common in the U.S. for trade associations to be unable to muster
authorization for the filing of antidumping petitions.'').
258. Stephen Engelberg & Martin Tolchin, Foreigners Find New Ally in U.S. Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1993, at AI.
259. Id
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ers to engage in a concerted letter-writing campaign expressing disapproval
of the Clinton Administration's plan to engage in protective measures
against Japanese automakers. 260
Thus, as a practical matter, the modem realities of international interdependence may mean that trade protective laws for "domestic" companies
seeking relief from import competition will become less used and less useful. Nonetheless, assuming that there are still laws within the WTO that
work from a distinction between the "home" and the "foreign," the proposal is designed to encourage individual countries within the existing trading system to accommodate, through their trade laws, both their nationalist
and internationalist ambitions.

B.

Reforming Product Nationality: A New Rule of Origin Framework

Unless the international trade system eliminates rules of origin altogether, they remain relevant under current law 61 and under the proposed
domestic participation test and its offset right. But there are real problems
with rules of origin as currently understood. First, as detailed in Part II, the
distinction between domestic and foreign products is no longer clear, making a rule-of-origin application increasingly indeterminate, arbitrary, and so
complex that it is difficult to meet. 262 The erosion of sovereignty calls into
question:
260. /d.
261. See generally Silveira, supra note 172, at 463 n.3, 473. Rules of origin are needed for
preferential and nonpreferential trade purposes. Rules of origin determine which products from which
countries may benefit from preferential trade agreements. They also further nonpreferential goals such
as the determination of the appropriate tariff rates to be applied for Customs purposes as well as for
general statistical purposes and the identification of the relevant products where antidumping or
countervailing duties have been imposed. See also WTO Rules of Origin art.!(!) to 1(2), supra note
205.
262. The European Community (the "EC") has its own rules of origin, some of which are designed
to grant EC preferences to certain beneficiary countries by requiring certain conditions to be met before
preferences are granted. For example, the Fourth Lome Convention between the EC and the so-called
African, Caribbean, and Pacific States ("ACP") require the following rules of origin before EC
preferences for ACP fishery products can be granted:
canning does not confer origin; to have origin of the ACP States the fish must be "taken from
the sea by their vessels"; to qualifY as "their" (i.e. ACP) vessels, vessels must be registered in
an ACP State (or an EC Member State), sail under the flag of an ACP State (or an EC
Member State), must be owned at least 50 percent by nationals of an ACP State (or of an EC
Member State) or by a company that has its head office in one of these states, of which the
manager or managers, chairman of the board of directors or the supervisory board, and the
majority of the members of such boards are nationals of an ACP State (or of an EC Member
State) and of which, in addition, in the case of partnerships or limited companies, at least half
the capital belongs to ACP States (or to EC Member States) or to public bodies or nationals
of such states, and of which at least 50 percent of the crew, master and officers, are nationals
of ACP States (or of an EC Member State).
Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Rules of Origin: An Introduction, in RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, supra note 124, at 3.
Besides being unnecessarily complicated, those origin rules are also too stringent for beneficiary
countries to meet. Additionally, as has been noted, "[i]f these rules of origin are designed to encourage
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a central notion of GATT: that all merchandise has a single
nationality. Whether dealing with tariff bindings or "unfair trade"
remedies, GATT rules assume (without defmition or explanation)
that all imports into a country have an objectively certain single
national source. But the identification of this national origin is
often difficult and arbitrary. 263
Second, these highly complex rules and the equally complex customs regulations implementing them may also be a form of nontariff barrier impeding duty-free trade.2 64 Third, there are questions about their relevance to
consumers in today's global economy. For example, currently, under
Section 301 of the Tariff Act of 1930, "every article of foreign origin" or
its container must be appropriately marked to inform the ''ultimate
purchaser"265 in the United States of its country of origin.266 Yet, in today' s
global economy, one could question whether or not the premise of the
marking statute is still relevant. Do consumers care about country-of-origin
labels or about brand? Setting aside the special scenario of boycotting
products from countries that tolerate practices that are contrary to one's
own sense of ethics, consumers in most other cases are less likely to care
that Nike shoes are made in one country versus another and more likely to
be concerned with whether or not the Nike shoes they own are authentic or
fake.2 67 Fourth, the current "substantial transformation" rule, designed specifically to aid in the determination of the nationality of a product that is
made of parts from many countries, is unsuited for the current postindustrial, global economy. And fifth, as I develop further below, current rules
also exacerbate the distributional gap that globalization may impose on
poor countries and lesser-skilled workers in rich countries.
the ACP countries into developing a fishing and fish processing industry entirely of their own, it is
difficult to understand why fishing vessels may be owned by EC nationals or by EC companies." /d.
263. Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 231.
264. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.-CANADA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 28-31 (GAO/GGD-93-21, 1992).
265. Who is an "ultimate purchaser" is also a contestable issue. See, e.g., Pabrini, Inc. v. United
States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 128 (1986); National Juice Products Ass'n v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade
48, 57-58 (1986). Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994), requires that all
imported merchandise be marked in a manner "conspicuous" to the "ultimate purchaser." An ultimate
purchaser is defined in Customs regulations as "the last person in the United States who will receive the
article in the form in which it was imported." 19 C.F.R. § 134.1 (WESTLAW through Sept. 4, 2001).
266. Presumably, "the primary purpose of the country-of-origin marking statute is to 'mark the
goods so that at the time of purchase the ultimate purchaser may, by knowing where the goods were
produced, be able to buy or refuse to buy them, if such marking should influence his will.' (Congress,
of course, had in mind a consumer preference for American made goods.)" National Juice Products
Ass 'n, I 0 Ct. Int'l Trade at 58 n.I 4 (citation omitted).
267. See generally RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 397 (1996). On a related note,
assuming that consumers do care about the country of origin of a product, current marking rules may
not truly reflect the origin of a product because a product is comprised of global composites. The
marking statute, in today's global economy, may have the effect of deceiving the very consumers it is
supposed to inform.
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As a result, questions have been raised about whether it is possible to
retain rules of origin.
In addition, with investment flows now growing at a far greater rate
than trade flows, the question arises to what extent it will be
practical to define the origin of goods. Furthermore, it might be
questionable whether it will be of any value to do so, with growing
multicountry production and the largest producers becoming
international corporations through acquisitions as well as the
increasing establishment of transplant factories.2 68
However, to the extent that rules of origin remain a part of the international
economic system,269 I propose that they be reexamined in light of the
global economy.
The "substantial transformation" test that is the core of rules of origin
laws must be reevaluated. 270 The test might once have been suitable for a
nationally based industrial economic system, but is now obsolete and too
narrow for a postnational, postindustrial economic system. There are two
primary problems with its continuing application to the current trading system. First, the test is unable to capture the full and complex range of economic activities undertaken by skilled and lesser-skilled workers in rich
and poor countries. Second, the test consequently has a detrimental impact
on and is unresponsive to the needs of workers at the lower end of the
skills spectrum.
The proposal for revision starts with a reexamination of the current
"substantial transformation" test used in nonpreferential rules-of-origin
determinations. 271 Under the "substantial transformation" test, if imported
merchandise is produced in two or more countries, its country of origin is
the country where the last "substantial transformation" occurred. The
United States, for example, could "domesticate" an imported product, that
is, transform it from an "article of foreign origin" into a domestic-origin
product if it is "used in the manufacture in the United States of a new

268. Kingston, supra note 124, at 24.
269. Ru1es of origin remain part of the national trade laws of many countries and the Agreement
on Ru1es of Origin is a part ofWTO. See supra note 205.
270. Note that the test is retained in the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin Article 9(b):
[RJules of origin should provide for the country to be determined as the origin of a particu1ar
good to be either the country where the good has been wholly obtained or, when more than
one country is concerned in the production of the good, the country where the last substantial
transformation has been carried out.
WTO Rules of Origin, supra note 205. For a discussion of how the application of the substantial
transformation test by U.S. Customs Service and U.S. courts has been "fraught with subjectivity and
unpredictability," see Mark R. Sandstrom, Rules of Origin: Considerations for Investment and Trade
in North America, 16 ARIZ. J.lNT'L & CoMP. L. 217,219 (1999).
271. Although 1 focus for the most part on the "substantial transformation" test used in
nonpreferential rules-of-origin inquiries, my critique is equally applicable to the other tests employed in
the preferential rules-of-origin context.
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article having a new name, character, and use."272 The Supreme Court, in a
later case, noted that "[m]anufacture implies a change, but every change is
not manufacture, and yet every change in an article is the result of
treatment, labor and manipulation. But something more is necessary ....
There must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge,
'having a distinctive name, character or use."'273 The Court's language
suggests an emphasis on "manufacture" and a resulting "transformation" in
the United States of the imported item. Subsequent lower court cases have
been more restrictive, requiring "substantial transformation" plus explicit
"substantial manufacturing."274
Thus, although the question of"[w]bether a substantial transformation
bas occurred bas depended historically upon the nature of the article
emerging from a particular process ... and not on the nature of the process
itself,"275 the underlying process is a crucial factor in a substantial transformation inquiry. Processing or manufacturing is generally considered to
be the activity that produces the requisite substantial transformation. 276 The

272. United States v. Gibson-Thomson Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 267,273 (1940).
273. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1907); see also Silveira,
supra note 172, at 415. The basic issue is "whether the 'change' (manufacturing or processing) is of
such a substantial nature to justify the conclusion that the article is a product of the country where such
change took place." Jd. at 416. A change in "name," for example, from "fresh broccoli" to "frozen
broccoli" might not confer origin, whereas a change in name from "peanuts" to "peanut butter" may. ld.
A change in the "character'' of a product usually involves a change in its chemical composition. Mere
"finishing" processes such as painting, cleaning, or polishing, may not be a sufficient change in the
product's character. A change in "use" may occur "if the process of manufacturing transforms the
product from one that is suitable for one use to one applicable for another use or for multiple uses,"
Silveira, supra note 172, at 415, for example, a change from a producer to a consumer good. Jd at 416;
see also Joseph A. LaNasa III, Rules of Origin and the Uruguay Round's Effectiveness in Harmonizing
and Regulating Them, 90 AM. J.lNT'L L. 625, 629 (1996).
274. Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1026, 1029-30 (1982) (finding that footwear
uppers, essentially complete shoes without soles, were not substantially transformed by the addition of
out soles because the uppers underwent no physical change and because the process of attaching the out
soles was less time consuming and costly than that of producing the uppers). In 1985, the Treasury
Department issued regulations requiring that "[a] textile or textile product will be considered to have
undergone a substantial transformation if it has been transformed by means of substantial
manufacturing or processing operations into a new and different article of commerce." 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.130(b).
275. Palmeter, supra note 245, at 24.
276. See Midwood Indus., Inc. v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 499, 507 (1970) (finding that "the
end result of the manufacturing processes to which the imported articles are subjected .. .is the
transformation of such imported articles into different articles having a new name, character and use");
see also Palmeter, supra note 245, at 25-26 (describing the decision in Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States
by the Court of International Trade, 542 F. Supp. 1026 (1982)), supra note 274, as "providing the
rationale for a new and more restrictive test: 'substantial transformation' plus 'substantial
manufacturing."' Palmeter, supra note 245, at 25; Mark Loftin, Flavell v. Canada: Rethinking
Canada's Domestic Import Tariff Policy, 6 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 385, 403 (1999) ("'Substantial
transformation' occurs when, as a result of manufacturing processes, a new and different article
emerges ... which is different from that originally possessed by the articles or material before being
subject to the manufacturing process.").
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major trading countries, the United States included, use three criteria to
determine whether a substantial transformation has occurred: change in
tariff heading, 277 processing, 278 and value-added operations. 279 All three
criteria are themselves linked in turn to an inquiry into the underlying
manufacturing or processing operations.280 As a policy matter, the
"substantial transformation" test is designed to cause importers to perform
value-added activities in the country where the activities are to be performed, to take an act of "manufacturing" or processing in that country of
In many ways, the emphasis on manufacturing may be viewed as a proxy for some other
concern: that the origin-conferring activity involves a process that requires a certain degree of skill, a
certain amount of time to complete, and is not too simple. See infra notes 286-94 for a discussion of
how the WTO Technical Committee on Rules of Origin attempts to address these concerns. See also
infra note 285.
277. The "substantial transformation" test does not provide guidance for what constitutes
"substantial." Does the transformation of copper into copper wire constitute "substantial
transformation"? Under the tariff shift approach, a transformation may be substantial if it results in a
change in the Harmonized Tariff System classification of the good. A change in the product's origin is
deemed to "take place in the country where, as a result of manufacturing or other processing, the tariff
classification of the article changes from one category to another." Silveira, supra note 172, at 417.
Thus, if copper is classified in one tariff heading category and wire in another, the transformation from
copper to copper wire, resulting in a change in tariff heading (or as it is also referred to, a tariff shift)
might be "substantial." However, if"[m]inor features of processing, such as simple assembly ... bring
about a change in the tariff category, ... a change of origin will not be acknowledged because the tariff
change was not decisive." !d. at 417.
The Change in Tariff Heading rule relies on the Harmonized Tariff System. The Harmonized
System groups goods in twenty-one sections, ninety-six chapters, which are established by industrial
sector, and I ,241 headings, with additional subheadings. The headings are important for tariff
classification and origin purposes. Headings are placed within a chapter in the order based on the
degree of processing, and the heading number increases as a product is further processed. A "product
obtained is considered to have undergone sufficient manufacturing or processing if it falls under a
heading of a systematic goods nomenclature different from the headings applicable to each of the
materials utilized." International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs
Procedures, Annex Concerning Rules of Origin, May 18, 1973, annex D. I, S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-23;
see also Hironori Asaknra, The Harmonized System and Rules of Origin, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1993).
Again, note the emphasis on processing or manufacturing embodied in the tariff-shift approach.
278. Substantial transformation can also be determined by reference to whether a product has
undergone certain processing operations in a country. See N. David Palmeter, Rules of Origin in the
United States, in RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 124, at 29; Michael P.
Maxwell, Formulating Rules of Origin for Imported Merchandise: Transforming the Substantial
Transformation Test, 23 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 669, 670 (1990).
279. Under the value-added criterion, a good is deemed the origin of the most recent exporting
country where a specified percentage of value was added to the good in that country. See Silveira,
supra note I 72, at 4 I 8 ("Under this procedure, one must consider the extent of the manufacturing or
processing undergone in a country based on the value it adds to the goods. When this added value
equals or exceeds the specified percentage, the goods acquire 'origin' in the country where the
manufacturing or processing was carried out."). For example, the U.S. GSP program adheres to a 35%
value-added test, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1994), as does the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative program,
I 9 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1994). In the same way that a tariff shift may occur through a minor process,
see supra note 277, "substantial transformation" is possible by means of a minor process as well. This
explains the requirement in the GSP scheme that there be "both a substantial transformation and a
contribution of at least 35% to the appraised value of the new and different article." Palmeter, supra
note 245, at 24-25.
280. See supra notes 277-79.

2002]

RETHINKING U.S. TRADE LAWS

473

sufficient significance to transform the imported article into a domestic
article, in effect increasing the "local content" of a product. Aside from the
political interests underlying a particular rule of origin, the problem with
the "substantial transformation" rule generally is that while it might have
been appropriate for an industrial, manufacturing-based economy, it is no
longer suitable for today's postindustrial, global economy. If products are
more or less composites that are conceived, designed, engineered, manufactured or assembled in more than one national jurisdiction:
What are the interests our international agreements and domestic
laws ought to protect in these cases? Is the last important step in
completing the product as imported more significant than the first
idea? Is the accident of 'high value' added in one operation more
important to national interests than a less expensive, but, perhaps,
more innovative step?281
Although the internationalist project has aimed to contain or discipline
nationalist impulses by instituting a set of universal rules to minimize the
influence of politics on the international economic system,282 rules of origin
generally remain intensely political and reflect intensely nationalist objectives. They are not just about technical or technocratic considerations, but
rather are a reflection of political and policy preferences. "The inescapable
fact is that rules of origin are tools of discrimination. They have no other
purpose. They are used to implement national and international laws that
confer special benefits on goods of some countries and special penalties on
goods of other countries."283 The remainder of the Article looks at how
these politicized interests should be spread if one is concerned about the
emergence of the new knowledge economy and the distributional impact of
global free trade on national economies. How should rules of origin be
revised both to reflect the postindustrial economy and to alleviate globalization's impact on different groups in the international economic system?
As the preceding discussion reveals, the substantial transformation
rule as currently interpreted is inappropriate because it requires a product
to be transformed by acts that are essentially process or manufacturingbased.284 Thus, it tends to result in the exclusion of some other form of
"transformation," for example, one that involves labor-intensive activities
such as assembly or simple processing operations that would benefit both
developing countries with abundant unskilled labor and high-volume, bluecollar workers in developed countries.285 It also excludes acts that are not
281. Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 232.
282. See supra notes 72-73,75-76,85.
283. Simpson, supra note I 72, at 40.
284. See supra notes 272-80 and infra notes 286-94.
285. For example, although the Report by the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Origin, see
supra note 205, states that assembly could confer origin, it also notes that "assembly cannot be always
origin-conferring." Thus the real question is to identify the threshold of the assembly work, over which
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industrial or manufacturing but do in fact benefit the local economy, for
example, acts that further the development of a service industry, such as
after-sales servicing and technical support. If those acts are not considered
acts that "substantially transform" the product, then the performance of
those acts in certain countries would have no impact on national origin
determination.
Current efforts by a WTO committee to harmonize rules of origin in
the Agreement on Rules of Origin remain unresolved because of disagreements about which types of activities qualifY as origin conferring. Indeed,
many of the contested questions center around whether the activity at issue
or the skill level required to perform certain operations is sufficiently substantial and transforming. Included among the list of disagreements over
which activities may constitute "substantial transformation": in the agricultural products and fish category, the slaughtering of animals; 286 drying
of fish, fish roes, and other fish products; 287 smoking of meat; 288 obtaining
of fish fillets; 289 obtaining of coffee creamer; 290 and producing wine from
assembly can be considered as "substantial transformation." The Technical Committee was established
to harmonize rules of origin among Member States, such as developing uniform understandings of
substantial transformation. WTO Rules of Origin, art. 9(1}, 9(2)(i) & (ii}, supra note 205. In
considering the criteria for substantial transformation, the Committee will rely on the change in tariff
classification method and, where necessary, the value-added methods. !d. at art. 9(2)(c}(ii}.
Although the work was scheduled to be completed by July 1998, to date, it is not yet finished.
Committee on Rules of Origin, Report by the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Origin to the
General Council, Sept. 24, 2001, G/R0/48, No. 01-4526, at para. 3.3, available at
http://docsonline. wto.org.
There is still a lack of consensus among Committee members over the type of assembly and
processing operations that does or does not qualify as origin conferring. See infra notes 286-94 for a
discussion of some areas of disagreement among Committee members.
286. Those who favor deeming slaughtering to be a last substantial transformation argue that
products obtained are completely different from the initial products in all respects: the
products arising out of slaughtering are for human or animal consumption, whereas live
animals cannot be used for that purpose.... Slaughtering is not restricted solely to the killing
of the animal; a series of processes are necessary in order to obtain the meat or offal.
Committee on Rules of Origin, Integrated Negotiating Text for the Harmonization Work Programme,
Agricultural Products and Fish, Sept. 25,2001, G/R0/45/Add.8/Rev.l, No. 01-4529, at 4, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org. Opponents argue that slaughter does not alter the quality of the meat and thus
cannot constitute a last substantial transformation.
287. Those who favor counting drying offish and fish products as substantial transformation argue
that the process of drying is time-consuming and involves a change in character of the product which is
significantly valued over the raw material. In this case, drying should not be regarded as merely "a
process for the preservation of goods during transportation and/or storage," which would not qualify as
substantial transformation. !d. at 5-6.
288. Proponents argue that smoking substantially transforms the characteristics of the meat;
opponents argue that smoking is a simple process. !d. at 8.
289. Proponents, Norway for example, argue that the production process from gutted fish to fish
fillets is a comprehensive process, involving production of fillet with skin on and pin bone, splitting the
fish into fillets, removal of the backbone, and skinning. Some of the processes require special
machinery. Opponents argue that the process is simple and does not involve transformation of the fisb.
!d. at 13-14.
290. The transformation of skimmed milk powder, through the addition of milk fat, water
emulsifiers and stabilizers, sterilization, and finally cooling, to coffee creamer should qualify for
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grapes. 291 In the textiles sector, disputes have centered on the following: carding or combing of fibers in preparation for spinning;292 down
proofing fabrics; 293 or bleaching of fabrics, 294 among many others.
As the examples above show, the processes that are currently disputed
are those that are relatively simple and involve lower-skilled labor. Yet,
those are precisely the areas in which poor countries are more likely to
have a comparative advantage because of their large pool of cheap and
relatively lower-skilled labor. Although rich countries grant GSP or other
preferential status to qualified poor countries, the "substantial transformation" origin rules with its focus on a manufacturing-based transformation
often have the effect of nullifying any benefits theoretically available under
GSP. As one commentator has noted:
[T]he labor content of the production process is hardly ever
sufficient to guarantee origin. The origin rules incorporated nearly
always close the easiest route, that of simple assembly, as a way for
management and labour of underdeveloped countries to learn the
skills that will enable them to move first into component
production and ultimately total manufacturing. 295
If rich countries were to allow assembly and other labor-intensive activities
conducted in a developing country to count in the "substantial
transformation" determination, the resulting product could be deemed the
product of the developing country where the "substantial transformation"
occurred, which would make the product eligible for better-than-:MFN
treatment, attract global economic activities to those countries, and encourage the development of assembly facilities in poor countries.
substantial transformation. Opponents argue that the origin of coffee creamer should remain in the
country where the liquid milk was obtained in its natural state. !d. at 19.
291. Grapes undergo a substantial transformation when made into wine. Opponents argue that the
essential character of wine is determined by the grapes and the country of origin of the wine is where
the grapes were produced. !d. at 69.
292. See Committee on Rules of Origin, Integrated Negotiating Text for the Harmonization Work
Programme-Textile Products and Textile Related, Sept. 25, 2001, G/R0/45/Add.l/Rev.l, No. 014530, available at http://docsonline.wto.org. Those who contend that this activity constitutes a
transformation argue that the process is a substantial one and that these operations are necessary before
natural fibers are suitable for spinning. Wool or animal hair must be carded and combed in preparation
for spinning, which involves disentangling the fibers, removing extraneous matters, laying the fibers
into wide webs, and condensing them into slivers, which must be combed before they are converted
into rovings. Other members argue that the process does not qualifY as substantial transformation
because it is simple.
293. Some committee members argue that fabric treated by down-proof finishing (pillows and
sleeping bags, for example) to ensure that feathers are retained inside the cover should be deemed
substantially transformed by the physical and chemical process involved. Others contend that the
process does not qualify as substantial transformation because it is only a finishing process. !d.
294. Prior to bleaching, a fabric is subjected to a number of processes, such as shearing or
cropping, desizing and scouring. Bleaching, which is a controlled chemical reaction, substantially
transforms dirty fabric into clean, absorbent white fabric free of impurities. Opponents argue there is
not sufficient transformation involved. !d.
295. Kingston, supra note 124, at 14.
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The same reasoning applies to areas in rich countries such as the
United States with displaced, lower-skilled workers in technologically
superseded sectors. While it is reasonable that for richer countries, the development of a higher-skilled, technology-oriented sector is of paramount
importance, this shift towards higher-skilled work has also left workers,
many of whom are lower-skilled minority and immigrant workers in the
high-volume sectors, economically vulnerable. 296 What rules should trade
law adopt to ease the transition period for workers in countries undergoing
the high-volume to high-value shift, one further exacerbated by the movement to globalize production? One way to address this distributional conflict is to encourage the establishment of activities, whether it be simple
assembly or more sophisticated assembly, that employ otherwise displaced
U.S. workers. Again, this may be achieved by altering the "substantial
transformation" rule from one that currently excludes the assembly stages
of production to one that includes assembly in the determination of origin
rules. 297
An alternative and more expansive framework for rules of origin
determination could work this way. An imported item may be
"domesticated" into a domestic-origin item if its parts, though imported,
are assembled in the country at issue, for example, the United States.298 In
order to ensure that domestication involves more than mere perfunctory
assembly, an additional requirement could be imposed, for example, mandating that the U.S. assembly facilities meet certain standards regarding
investment of capital in land, buildings, and employment. Other requirements may be imposed to address any concern that allowing assembly to
count in origin determination would only attract maquiladora-type operations into the United States. For example, a requirement that assembly in
the United States may be included but must be capped so that it could account for only a certain (limited) percentage of the U.S. value of an item.
Similarly, including assembly in the overall origins determination might
also be phased out over a period of years, during which high-volume or
lesser-skilled workers may be helped by adjustment programs such as
training and job search assistance.
296. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, KEEPING JOBS IN fASHION: ALTERNATIVES TO THE EUTHANASIA
OF THE U.S. APPAREL INDUSTRY 1-6 (1989) (describing the impact of the decline of the U.S. apparel
industry on rural women, blacks, Hispanics, and immigrant workers).
297. This suggestion still may not work effectively in First World countries like the United States
because what draws global companies to perform certain economic activities in the United States is not
likely to be lower-skilled, lower-wage U.S. workers. Others have favored tax-financed remedies and
direct wealth transfers to these workers. See Chen, supra note 16, at 212.
298. In fact, Customs rulings already allow certain assembly operations in the United States to
confer U.S. origin: assembly of mechanical equipment such as laptop computers, printed circuit
boards, video display terminals for televisions, and televisions. Nomio Komuro, International
Harmonisation of Rules of Origin, in THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (Philip
Ruttley et al. eds., 1998).
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Changing the existing "substantial transformation" rule to include
postindustrial activities would also allow for more logical treatment of the
postindustrial economy itself. Besides the fact that the wrong political
choices currently underlie the "substantial transformation" test, the test is
also better suited for the older industrial economy in so far as its focus is
on the manufacturing act in the final production process. If the production
process is divided into four different stages-research and development,
intermediate production, fmal production, and marketing and distribution--origin rules founded on a "substantial transformation" criteria "have
their impact on the third stage (final production) .... The effect of the
widespread use of substantial transformation criteria is that in products
where origin is important, a bias is created towards the localization of the
third stage in the production process."299 This eliminates other possibilities
from serious consideration.
In certain products it might be considered that one key component
is so vital to the essential character of the final product that it
should provide the key to determining origin. In such products the
final production stage, no matter how complex, may be considered
little more than simple assembly and thus not regarded as sufficient
to determine origin.300
For example, it might be that for some products such as those that are
chemically based, the fourth stage, marketing and distribution, or the first
stage, research and development, constitutes a substantial proportion of the
value or cost of the final product. Yet, those stages are usually not included
in origin determination.301
The considerations set forth above to help guide a "substantial transformation" analysis are also applicable in preferential rules-of-origin contexts. Referring to the rules of origin in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example,
commentators have remarked that "reading even one chapter of each
agreement is enough to make one forget what the agreement was about, as
one searches for clues to rules within rules, exceptions to exceptions, and
299. Kingston, supra note 124, at 16.
300. ld.
301. Kingston observed:
With the rapid increase in crossborder investment flows, governments are now recognizing
that the important elements in the manufacturing process in the case of high technology
consumer goods seldom lie in the final production (substantial transformation) stage but
rather in the R&D stage and in the capital equipment that is employed in the production stage.
It could be argned-althougb it would add confusion to the debate-that the country of origin
of a product should be where the capital equipment for producing the product is made. There
is a clear difference between increasing a country's capital stock by installing imported
modern equipment and having the technological ability to produce the equipment
domestically.... Despite its importance, traditional concepts of origin-such as substantial
transformation-do not therefore reflect the origin of the technology.
Id. at 17.
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bewildering cross-references."302 Under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, for example, a good containing third-country components may
be transformed into a Canadian or U.S. product if each of the non originating components is transformed in the territory of one or more of the parties
through processing and assembly and if this transformation also results in a
change in tariff classification. 303 But where the change in tariff classification occurs from one heading to another heading within a chapter (rather
than from one chapter to another), 304 the good is not necessarily entitled to
duty-free treatment. In most cases, such a product must meet an additional
test-that 50% of the value of the product when exported from one party to
the other must consist oflocal North American content. 305 With this understanding, are Honda Civics produced in the United States, whose engines
are made from U.S.-origin components and imported parts from Japan,
shipped to Canada for incorporation into cars, and then shipped to the
United States, North American in origin and therefore eligible for duty-free
treatment by U.S. Customs?
U.S. Customs said no, partly because it refused to allow certain costs
incurred in North America to count towards the determination of the North
America value of the product. According to Customs, the statutory allowance of "costs directly incurred in the production of goods" applied only to
direct costs, not to costs such as payments for on-site technical assistance,
royalties, and production controls. 306 Under the expanded framework I am
proposing here, activities that are not based on manufacturing but that confer value, such as service and technical assistance and support, marketing
and distribution, should be included in the determination of origin. A different result might have been produced in the high-profile U.S.-Canada
automobile dispute above were we operating under such a framework.
Similar issues about which activities would count or not count
towards origin determination have also arisen in the NAFTA context. In
determining the North American content of a product, trade administrators
must decide how nonoriginating materials should be valued in the calculation of the local content of a component. What costs could be included?
Although NAFTA permits processing costs to be included, partly to allow
local manufacturing to count towards local content determination, NAFTA
rules also specify as nonallowable costs those costs associated with sales

302. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 389.
303. See NAFTA, supra note 172, art. 301(2), 32 I.L.M. at 299-300; Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra
note 5, at 377.
304. The Harmonized Schedule classifies goods into twenty-one sections and ninety-six chapters,
with each chapter divided into headings with four-digit numerical codes, which are further subdivided
into subheadings, with two additional digits. See supra note 277.
305. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 378.
306. Id. at 381.
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promotion, marketing, and after-sales service307-precisely the costs associated with activities that contribute towards a service industry.
1 propose that a different framework be adopted to consider a wider
range of activities for inclusion in "domestication" determinations, particularly those that are currently left out of the manufacturing or industrial orientation that underlies the current focus. 308 If they are not eliminated
altogether, rules of origin, already themselves a reflection of political
choices, should at least aim to address, first, the political pressure points
that currently pose the most serious threat to the free trade system and, second, the emergence of nonindustrial activities that will define the new trading economy.
The "domestic participation" test, in conjunction with the new rulesof-origin approach, would work as follows: Under the first step, the company has to establish that it is economically domestic. Assuming the company qualifies as domestic, the "participation offset" right delineated in the
second step of the test would be triggered, allowing the company to balance the net total of its participation against any tariffs owed on any products it imports. The alternative sketch proposed to reform the rules of
origin would then be used to guide the determination of whether the product at issue is a domestic or imported item subject to which tariff or charge.
If it is an import and produced in two or more countries, the "substantial
307. /d. at 388.
308. To ensure that minimal acts do not qualify for origin determination, the proposed test would
exclude acts normally undertaken by a pure "middleman," such as receivership, storage, wholesale,
delivery of goods, or handling directly associated with these activities. An analogy may be made with
cases in the products-liability area that deal with the concept of a middleman. Under these cases, a
middleman (who merely deals in goods and does nothing to alter the goods or the use of the goods)
cannot be held liable in implied strict liability for selling a defective product in a sealed container. See,
e.g., Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972). A "sealed container'' means a "box,
container, package, wrapping, encasement or housing of any nature that covers a product so that it
would be unreasonable to expect a seller to detect or discover the existence of a dangerous or defective
condition in the product." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.18, § 7001(a)(3) (2001); Parker v. Ford Motor Co., 331
So. 2d 923 (Miss. 1976).
However, if a party undertakes to repair or rebuild a product, the party may be treated as if it were
the product's manufacturer. Anderson v. Olmsted Uti!. Equip., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1991).
Under the doctrine, a mere retailer of a product is deemed to be a middleman, not a manufacturer, even
if the retailer possesses or holds himself out as possessing special knowledge with regard to the
product. Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1991). Furthermore, even the right to
exercise supervision over the manufacturing process does not turn a middleman into a manufacturer.
See, e.g., CAL. C1v. CoDE § 3434 (West 1997).
For the purposes of international trade, the definition provided by the "sealed-container'' doctrine
cases is helpful because the doctrine offers a test designating one as a ''manufacturer'' if one produces
goods supplied in a box, container, package, wrapping, encasement, or housing of any nature that
covers a product, or alters, repairs, or improves the product in any way. However, mere retail sale or
supervision over production does not convert one from "middleman" to "manufacturer." In the trade
context, mere importing and then retail (and activities associated with mere retail, such as minimal
employment of warehouse and storage facilities, handling, delivery, development of customer lists of
retailers, and local middlemen) would not qualify as activities that may be included in the calculation of
the local content of a product.
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transformation" test (expanded as proposed) would be triggered. The company importing the product would owe tariffs under the applicable origin
rules, unless the company has domesticated the product, thus transforming
the product into one of domestic-origin, not an import; or the company's
domestic participation is greater than what it would otherwise owe in tariffs and other protective measures.
One may object that the proposal is costly for companies to administer. Rules of origin compliance requirements, whether currently applied or
as proposed in this Article, are indeed complex and costly to administer,
which is one additional reason, among the other reasons discussed/ 09 why
a true free trading regime would no longer retain them. This is especially
true if an importer seeks the duty-free rate for products satisfying the particularly strict NAFTA rules of origin (or other strict preferential rules of
origin) because the regulatory cost and inconvenience of meeting the
requirements for customs verification purposes may outweigh the benefit.310 The transaction costs, however, could be balanced out by the incentives created by the proposal for participation offset, as described above.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that the United States and other countries in the world
trading system should rethink two fundamental issues: "nationality" and
"national origin." Trade laws are replete with provisions that make reference to domestic companies and domestic products. But dynamic changes
caused by the international movement of capital and the globalization of
production pose new challenges for the trading system. In a world in which
U.S.-origin companies have significant operations offshore and foreignorigin companies have substantial operational presences in the United
States, which standards should the United States or any other country use
to determine what constitutes a domestic company? And if products are
essentially global composites, with research and development, manufacturing, assembly and processing, and marketing each conducted in a different
country, what is their country of origin? Under those circumstances, what
is a domestic product?
The United States and other countries have responded to these developments in a disappointingly piecemeal manner, without a thorough
examination of the changes that have blurred the distinction between the
"national" and the "foreign" and without a reevaluation of the impact these
changes have on international trade law and policy. Thus, depending on the
political interests at issue at the time, a Honda is a North American product
309. See supra notes 262-65, 267-68.
310. See Gantz, supra note 172, at 395-97; Silveira, supra note 172, at 418, 449 ("[C]ompliance
with the rules in many cases forces eompanies to set up expensive internal procedures that add
significantly to the cost of sales. Many would rather pay the tariff.").
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sometimes and a Japanese product another time. And more often than not,
the nationality of a corporation continues to be determined in a reflexive
manner, that is, by reference to antiquated tests more appropriate for a
national, not postnational economic system. Yet, why should the place of
incorporation continue to be a determinative factor in nationality determinations when companies are global in their orientation and conduct? And
why should the nationality of controlling persons matter when their fiduciary duty obligates them to make corporate decisions to maximize shareholder interest, not to further the general national interest?
Although "nationality" and "origin" are inextricably woven into trade
laws and policy and thus are highly relevant to the globalization debate,
neither nationalists nor internationalists have engaged in an examination of
these issues. Instead, both accept the assumptions behind the terms
"domestic" company, "domestic" products or "foreign" products, however
inaccurate or misleading such terms have become. The nationalist project
aims to derail international economic liberalization and reassert the rightful
place of the national in the world trading system through the reinforcement
of national borders and national economies against foreign companies and
foreign products. The state is defended as the site for political governance,
national cultures, and national sovereignty. The moorings of national
community and the politics of identity are preferred over the abstractions
of economic internationalism and universalism.
By contrast, the internationalist project, perhaps because it is suspicious of nationalist passions and ambitions, is favorably inclined towards
international liberalization, convergence, and interdependence. Within this
economically integrated system, conflicts among nations are to be administered through a regime of rational and universal rules whereby the interests
of the national and the international generally, and of domestic industry
and foreign industry, domestic products and foreign products more particularly, are to be balanced and managed. Domestic industry should not be
protected against imports as a general matter, except in cases of undue
import surges or in cases of dumping or other unfair acts. Like the nationalist, however, the internationalist fails to grasp fully the extent to which distinctions between the national and the foreign have blurred.
Thus, despite their claims of difference, both, curiously enough, share
a few common assumptions. First, both continue to speak the same language and accept the same assumptions behind the current distinctions
between "foreign" and "domestic" in trade laws, except that the nationalist
seeks to protect that which is domestic-domestic companies and domestic
products-from that which is foreign, and the internationalist seeks to
accommodate and reconcile one with the other. And second, both continue
to have their own blind spots: the nationalist to the global reality, and the
internationalist to the populist appeal of matters grounded in the traditional
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framework of nationality. Human beings continue to respond to the pull of
the community and the plight of those within their home territory. A
French person might be a cosmopolitan citizen of the world, a European in
the European Union, but she will also remain French. The internationalist
somehow seems oblivious to those realities.
The proposal I advocate in this Article is one that aims to reconcile
the appeal of loyalty to the national and the particular on the one hand with
the current global logic of economic integration and liberalization on the
other. I propose that these two interests be accommodated within the trading system itself, by re-evaluating the two basic premises of trade laws and
adopting a new understanding of these premises. We thus return to the two
original and pivotal questions posed at the outset: What is a domestic
company and what is a domestic product? The test for corporate nationality, I argue, should be grounded in the company's substantial socioeconomic participation in a state's economy. Multinational or transnational
companies maximizing their economic objectives in the global economy
may be "anchored" in a state, not by the artifice of where they are incorporated or where management and shareholder control lies, but by their
degree of commitment to that state's territorial boundaries. While the new
test responds to the economic interests of the national, it does so without
the threat of reinforcing national fortresses to keep out the international.
Indeed, it does the opposite, by using the reality of corporate transnationalism to embrace the international within the national fold (through the
added benefits and incentives of a participation offset right). In other
words, corporate nationality, as revised, serves as the conduit through
which to reassert the nationalist commitment to the relevance of place and
at the same time reaffirm international aspirations and the global orientation of economic activities. Equally significant, this proposed test, I argue,
is simply a more accurate reflection of developments that have
occurred as a matter of fact.
One may worry, as an internationalist, however, that the proposed
domestic participation test would cause multinational companies to vie for
"nationality" status in rich countries with rich markets and iguore poor
countries with poor markets. Given the trend towards regionalism and following in the examples of the European Union and NAFTA, developing
countries have been exploring the possibility of forming their own regional
free trade agreements. Initiatives towards such arrangements "can promote
further liberalization and may assist least-developed, developing and
transition economies in integrating into the international trading system."311
311. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/Min(96)/DEC, No. 96-5316 (Dec. 9-13, 1996), at
http:l/www.docsonline.wto.org. There has been an increase in trade blocs, such as the Southern Cone
Common Market ("MERCOSUR'') and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area
("AFTA"). An examination of regional trade agreements is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
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The establishment of a robust regional economy would also provide the
incentives for companies to become domestic participants of member
countries.
In stark contrast to internationalists, nationalists, particularly from the
developed world, have bemoaned the shifting of corporate capital from the
national borders of rich countries into those of the poorer countries.
Globalization has produced both an international and national distributional
fault line, among countries and groups within countries. Again, revising a
basic premise of trade laws, product origin, would address this political
problem. Rules of origin, far from being neutral or innocuous, are in fact
quite political. How they are interpreted has a direct and profound impact
on where factories will be located and where economic activities will be
centered. As the Article shows, products that are globally sourced are in
fact the products of no one country in particular. Country-of-origin designations thus merely perpetuate this chimera of nationality in a world of
internationality. Currently, the various tests used to elevate certain activities as endowing origin and to exclude other activities as not being relevant
for origin determination are themselves a reflection of political choices.
These tests merely "freeze" the broad global picture to provide a "snapshot" that captures but a brief "national" moment, whereby the qualifying
activities undertaken within that national territory are then deemed originconferring activities.
An internationalist corrective to this state of confusion would favor
the elimination of the concept of product origin altogether, on the grounds
that it is but a virtual figment of the national imagination. This remedy, I
admit, is appealing if one allows oneself to indulge fully in one's internationalist fantasies. My proposal, however, works from the existing framework of the WTO where rules of origin are very much a political and
economic fact. In that respect, the proposal seeks to alter the current political choices behind rules of origin by expanding the range of qualifying
activities in order to accomplish two objectives: first, to reflect the emergence of the postindustrial economy and second, to address the nationalist
fault lines that need to be dealt with to ensure the continued political survival of the current trading system.
The internationalist may want to tame nationalism, subject it to international discipline, and even exclude it as being incompatible with economic liberalization. And the nationalist, in turn, may want to exalt
nationalist identity and protect national companies and products against the
unboundedness of international capital movements. Yet, the world trading
system to which the majority of countries belong would be best served if
discussion of trade regionalism within the landscape of international trade, see, for example, Sungjoon
Cho, Brea!.ing the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade
Regionalism, 42 HARv.INT'L L.J. 419 (2001).
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internationalism could enlist nationalism as its ally and vice versa. In this
Article, I select two areas that form a basic foundation of trade laws, and
illustrate how revising them along the lines articulated could achieve this
objective.

